Anthropology and development planning, with special reference to a large-scale agricultural project in Sudan by Adam, Abdel Raouf Mohamed
  
ANTHROPOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING, 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO A LARGE-SCALE 
AGRICULTURAL PROJECT IN SUDAN 
 
Abdel Raouf Mohamed Adam 
 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of MPhil 
at the 
University of St Andrews 
 
 
  
1989 
Full metadata for this item is available in                                                                           
St Andrews Research Repository 
at: 
http://research-repository.st-andrews.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10023/15257       
     
           
 
This item is protected by original copyright 
 
ANTHROPOLOGY AND DEVELOPMENT PLANNING,
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO A
LARGE-SCALE AGRICULTURAL PROJECT
IN SUDAN
By
Abdel Raouf Mohamed Adam
Thesis submitted for the degree of 
M.Phil to the 
University of St Andrews
April 1989
ProQuest Number: 10166698
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The qua lity  of this reproduction  is d e p e n d e n t upon the qua lity  of the copy subm itted.
In the unlikely e ve n t that the au tho r did not send a co m p le te  m anuscrip t 
and there are missing pages, these will be no ted . Also, if m ateria l had to be rem oved,
a no te  will ind ica te  the de le tion .
uest
ProQuest 10166698
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). C opyrigh t of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected aga inst unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C o de
M icroform  Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 4 81 06 - 1346

DEDICATION
To my mother, Aaisha and my brother, Noah
DECLARATION
In submitting this thesis to the University of St Andrews I 
wish access to it to be subject to the following 
conditions: for a period of five years from the date of
submission the thesis shall be made available for public 
use only with consent of the head of the Department of 
Social Anthropology.
I understand; however, that the title and abstract of the 
thesis will be published during this period of restricted 
access; and that after the expiry of this period the thesis 
will be made available for public use in accordance with 
the regulations of the University Library for the time 
being in force, subject to any copyright in the work not 
being affected thereby, and a copy of the work may be made 
and supplied to any bona fide library or research worker.
Signature:
Date : ^  f ^ 9
DECLARATION
I, Abdel Raouf Mohamed' Adam, hereby certify that this 
thesis which is approximately 60,000 words in length has 
been written by me, that it is the record of work carried 
out by me in the University of St Andrews and that it has 
not been submitted in any previous publication for a higher 
degree. I was admitted as a research student under 
ordinance No.12 on the 15th of October 1987 as a candidate 
for the degree of M.Phil in Social Anthropology (Rural 
Development) on the same date.
Date : I S ^  ^
Signature of Candidate:
CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that the candidate has fulfilled the 
conditions of the Resolution and Regulations appropriate to 
the degree of M.Phil of the University of St Andrews and 
that he is qualified to submit this thesis in application 
for that degree.
Date: ^9^'?
Signature of Supervisor:
Acknowledgement 
The work of this thesis was carried out at St Andrews 
University from mid-October 1987. I am very grateful for 
the University of Gezira, Sudan for the funding of this 
work. Thanks are due to my Supervisor, Dr David Riches, 
for his insightful suggestions and for his instructive 
criticism, corrections and timely help. I am also thankful 
to Professor Ladislav Holy for his persistent help and 
encouragement. I also wish to thank Dr Richard Fardon for 
his encouragement.
Special thanks are due to Dr Abdullahi Osman el-Tom of the 
University of Gezira for his inspiration and the training I 
received from him during my stay at the University of 
Gezira. Also, I would like to extend my thanks to Ustaz 
el-Tigani Mustafa Mohamed Salih and to his wife, Batoul, 
for their Sudanese-style hospitality and generosity during 
my stay at Fife Park.
I am very grateful to Mrs Sue Canfield for her patience in 
typing this thesis. Particular gratitude is due to my 
brother Dr el-Tahir Adam Mohamed el-Faki and his wife. 
Dr Nadia Yousif for the persistent support through the 
difficult times of carrying out this research. Finally, I 
very much appreciate the help given by the staff of the 
University Library, especially the help given by 
Frank Story.
Abstract
This thesis is concerned with rural development in Nuba 
peasant communities of the Southern Kordofan region, Sudan. 
Peasants have always been considered by planners as scape­
goats for the failure of state-designed rural development 
schemes in Third World societies. This plainly does not 
grasp the cause of such failure. The thesis argues against 
both the practice and theoretical foundations on which 
rural development planning is based. The author maintains 
that empirical investigation at the grassroots level is 
badly needed to fully grasp and explain the total situation 
of the indigenous communities and their forms of
organisation.
The author singles out one Nuba peasant society located at 
Habila, where rural development is currently underway; he 
examines the roots of the failure of the state-initiated 
Habila scheme to arouse the popular participation of the 
poor Nuba peasants. The Nuba are primarily subsistence
farmers cultivating dura, cotton, sesame, tobacco and
vegetables. The majority have professed Islam, though a 
few are still Pagans and Christians. The thesis aims to 
bring to the foreground some of the socio-economic and 
cultural factors which have direct bearing on rural 
development. Underpinning the theoretical analysis are 
cultural and strategic perspectives relating to social 
action. Failure of economists to provide a sufficient
explanation for the poor response of the Nuba peasants to
the cooperative schemes of Habila has stimulated such 
perspectives which, the author contends, are badly needed 
for examining development situations at the level of the 
local community. The author concludes that the dissolution 
of the traditional forms of cooperation as a result of the 
commercialisation of the economy is mainly responsible for 
the failure of the Habila cooperative schemes to attract 
local peasants. But, ironically the scheme itself seems to 
perpetuate the same problems which it aims to mitigate, 
included here are the trends of labour migration and the 
ideology of consumerism.
CONTENTS
Page No
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER 1 - Theories of Development andUnder-development: An Overview .......... 15
Critique of Modernisation Theories .. . . .. 16Critique of Dependency Theories .. .. .. 20
CHAPTER 2 - Rural Development Practice . . . . 37
The Improvement versus The Transformation ApproachesThe Improvement Approach ....................  42The Transformation Approach ...............  47Some Categories of Programmes  . . 51The Integrated Rural Development Programme .. 51The Basic Needs Programme .. .. . . .. 54The Accelerated Development Programmein Sub-Saharan Africa .. .. .. .. 56The Critique of Rural Development Programmes ., 59Dogma In Development Planning  . . 62Rural Fundamentalism   . . 62Agricultural Fundamentalism ...............  63Planning Fundamentalism ....................  64
CHAPTER 3 - The Setting: Social and EconomicOrganisation In The Nuba Mountains 66
Land Tenure and Agricultural Operations .. .. 68Community Solidarity and Allegiances .. .. 70Policies toward the Nuba ..   .. 74Development in the Region   84
CHAPTER 4 - The Habila Scheme...............  90
Wage Employment .. ..... . ..............  98Effects on Traditional Agricultureand the Nuba Peasantry   . . 105Economic Explanations for Low Investment:toward the Importance of Social Variables 106
CHAPTER 5 - Socio-Cultural Factors in theNuba Mountains Region . . .. Ill
Kinship ...................................  IllLabour Migration .........................  117Conspicuous Consumption and the Ideology of Consumerism; their effect onInvestment in peasant farming ..........  130
CHAPTER 6 - Nafeir As a Form ofTraditional Cooperation .. .. 140
Communal Labour in the Southern Kordofan Region 147The Dissolution of Nafeir .. .. .. .. 161
CHAPTER 7 - The Importance of Building on Local Institutions as a Pre-requisite for Rural Development .. .. 170
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..............................  187
LIST OF TABLES
Pages
Table 1Cotton Statistics NMAPC (Nuba Mountains Agricultural ProductionCorporation) 89
Table 2Habila Mechanized Schemes in Operation(1975/76) 97
Table 3Labour Input and wage rates 99
Table 4Seasonal Labour in the Private andSupervised Sectors 102
Table 5Average Yield in Habila Scheme(1970-76) (metric tons) 104
Table 6Items for producing a Feddan of Durain Both Traditional and Mechanised Sectors : Habila (1975/76) 108
Table 7Population of South Kordofan Province and Southern Jebels District (percentage) as shown in the Sudan National Census of 1973 122
Table 8Household Income from Bildat Cultivation and Seasonal Employment in the Habila Schemes (1975/76) 123
Table 9Functional Classification of Farm ownersby Major Job. 184
INTRODUCTION
For most post-independence sub-Saharan African countries, 
including Sudan, the results of development planning are 
disappointing. Development projects, though they seem 
technically and economically appropriate to planners, in 
practice often do not work very well, from both economic 
and social standpoints. Indeed, significant recent strides 
in development thinking have culminated in a common theor­
etical acceptance that imposed models of social change in 
themselves turn to become fetters on development. More 
often, development schemes tend to accentuate the pre­
existing trends of unequal income distribution by making 
the rich richer and the poor poorer. One suggested way of 
reversing the negative impact of schemes for improving 
people's quality of life is to approach local problems with 
a sound analytical understanding of the inter-relationship 
between the technical-economic and social and cultural 
variables in traditional communities (Hagen, 1962). 
Accordingly, one view holds that to have a significant 
impact toward achieving development objectives, planning 
should be capable of building on indigenous models and 
forms of organisation (Abdel Ghaffar, 1977b.). Never­
theless, problems continue to persist, among them the 
institutionalisation of the very adverse trends which 
development is intended to mitigate.
One of the reasons for this bleak outlook with respect to 
planned social change is the divergence of perspectives
concerning the appropriate solution to problems arising in 
respect of project implementation (Wenger, 1982). But the 
dominant idea in development literature, which holds that 
success in development schemes rests in stressing local 
forms of labour organisation, thus stimulating people to 
effectively participate in the process of development, is 
increasingly losing ground (Worsley, 1971). Ethnographic 
research has empirically established that indigenous forms 
of labour organisation and traditional systems of co­
operation are not always conducive to modern cooperative 
development.
This thesis examines rural development in the peasant world 
from the perspective of socio-economic anthropology. It 
draws on one of the large-scale agricultural schemes in 
Sudan, the Habila scheme in the Nuba Hills area, and spec­
ifically examines its impact in respect of arousing partic­
ipatory enthusiasm among local people. The thesis, how­
ever, does not purport to address the issue of rural 
development per se, as to how planners can most effectively 
bring this about. Rather, I set myself the task of iso­
lating some of the social and cultural factors inhering in 
the process of development and of examining their relevance 
to the development process. Prominent among these factors 
are the bases of traditional cooperation and the indigenous 
practices in agriculture.
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It is my contention that an anthropological understanding, 
or context, is absolutely necessary for appreciating the 
poor response of the ordinary peasant to the Habila scheme.
As such the thesis is a necessary adjunct to the comments 
about the scheme which have already been offered by econom­
ists and planners. In this thesis, for the first time, the 
considerable anthropological knowledge relating to the 
culture of the Nuba Hills area is brought to the foreground 
in explaining why the scheme failed. In general, there has 
been very little anthropological work, per se, on this very 
major example of economic development in the Sudan.
More importantly the thesis is offered as a direct response 
to the call by Affan (1978:45) that there should be further 
investigation of the disillusionment on the part of Nuba 
peasants with cooperative schemes - a finding of his econ­
omic research for which he fails to find an explanation.
The theoretical model adopted in the thesis is, very broad­
ly, an actor-centred approach. As is shown in Long (1977), 
the importance of the actor-centred model lies in its 
rejection of an outsider's bias and value judgement in 
evaluating social situations. The limitation of the out­
sider's view of things is that it fails to adequately 
account for local people's capacity to utilise pre-existing 
knowledge and forms of organisation for their own economic 
planning (1977:135). In contrast to this, the actor- 
centred model purports to analytically examine the ways
- 3 -
people make use of local concepts in their allocational 
choices in the various spheres of economic activity. 
Understanding the context in which decisions concerning 
specific social choices are made is the sine qua non for 
explaining why individuals opt for a particular course of 
action when confronted with new opportunities (eg develop­
ment schemes). Long maintains that individuals and groups 
display differential response to social change because 
assessing their access to and utilisation of various kinds 
of resources, some are more often "strategically placed to 
doing so than others" (1977:135). The way of assessing or 
'mapping out', to use Long's terminology, people's access 
to resources is plainly stated as follows:
"One method of [documenting the ways in which groups 
or individuals utilise resources in novel situations] 
is to focus upon problematic situations that present a 
range of possible situations. Attention is then given 
to analysing why it is that certain individuals or 
social categories pursue particular courses of action; 
and to assessing the economic, organisational, and 
other outcomes (intended and unintended) of such 
decisions." (1977:135).
It is this kind of theoretical work that, in my view, is of 
considerable value for development planning - which aims to 
help formulate policies that would bring about desirable 
changes with minimum social cost. The importance of this 
work holds despite certain methodological shortcomings from 
concentrating on actors' perceptions. One shortcoming stems
from the fact that this model, by and large, takes a micro­
view of the society in contrast to the macro-level of 
communities of which planners are too often concerned. On 
balance, the vigour of the actor-oriented analysis stems 
from the fact that the actor's knowledge may be inferred 
directly from behaviour -
"Assuming that all actions are guided by relevant
knowledge, and are meaningful to others because the
actor and the others share the same notions, it
follows that by observing actions (and taking into 
account all the accompanying statements) and by 
accounting for them as meaningful, the anthropologist 
should be able to infer the notions guiding these 
actions" (Holy and Stuchlik, 1983:68).
The thesis adopts the actor-oriented model, isolating some 
relevant social, cultural and economic factors which shape 
the Nuba peasants' response to the Habila scheme. The over­
all thrust of the thesis is that of applied anthropology. 
The relevance of applied anthropological research to dev­
elopment situations derives from the recognition on the
part of the planners that understanding people's views on 
planned change could help provide guidelines for sound 
formulations. Furthermore, developers need data of a 
qualitative nature to supplement the quantitative and stat­
istical data provided by economists. The availability of 
these two types of data (the qualitative and quantitative) 
is the sine qua non for sound practical action since the 
oral societies studied by anthropologists exhibit forms of
— 5 —
behaviour which encompass both economic and social aspects 
(Baric, 1967). In this respect, applied anthropology deals 
with cultures and societies in which the economic is only 
one aspect of human behaviour. Thus, it deals with the 
complex processes of commercialisation, urbanisation and 
modernisation that are directly related to development. 
According to Dalton, "these processes take place over much 
longer periods of time than anthropologists customarily 
remain in the field" (1987:373) and anthropologists must 
grasp them. He suggests that analysis of such processes 
should put into consideration "policies of central govern­
ment which directly impinge on [the level of the] local 
group... [which] traditionally has been the focus of 
interest in anthropology" (1987:373).
In studying development we should define our concepts in 
such a way as to fit what developers purport to do with the 
goals and ends which local groups have in respect of devel­
opment. We do this by relating local level processes to 
the processes of socio-economic change and consider both as 
an ongoing social process. According to Bastide applied 
anthropology is the science of man's manipulative action 
(1973:209). As such it is concerned not with action and 
planning proper but with the way planners come to interact 
with and affect pre-existing social relationships and 
structures. "It analyses that action and that planning as 
the old anthropology analysed kinship systems, economic and 
political institutions, spontaneous processes of change and 
with exactly the same techniques of approach" (1973:181).
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This work is certainly concerned with the interaction 
between developers and the developed as Bastide views it 
and, therefore, qualifies as applied anthropology - all the 
more so since it contributes to an understanding which 
could have practical implications. The analysis adopted 
also has some bearing on the 'obstacles to development' 
school (which effectively sees indigenous institutions as 
physical objects) but attempts to avoid the latter's short­
comings. One shortcoming of this school lies in the fact 
that it is value-laden and static. We avoid this by going 
deeper, and investigate the conditions under which change 
could be both accepted and rejected. The 'obstacles to 
development' school does not provide for^  ^"the dynamics of 
traditional change and the propensity or capacity of 
traditions to adjust to ongoing processes and conditions" 
(Weintraub and Margulies 1986:41).
To empirically investigate development situations Bastide's 
principles of applied anthropology should be cited since 
they form the core of our theoretical framework. These 
principles could be summarised in the following four 
points. First, where components of a development plan are 
technical and economic our study should allow for com­
parison between the pre-existing technical and economic 
aspects of culture with actors' conception of the technical 
and economic aspects of development proposals. This helps 
forecast the possible local level response and reactions. 
Secondly, it is essential that our analysis should isolate 
the main general factors within the existing culture and
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social system that are conducive to development; but more 
importantly which can, in effect, sufficiently arouse local 
participation in the development scheme. Thirdly, a 
follow-up analysis of the development project and its 
impact on local people should be made in each project phase 
to enable potential constraints to be sorted out for early 
prescriptions and solutions. Fourth, post-implementation 
assessment should be made for corrective action and re­
adjustment (1973:123).
By and large our theoretical analysis focuses on processes 
of social change and deals with the interplay between dev­
elopment inputs and social values held by local people. 
Both developers and the developed agree on one objective: 
that development and improved well-being is desirable; but 
the two differ concerning how development should be ap­
proached. Actors in their response to external stimulus 
not only think of the immediate reward such change is 
likely to confer, but also the way the existing social 
relationships, or institutions may be remodelled and struc­
tured. Such change involves both economic and social costs 
and benefits and the actor himself is able, given that 
specific context, to weigh the costs and benefits before a 
decision or a response is made. Developers on the other 
hand may be entirely lacking cognizance of actors’ rational 
behaviour in choice situations since a wide cultural gulf 
exists between them and the people at the grass roots. 
Concerning actors' response to schemes of change which 
turn out to be not in the interest of local people, Dalton
•(-. 8 —
succinctly states that, too often -
"having lost the primary ties of meaningful culture, 
social relationships and activities... and having been 
forced into meaningless activities and degrading help­
lessness, individuals and groups react to bewildering 
changes with fantasy, aggression, withdrawal and 
escape" (1987:375-6).
This highlights the fact that response of people subject to 
development can often diverge considerably from what 
planners had anticipated. With this fact well acknow­
ledged, applied anthropological research attaches primacy 
to the cultural components of the society, implying that 
change in attitudes and values are the key to future social 
and economic development. This implies in turn that 
planned action should, a priori, define the aspects of 
society in which the capacity to absorb change has become 
manifest. This is the task of the anthropologist who works 
from within and who can therefore represent the actors’ 
views on planned change. The anthropologist’s study of 
groups and individuals is of vital importance since "it is 
only through the human psyche and the group that the meta­
morphosis of ideas into social forces can take place" 
(Bastide, 1973:189). A more concrete danger is that devel­
opment resources may be seen by local people as being 
largely accessible to certain groups who can then manip­
ulate the less advantaged for their own personal advance­
ment, The task of the anthropologist lies, therefore, in 
identifying "the privileged groups and vested interest that
— 9 —
have to be liquidated before the model can work" (Abdel 
Ghaffar, 1977a:33; I demur from the tone of the word 
'liquidate'). When constraints of this type are not 
pointed out in the pre-scheme implementation phase planners 
can be misled into propagating models which can unwittingly 
result in a situation where specific groups tend to 
manipulate development inputs (both human and non-human 
resources), and to thwart development efforts. But also 
where the underprivileged group is conscious enought of the 
adverse implications of change it is more likely that fear 
of manipulation provides a convincing reason why popular 
participation fails to be aroused.
Our anthropological analysis of the outcome of the Habila 
scheme implies the level of the local community, though I 
hope it applies more generally to the wider region. The 
Nuba peoples, located in the Southern Kordofan region of 
Sudan, notwithstanding their cultural variation, present 
certain common features in terms of value system and social 
structure. Being able to generalise the analysis is of 
great theoretical and practical importance. It is held 
that "the more general a proposition, the greater is its 
validity, not only theoretically ...but also as applied to 
a particular situation" (Bastide, 1973:125).
The different parts of the thesis are arranged such that 
issues of both theoretical and practical dimensions are 
encompassed. Chapter 1 views some contending theories of 
development and underdevelopment. It is shown that, con­
— 10 —
trary to what might appear, all these theoretical formula­
tions embody an outsider's bias, incorporating unwarranted 
value judgements that could, in the end, hinder develop­
ment. Being beset with objective evaluation rather than 
subjective expectation of alternatives, these theories are 
rejected. In Chapter 2, the analysis shifts to an assess­
ment of the practice of rural development proper. The 
discussion follows naturally from Chapter 1 since almost 
all practical development models are linked to some general 
theoretical formulation about development. Partly due to 
the fact that development approaches and schemes rest with 
evidently fallacious theoretical underpinnings and partly 
because of the inherent difficulties concerning their 
practical fitness, an overall criticism is called for. 
Thus in this chapter we turn more explicitly to policy­
makers and to their practical approaches to rural develop­
ment and social change. The purpose is to reveal the broad 
theories of development 'implied' in the particular 
practical policies with which we are dealing. As we shall 
see, these planners are mostly attending to specific prob­
lems within the rural sector; therefore they are presumably 
subscribing to some sort of 'modernisation' theory. The 
various schemes mentioned in this chapter are all in sub- 
Saharan Africa, if not in Sudan. Of the various practical 
schemes presented in this chapter, the Habila scheme, to 
which we shall later turn, is shown to fall into the cate­
gory of 'transformation' approach.
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In chapter 3 ethnographic data on the Nuba Mountains region 
is furnished. What is presented is more or less a his­
torical account. The purpose is to link past trends with 
present general tendencies and to mould the two processes 
into a complex whole. Detailed here are local resources 
and the way these resources are utilised; the system of 
land tenure and agricultural operations ; bases of community 
solidarity and allegiances; processes of commercialisation 
of the economy; and the educational policies in the region. 
It is shown that the interplay of the above mentioned 
factors and processes gives rise to community division 
between local inhabitants (ie the Nuba) and the immigrant 
Arabs and later to a sense of identity among the Nuba which 
culminates in the development of political consciousness. 
This consciousness is. manifested in the ordinary Nuba's 
concern to have a share in the economic and political 
opportunities of the country as exemplified by labour 
migrants' unions in towns, the desire to form cooperatives 
run exclusively by local inhabitants, and attitudes of 
scepticism towards the Arabs, officials and Jellaba trad­
ers .
Chapter 4 examines the Habila scheme proper. It is posited 
that this is akin in its features and aims to the ' trans­
formation approach' since it advocates change in methods of 
production, as well as alterations in the type of produc­
tion units (towards cooperatives), and population movements 
and state intervention. It is also shown how the scheme is 
dominated by private farmers who have vested interest in
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their own individual advancement rather than the develop­
ment of the local community. It is shown that the coopera­
tive schemes play a minor role in the scheme in general and 
do not attract local participation. The impact of the 
scheme on the local population is painfully disappointing: 
the poor get poorer and the rich richer; there is 
environmental degradation and an accentuation of the 
processes of labour migration. The economic explanation 
for the low indigenous investment in peasant farming is 
presented. It is shown that economic factors must be 
complemented by the relevant social and cultural factors 
which directly affect agricultural performance. In Chapter 
5 the social factors which affect peasant farming are 
isolated. These include kinship, labour migration and 
conspicuous consumption. Together, these are partly 
germane to the low investment in traditional agriculture.
Chapter 6 is a preliminary to explaining why cooperative 
schemes in Habila fail to attract effective local partici­
pation. It is presented to refute the implicit and errone­
ous assumption that the traditional system of cooperation 
in Nuba culture - the nafeir - provides a blue-print for 
modern cooperative development in the region. It is shown 
that the institution ( ie nafeir) because of its rapid 
disintegration can no longer function as it traditionally 
did. But more important, due to the persistence of the 
trends which led to its dissolution, it fails to provide a 
blueprint for modern cooperatives as the people them­
selves have, in the contemporary context, developed a
13 -
negative attitude toward joining a nafeir. In line with 
other anthropologists we argue that the commercialisation 
of the local economy and the presence of alien groups 
seemingly manipulating local groups for their own advance­
ment had precipitated the disintegration of the nafeir 
system.
In chapter 7 the importance of building on local instit­
utions as a pre-requisite for rural development is exam­
ined. Here an extrapolative analysis is adopted to allow 
comparison and generalisation from other contexts. We show 
that traditional institutions are not always amenable to 
development since local people hold perceptions about the 
social and economic costs of participating in schemes 
imposed from outside. .Thus, we conclude that for a tradi­
tional system of cooperation to be successfully incorporat­
ed into modern cooperatives, minimisation of the social 
costs concomitant with so-called 'modernisation values' is 
necessary. This necessitates an empirical anthropological 
investigation of what constitutes a social cost from an 
actor's perspective. With regard to the Nuba Hills area we 
infer that the lack of receptivity among local people 
derives from an impending fear that aliens manipulate them 
for individual self-interest.
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CHAPTER 1
Theories of Development and Underdevelopment:
An Overview
The various theories concerned with development in Third 
World countries can be broadly divided into two main camps. 
Modernisation theories on the one hand, and dependency and 
articulation-of-modes on the other. The significance of 
these theories lies in the fact that policy-makers, what­
ever their ideological orientations, are tempted to invoke 
them to legitimise their formulations (Wenger, 1982): one 
can hardly imagine a government policy that has been 
established independently of pre-existing theoretical 
orientations. Indeed such theoretical concepts advocated 
by professionals are taken to provide the essential frame­
work for national decision-making processes. In this re­
gard Long can appositely remark:
"Hence both the planning process and the study of 
socio-economic change rests upon sets of ideas, 
assumptions and methodologies which derive from the 
sort of macro-theoretical orientations mentioned 
earlier" (Long, 1977:8).
In this chapter an endeavour is made to touch on some of 
the recent critiques of the contending development 
theories. The critique should establish that the under­
lying assumptions and the theoretical framework on which 
such theories rest are both deficient and, as a result.
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cannot serve the purpose of development as we view it. 
Their deficiency is that they overstress planners views 
about development rather than local concepts themselves.
The Critique of Modernisation Theories
The modernisation school derives its theoretical tenet from 
the ideal-typical constructs which characterise both trad­
itional and present-day advanced societies. It describes 
modernisation with reference to present-day conditions of 
western advanced countries. Thus, Moore (1963) defines 
modernisation as -
"a 'total' transformation of a traditional or pre­
modern society into the types of technology and 
associated social organisation that characterises 
'advanced', economically prosperous, and relatively 
politically stable nations of the Western World" (in 
Long, 1977:9).
The implications of such a definition is that for less 
developed societies to develop it is essential that modern 
technology be diffused to effect structural differentiation 
in their traditional systems. The move towards modernity 
is conceived of as a unilinear process akin to the one that 
had characterised present-day western societies in the 
early sixteenth century. Basically, the process of modern­
isation takes presumably three stages: differentiation,
adaptation and integration into a new structure (Smelser, 
1967:30). Smelser argues that a host of disturbances occur 
in the different aspects of the social structure in the
—  1 6 "—
modernisation process. Social relationships change from 
face-to-face and personal to purely impersonal ones. In 
the sphere of politics the traditional chieftainship system 
gradually becomes superceded by modern bureaucracy. The 
family system based on extensive kinship connections gives 
way to an atomised nuclear type. Social behaviour becomes 
increasingly oriented toward rational calculations of 
material benefits and rewards. And the marketplace with its 
traditional spheres of exchange is substituted with new 
elaborate marketing institutions.
This ideal-typical construction merely describes the main 
features which a modernising society is likely to assume in 
the modernising process. Moreover, depicting the process 
as universal reduces the whole notion of modernity to 
absurdity, for the simple fact that change often takes 
place in a particular aspect of the social structure with­
out revolutionising the rest of the component parts. For 
example, change in the family structure in a number of 
Third World countries has never been followed by rapid 
urbanisation or industrialisation.
The traditional/modern dichotomy implies the entire separa­
tion of modern sectors 'commanded by corresponding elites', 
and traditional subsistence sectors (Fitzgerald, 1983:14). 
The neglect of the interconnection of the two sectors, and 
also of the wider national and international context led 
the so-called dependency theorists to question the validity 
of such assumptions. For example, Fitzgerald states the
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following:
"This master conception [of universal societal 
evolution] focuses on the nation as its primary unit 
of analysis and thereby ignores the international 
context which is so crucial to any understanding of 
historical development and current realities in the 
Third World" (1983:15).
The point which modernisation theorists fail to recognise 
is that modernisation inputs bear with them modernisation 
values. If imported modernisation components are to fit 
into the values and social organisations of the receiving 
societies, then it follows that the values of the receiving 
and giving societies should not be in conflict. Indeed 
concern has recently been voiced about the relevance of 
imported technology and its concomitant values to the 
conditions of Third World countries (Meir, 1969; 
Schumacher, 1973; Johnston, 1979). Economists on the one 
hand have raised the issue of appropriateness as regards 
the technology for transforming traditional agriculture in 
late developing countries. Eckaus, for instance, suggests 
that the role of technological change in underdeveloped 
countries should lie in providing modern technologies 
"especially adapted to their resources and conditions" 
(1962:122) since most of the imported technology has been 
developed in and for advanced countries. Anthropologists 
on the other hand, are keen to note the so-called "differ­
ential response" to planned change and innovation (Long, 
1977:105). It is argued in this connnection that even
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within the local society there can be found individuals or 
groups (entrepreneurs) who are strategically better located 
than are other strata to apply themselves more vigorously 
to economic matters and to respond positively to innova­
tion. Those who lack such attributes are more likely to 
display a poor response to economic advantage. Also 
critical of modernisation theory, Marxists are prone to see 
foreign aid as a mechanism for actually syphoning off the 
resources of the borrowing traditional countries. Thus the 
different kinds of linkages between advanced capitalist 
countries and poor developing countries are judged suffic­
ient by so-called underdevelopment theorists to consider 
Third World formation as working under the aegis of one 
system of production and reproduction, viz, the inter­
national capitalist system (see below).
Yet another difficulty with modernisation theory is its 
failure to provide for redistribution. Where efforts are 
actively made on the part of national governments in Third 
World countries to improve the well-being of the popula­
tions result in economic growth, the benefits of the latter 
tend to accrue to a minority of progressive elites to the 
detriment of the underprivileged. As a consequence, the 
poor get poorer and the rich richer. In such a situation 
we can hardly speak of the 'total' structural transform­
ation postulated by modernisation theory as the concomitant 
of differentiation. We therefore, need to look anthropol­
ogically at political relations in the receiving community.
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Finally^ and more importantly, the assumption that trad­
itional social structures are inimical to modernisation has 
recently been questioned by promoters of rural development. 
Intensive research is now underway considering the possib­
ility of implementing development projects within the 
context of rural social structures. Tradition is no longer 
to be viewed as opposed to modernity. Indeed, the 
"dichotomy of traditional and modern, and the inimical 
relations between them vitiate any attempt to understand 
what is being transformed and in which directions" (Ostor 
and Fruzzett, 1978:7-8). Western professional writings are 
legitimated by western ideology which in turn blinds them 
from discerning the peculiarities of non-western countries. 
The conditions under which present-day advanced countries 
found their way to modernity are, furthermore, widely diff­
erent from that of late developing countries. The depend­
ency school addresses the above questions to show that 
analysis must be based on "a clear, conception of differen­
tial patterns of national evolution and their structural 
interrelatedness at the world level" (Fitzgerald, 1983:15).
The Critique of Dependency Theory
As an alternative to modernisation theories the dependency 
or underdevelopment school is founded on the premise that 
both present-day Third World Societies and the advanced 
western capitalist world are a product of mercantile 
capitalism's colonial and imperialist policies. 
Historically, the relationship between the two, it is 
argued, is but one of political and economic dominance of
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the developed over the underdeveloped. For that reason 
Third World countries’ relationship with the capitalist 
world should in fact be viewed as one of development of the 
latter and the simultaneous underdevelopment of the former; 
and labels such as undeveloped, as applied to Third World, 
hardly describe this situation (Frank, 1967; Dos Santos, 
1969; Cardoso, 1972; Baran, 1957). This state of affairs 
is described by Dos Santos (1969) as follows:
"Dependence is a conditioning situation in which the 
economies of one group of countries are conditioned by 
the development and expansion of others. A relation­
ship of interdependence between two or more economies 
or between such economies and the world trading system 
becomes a dependent relationship when some countries 
expand through self-impulsion while others, being in a 
dependent position, can only expand as a reflection of 
the expansion of the dominant countries, which may 
have positive or negative effects on their immediate 
development. In either case, the basic situation of 
dependence causes these countries to be both backward 
and exploited" (in Long, 1977:87).
Directing their criticism mainly at the concept of 
diffusion, underdevelopment theorists are apt to charac­
terise the relationship between 'underdeveloped' and 
'advanced' countries as a double-edged process. Diffusion 
is seen as imperialism's tool for exploiting newly 
independent Third World countries. Proponents of this 
school, including Amin, Arrighi, Baran, Frank and
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Wallerstein, et al, postulate a chain of satellite- 
metropoles connecting the remotest areas in Third World 
formations with the most advanced capitalist countries. As 
a result of this linkage, it is argued, surplus product 
produced in the underdeveloped countries is progressively 
appropriated by capitalist countries who dominate the 
latter (Limqueco and MacFarlane, 1983).
A sweeping argument is too often made by underdevelopment 
theorists that development in Third World rural communities 
is doomed to fail: communities on the receiving end of so- 
called development inputs in fact experience increasing 
underdevelopment because they lack the control of their 
development resources (Fitzgerald 1983:16).
The explanation of this process lies in the weak economic 
and political bargaining position of Third World countries 
in their exchange relationship with international capitalism. 
Looked at from this viewpoint, the structures of both - 
countries are no longer to be considered as separable from 
one another. Rather they are fused into a whole world 
capitalist system. Based on empirical investigations on 
Latin American countries, Frank et al, came to argue that 
dependency ultimately results from such mechanisms of 
surplus transfer as 'super-exploitation* of labour, unequal 
exchange, expansion of multi-national corporations in Third 
World markets, international lending institutions and 
metropolitan expansion financed by Third World savings 
Frank, 1969). The more strong the linkage between the
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developed and underdeveloped formations the more desperate 
the latter are economically. To confirm this postulate 
Frank investigated Latin American economic development 
record of the 1930's depression and the 1940’s to show that 
while the link between the satellite and métropole was in 
those times relatively weak, the latter in fact experienced 
more economic expansion.
Despite this theoretical advance over modernisation theory, 
the underdevelopment school bears weaknesses of its own. 
The first weakness discerned in dependency discourse is 
that it is said to be ahistorical. Colin Leys accuses 
dependency theory of being biased toward
"... what happens to the underdeveloped countries at 
hand of imperialism and colonialism, rather than on 
the total historical process involved, including the 
various forms of struggle against imperialism and 
colonialism which grow out of the conditions of 
underdevelopment" (Leys, 1975:20)
The dependency school also denies Third World countries the 
possibility of generating their own 'internal* development. 
Nor does it indeed explain changes internal to capitalist 
countries, especially the question of economic efficiency, 
automation and better know-how. Even from within its 
discourse, dependency theory fails to provide for 'dis­
locations' and the differential transfer of resources from 
Third World countries to advanced capitalist countries. In 
the majority of underdeveloped countries labour migration
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and especially the 'brain drain' resulted in a massive 
inflow of remittances to underdeveloped countries during 
the 1960's and 1970's. Hardly ever, if at all, do depend­
ency theorists talk of such redistributive mechanisms.
The functionalist variants of dependency theory (eg 
Wallerstein, 1974) put the focus on a total world system 
and view this as having requirements which are met by 
specific classes, or events existing. According to world 
system analysis we should no longer talk of peripheral 
world formations, but only of 'stages of world system' 
(Fitzgerald, 1983:19). Yet world system analysis merely 
elevates arguments within the dependency school to a higher 
level of analysis, it certainly does not deal with the 
difficulties inherent in dependency theory. Instead of 
looking at a single chain of core-periphery or satellite- 
metropole we now perceive the theory in terms of a multi­
plicity of linkages, both between developed and developing 
as well as between developed countries themselves. The 
transfer of surplus should, the argument goes, be approach­
ed in terms of what roles the different classes play in 
influencing the process of surplus redistribution at the 
world scale. It is here that Wallerstein's functionalism 
can be discerned: classes exist merely to serve the
interests and requirements of capitalism.
The dependency school also fails to explain poverty within 
developed countries themselves - the general phenomenon 
characterised by Oscar Lewis as the 'culture of poverty' is
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a case in point. Furthermore, we cannot accommodate dep­
endency theory to fit, with impunity, the pro-socialist 
Third World and advanced communist fronts. The question 
which remains is whether we locate such countries within 
the so-called world capitalist system or isolate them as 
peculiar instances. Differences of ideology as well as 
between class and elite are largely neglected by the dep­
endency school. On the other hand, the notion of structure 
and function still loom large despite the claim to the con­
trary. This functional bias is mainly the result of the 
theory's over-emphasis of the notion of distribution to the 
neglect of production.
Dissatisfaction with dependency and world system theories 
prompted 'articulation' students to argue that it is in 
fact production, rather than distribution, that can indeed 
account for surplus transfer and exploitation. Articula- 
tion-of-modes theory holds that in fact Third World 
formation - in contrast to the view which sees it as being 
split into pre-capitalist peripheral and advanced capital­
ist centres - should be seen as one formation subsuming two 
or more modes of production articulated through the rela­
tions of production. The relations of production came to 
dominate articulation-of-modes discourse, market exchange 
alone being considered insufficient for defining a mode of 
production (Taylor, 1979:110). The significance of the 
articulation-of-modes theory is that it provides for the 
existence of more than one mode of production at the same 
time and space. Surplus labour, as a consequence, can be
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appropriated by a capitalist mode under different laws of 
capitalist accumulation (see eg Meillassoux, 1975). Such 
transfer of surplus does not involve the separation of the 
direct producer from his means of production. On the 
contrary a non-capitalist mode is deliberately left to 
function so as to allow for the reproduction of labour
outside capitalism. Investigation of production in terms 
of articulation helps pinpoint the various forms of 
participation in a capitalist market. The nature and 
degree of such participation depends on the way production 
is organised under the mode of production under investi­
gation. Kinship and commodity modes of production, for 
instance, organise production in different ways. When
different modes articulate, the ultimate outcome is the 
domination of the non-capitalist by the capitalist mode of 
production. Some sort of structure is then created in 
which the dominance of the capitalist mode is continuously 
re-produced. The whole process is referred to as the 
preservation/destruction of the subordinated, non­
capitalist mode of production (Meillaissoux, 1975). Thus,
the capitalist mode is referred to as the 'determinant' in 
the last instance and the non-capitalist mode the 
determinate. This process of determinacy and reproduction 
is described by Taylor as follows -
"Within a given social formation..., the dominant mode 
of production determines which of the instances 
occupies the determinant place; it is the structuring 
of the other instances of the social formation by the
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determinant instance that enables the mode of pro­
duction to be reproduced" (1979:139).
Meillassoux (1975) in Maidens, Meal, and Money deploys the 
concept of articulation to analyse the processes by which a 
capitalist mode of production interferes with a domestic 
mode and subordinates it to its requirements. The author 
sets himself to analyse the relationship between central 
capitalist economies and a domestic mode which sends 
migrant labour to the former. He argues that exploitative 
relations of production stem from two main sources. First, 
where migrant labour takes the form of circular migration, 
appropriation is expressed as labour-rent. Labour rent is 
defined by the amount of wage which would have to suffic­
iently reproduce the labourer within the capitalist system. 
The employer enjoys the labour rent as far as the 
labourer's reproduction of his labour-power takes place 
outside the confines of capitalism. Then there is the 
second source of exploitation. Where labour migration 
becomes a permanent phenomenon, labour-rent gives way to 
surplus-labour. Reproduction in this case falls with the 
capitalist employer. In general the domestic mode of 
production functions to subsidise capitalism; the latter 
mode need not interrupt such a mechanism.
For Meillassoux exploitation mainly takes two forms. The 
first derives from the way production is organised within 
the domestic mode of production. This mode usually organ­
ises production on a collective basis (eg family labour).
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The labourer who migrates to work in the urbane^ centres 
relies partly on the family property for his reproduction. 
Therefore, Meillassoux argues, exploitation should apply to 
the whole family since the surplus product expropriated by 
the capitalist sanctions the whole family. Exploitation 
ceases to be individualistic. The second form of exploit­
ation is that of surplus labour - as this is generally 
known in Marxist jargon. One of the results of the repro­
duction of labour taking place outside the realm of 
capitalism is that the level of wages can remain very even, 
even in the face of shortage of labour.
Meillassoux therefore puts considerable emphasis on various 
constraints on Third World communities against developing 
their own internal capitalism (see also, Signorelli, 1981). 
These constraints are in turn upheld by consumerist ideol­
ogy. Two facts immediately obtain. First, that transition 
from pre-capitalism to capitalism proper is, for present- 
day Third World formation, a long-term phenomenon, or at 
least remains a delayed process. Secondly, and consequent­
ly, the conditions of life in the periphery continue to 
deteriorate, or otherwise remain stagnant.
The concept of articulation-of-modes has recently been 
extended for analysing small-scale enterprise in the Third 
World. Kahn’s recent study of the blacksmithing industry 
in Western Sumatra is illustrative of this kind of analysis 
(Kahn, 1975). Kahn treated blacksmithing as petty- 
coramodity production working under a very low level of
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technology. The organisation of the labour process, how­
ever, is undertaken in a capitalist fashion. The smith's 
inputs of production consist of his own labour, hired 
labour and raw material bought from the market. Through 
this simple labour process the petty-producer is said to 
extract surplus value. Kahn traced the source of hired 
labour to the lineage mode of production, and the raw 
material and final output to capitalism. In this way three 
modes of production are isolated as articulating, viz, the 
lineage, petty-commodity and capitalist modes of pro­
duction. Here the most influential factor in the smithing 
industry is the cyclical movement of production forces 
whereby capitalism acts to determine the nature of produc­
tion in the smithing enterprise. It is argued that the 
rise in world prices would make expansion of the smithing 
industry possible. But this, in turn, interferes with the 
lineage mode of production since workers are drawn from 
rice fields into the smithing industry. This interferes 
with the subsistence food supply on which the blacksmith 
depends for the reproduction of his workers. The whole 
mechanism ultimately undermines the blacksmithing industry. 
Kahn's answer as to why the blacksmith fails to expand his 
industry is twofold. Firstly, there is the industry's 
inaccessibility to modern technology, which lies with 
capitalism. The other constraint derives from the smith's 
inability to increase the size of the productive units in 
the form of additional labour input.
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The importance of analysing small-scale enterprise in the 
light of articulation-of-modes is that it helps explain the 
persistence of non-capitalist or non-traditional forms of 
production in the urban sector of Third World formations. 
The logic of exploitation in this analysis lies in the 
undervaluation of goods and services supplied by a mode 
subordinated to a dominant capitalist one.
However, the articulation school came under heavy attack 
concerning the mechanism of over-exploitation (Booth, 
1985). Kahn himself (1980) criticises Meillassoux for the 
inadequacy of deploying the notion of reproduction. It is 
absurd, he argues, to believe that domestic modes of 
production exist merely for the purpose of 'subsidising' 
capitalism. Another attack on the articulation school 
comes from Booth (1985). Booth argues that while in 
actuality more than one mode is at stake in the exchange 
process, the real value of labour-power is imputed from 
capitalism. He puts the argument succinctly as follows -
"[E]xchanges within social formations with combin­
ations of modes or forms of production are judged 
against an ideal type of purely capitalist exchange 
representing (it may be argued) the future historical 
pattern in the social formation in question. This 
offends one's sense of history and does not seem to 
have any warrant within Marxist theory" (Booth, 
1985:771) .
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Kahn's analysis is likewise subjected to the same critic­
ism. For Booth, such analysis rests on a theoretical 
misunderstanding mainly because, too often it is wrongly 
believed that -
"The goods or services of the small-scale sector sell 
for less than their value because... the 'wages' 
imputed to the members of the enterprise or household 
are below what they would earn producing the same 
output under capitalism" (1985:771).
The nub of Booth's argument is that goods or, generally, 
transactions occurring in a non-capitalist mode should not 
be evaluated in terms of the value these transactions would 
generate within capitalism since the two spheres structur­
ally and historically differ from one another. These 
difficulties within the articulation school condemn it and 
would relegate it to functionalist explanations. As has 
been indicated, it is illogical to argue that a mode of 
production, in essence, exists not in respect of itself but 
for serving the requirements of other modes.
There is also the question of whether the concept of 
exploitation is itself the correct way of describing social 
relationships. Dalton (1974) holds the opinion that the 
concept of exploitation, as applied to peasants in par­
ticular, bears some sort of ideological overtone. I agree 
with this sort of opinion. Discussion of this matter 
allows me to make a theoretical case for approaching the 
question of development in actor-oriented terms and
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generally put aside approaches which rest on outsiders' 
evaluations. Dalton rejects exploitation as being theoret­
ically inadequate for analysing peasant relations with 
non-peasants. For, if peasants are actually exploited why 
do they participate in schemes of change or engage in 
relationships that work to their detriment? Against 
exploitation analysis I argue that peasants must be seen as 
behaving rationally, evaluating options in relation to the 
situation and acting accordingly. Moreover, it is theoret­
ically dangerous to impute judgement on peasants without 
adducing empirical evidence for the existence of exploit­
ation.
Students of peasant economy (most of whom are Marxist or 
neo-Marxist) take the phenomena characteristic of peasant 
societies at their face value, and, not unintentionally, 
unproblematically link the description to the concept of 
exploitation. For instance, peasants are characterised by 
the linkages they have with towns and urban centres ( see 
Shanin, 1971). It is then held that such linkages necess­
arily entail that peasants should sustain the state and 
towns through some sort of unequal exchange relationship. 
My opinion is that this is not always the case. On the 
contrary, peasants very often engage in labour migration to 
cities in a conscious pursuit of objectives that directly 
engender the betterment of the quality of their own life 
and that of their home communities ( see eg chapter 5 ). 
There are, of course, some obvious reasons for considering 
peasants as an exploited group, as Dalton illustrates -
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"... peasants are thought to be ill-used by non­
peasants because of one or more features of the total 
peasant situation - economic, political, social and 
cultural: because peasants are politically powerless, 
materially impoverished, or in debt; because they are 
illiterate, or, if literate, uneducated; or because 
they are the lowest human segment in a socially strat­
ified society ... to say that peasants are 'politic­
ally powerless' or politically subjugated without then 
explaining for specific peasantries of actual time and 
place what are the political and legal institutions 
under which they live that make them powerless or 
subjugated, is very ambiguous" (Dalton, 1974:555-556).
This analysis reveals the complexity of using the concept 
'peasant exploitation' without reservations or without 
being specific about what it really means and the partic­
ular instance to which it applies. According to Dalton we 
cannot be certain of exploitation without adducing 
sufficient evidence, from an actor's perspective, of some 
sort of exploitation. Those who assert that peasants are 
exploited do not usually take into account "the subjective 
feelings of peasants, that is, whether or not various sorts 
of peasants feel themselves to be exploited" (1974:558). 
The bias of characterising peasant relations with non­
peasants in this superficial way is that it omits any 
mention of what peasants actually gain in being engaged in 
the various fields of activity. And indeed some writers 
can adduce concrete facts which falsify exploitation
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argumentation. As Dalton has shown, Finney documents a 
case where peasants of New Guinea can receive substantial 
advantage from the obligatory payments to entrepreneurial 
big-men. The argument quoted at length is as follows -
"And once they [big-men entrepreneurs] became inter­
ested in investing their coffee revenue in other pro­
jects, they have usually been able to solicit 
considerable additional amounts of cash from their 
agents for investment purposes, just like the big-men 
of earlier days were able to solicit pigs, shells, and 
other valuables for an important exchange. The 
relationship between the modern big-men and their 
clansmen, and other followers, should not, however, be 
seen as exploitation of the unsophisticated. Rather, 
it should be judged in terms of the standards of 
Gorokan society... The Gorokan entrepreneurs fully 
realise that they are beholden to their supporters for 
their commercial success, and they take pains to grant 
reciprocal favours to those who have helped them as 
well as to emphasise that their enterprises are also 
enterprises of the group. Their supporters, in turn, 
are generally proud to have helped 'their big-man' to 
achieve his status, and enjoy the prestige of being 
associated with a successful entrepreneur" (in Dalton 
1974:558).
With this sort of analysis in mind, I make the case that a 
sound theoretical framework capable of providing appropri­
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ate information for policy-making is one which is basically 
actor-centred. According to Long (1977) analysis from an 
actor-centred perspective should give close attention to 
the way individuals, group or particular categories of 
individuals evaluate or perceive alternative courses of 
action in a particular social context and assess the poss­
ible outcomes (1977:134). The strength of this sort of 
theoretical framework lies in its freedom from value 
judgement, outsider's bias or ideological overtones that 
may give a lop-sided image of realities. Commitment to an 
actor-centred approach necessitates that answers to given 
questions should be sought with reference to the actor's 
culture, the means available to him and the goals as per­
ceived by the actor himself. Economic anthropologists who 
subscribe to the actor-centred model include Moerman 
(1968), Salisbury (1970), and Ortiz (1973). Adopting an 
actor-centred view for analysing Thai peasants' choices 
with respect to farming techniques, Moerman maintains that 
farmers decisions could be grasped adequately only with 
reference to the farmer's perceived alternatives, inform­
ation available and rules guiding farming behaviour.
As quoted by Long, the strategies which Thai peasants adopt 
can only make sense because -
"the village farmer categorizes and compares, demands 
a close fit between what he observes and what he talks 
about, make judicious use of previously successful 
means, anticipates the alterations that his actions 
will produce, plans possible alternative courses of
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action, is concerned with timing, finds ways to 
increase the predictable features of his situation, 
decides his correctness in terms of rules of proced­
ure, is aware of and actually exercises choice, and 
works to increase the scientific corpus of information 
he uses for making and explaining his farming 
decisions and their rewards" (in Long, 1977:134).
The relevance of the actor-centred model for assessing 
development schemes and projects is that it is theoretic­
ally grounded to account for people's responses by assuming 
the actor's position, which is tantamount to appreciating 
the ways people, on their own, evaluate their participation 
in schemes aimed at improving the quality of their life.
36 -
CHAPTER 2 
The Practice of Rural Development
Rural development has become a growing theme in national 
governments of the Third World as well as in international 
assistance since the United Nations Second Development 
Decade of the 1970's. The impetus comes from the recog­
nition that past experience with industrialisation, 
imported technology and urban-focused plans are ill-suited 
to the realities of Third World countries. The latter 
policies, it is believed, could only lead to the creation 
of a dual structure in the national economy in which the 
modern sector progresses at the expense of the traditional 
agricultural sector. Development is therefore conceived to 
be a concern for precisely this agricultural sector, which 
comprises the majority of the population, living on the 
verge of poverty and in deteriorating conditions of living. 
That the rural sector's natural and human resources could 
be harnessed to provide the basis for national development 
stems from the recognition that agricultural surplus could 
be progressively drawn to feed the urban sector's popula­
tion. It could, also, supply raw material to enhance the 
manufacturing capacity of the modern industrial establish­
ments (Lea and Chaudhri, 1983; Mehta, 1984).
Against this background, international agencies in 
collaboration with national governments in less developed 
countries undertook the task of launching rural develop-
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ment projects for the transformation of the rural sector. 
The objective is to expand production to meet both domestic 
consumption requirements and export revenues. Despite 
efforts made on the part of the above-mentioned development 
promoters there is no universally accepted definition of 
rural development. This chapter is concerned to touch on 
the various approaches and programmes aimed at improving 
the well-being of rural communities and on the specific 
problems planners are attending to in the rural sector. In 
particular, the various schemes in sub-Saharan Africa and 
Sudan, will be mentioned in this chapter. It will be 
evident that the Habila scheme which we shall investigate 
in detail in chapter 4 is an example of the so-called 
transformation approach with respect to the aims it intends 
to achieve.
I have mentioned in chapter 1 that policy-makers invoke 
particular theories of development in order to justify 
their positions. Now, in this chapter, I turn more 
explicitly to these policy-makers and to their practical 
approaches to rural development and social change. The 
emphasis is more or less on planner's perceptions and the 
broad models or programmes underpinning the various 
approaches they advocate. We should establish that these 
planners are attending to specific problems within the 
rural sector; therefore, they are subscribing to some sort 
of modernisation theory (of chapter 1). The section below, 
on the critique of these rural development schemes and pro-
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grammes, thus links to the theoretical discussions about 
underdevelopment considered in chapter 1.
Among the attempts at defining rural development, the 
following has been made -
"Rural development is a strategy to enable specific 
groups of people, poor rural women and men, to gain 
for themselves and their children more of what they 
want and need. It involves helping the poorest among 
these who seek a livelihood in the rural areas to 
demand and control more of the benefits of rural dev­
elopment. The group includes small-scale farmers, 
tenants and the landless" (Chambers, 1983:147).
The position Chambers evidently takes is that rural 
development is to be looked at as a 'strategy'. A strat­
egy, according to Mabogunje (1980) encompasses both 
methodological and ideological dimensions; the ideological 
dimension relating to concepts and ideas concerning the 
forms of relationships and organisation preferred in a par­
ticular society; and the methodological relating to how 
such forms of organisation could be achieved (1980:118). 
Copp defines rural development as a total process "aimed at 
improving the well-being and self-realisation of people 
living outside the urbanised areas through collective 
"effort" (in Mehta 1984:14). It occurs to me that develop­
ment as a process is but one aspect of the development 
strategy since the latter includes the means (or process as 
Mabogunje states) as well as the ideas of achieving devel-
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opment goals. A more comprehensive definition is given by 
Lele (1975) in which rural development is seen as "improv­
ing living standards of the mass of the low-income popula­
tion residing in rural areas and making the process of 
their development self-sustained" (1975:20).
Whatever the perspective through which it is viewed, rural 
development has the following components, as advanced by 
Mehta. First it is concerned to "release the potential of 
man by creating skills and appropriate knowledge so that he 
can exploit his environment to his advantage". Secondly, 
"focus has to be on the ecological setting since rural is 
in contrast to urban and its development should have a 
proportionate or balance of approach to urban development". 
Thirdly, "the means of production and appropriate technol­
ogy (to gain access to efficient source of economic growth) 
should constitute the third component of rural develop­
ment". Fourthly, "institution-building [ie institutional 
innovations to enhance productivity and the quality of life 
in rural areas] at the village level and the organisation 
and management of men, money and material resources should 
be the fourth component of rural development". "The fifth 
component of rural development is 'self-reliance' which 
needs to be brought in through local initiative, participa­
tion and mobilisation of existing resources". The sixth 
component should be "focus on distributive justice insofar 
as the poor segments of the rural population are concerned" 
(Mehta 1983:17-18).
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Generally, the wide range of development projects, partic­
ularly those launched in sub-Saharan Africa during the 
early 1970's, share the following characteristics;
First, rural development projects are formulated and run by 
government agencies, often with grassroots participation 
and financed from foreign assistance.
Secondly, they are aimed at the eradication of rural pov­
erty and unemployment.
Thirdly, they have a moral element, viz, looking forward to 
achieving social justice and freedom.
Fourth, according to the ideological orientation or the 
political colour of the agencies sponsoring development 
projects and formulating development strategies, they are 
broadly classified as reformist, technocratic, and radical. 
Whatever the distinction, many projects seem to be rather 
similar as to the recipes they recommend, even if their 
goals and ideologies are different. A reformist strategy, 
for instance, aims at income redistribution in the context 
of an emphasis on the market mechanism (Lea and Chaudhri, 
1983:19). As regards income redistribution it is socially 
determined and backed by state help. Examples of the re­
formist strategy are land reform programmes and coopera­
tives. States like Taiwan and Japan are illustrative of 
countries advocating reformist strategies. Technocratic 
strategy is policy-determined, implies private endeavour
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and also cooperatives (1983:19). An illustrative example 
is South Korea. Radical strategies are more or less 
socialist or pro-socialist, the impetus usually coming from 
the state giving special emphasis to cooperatives or 
collectivisation programmes. China and Tanzania are illus­
trative examples. Theoretically, the various projects, 
programmes or strategies of rural development may be class­
ified under the labels, transformation approach or 
improvement approach (Hunter, 1962; Long, 1977).
We should be crystal clear about the distinctions between 
project, programme and approach. A rural development 
'project' is usually a micro-level attempt at improving a 
specific rural area and at bringing a specific type of 
change. A 'programme' on the other hand, is effectively 
the aggregate of all those rural projects that are intended 
to affect a wider sector of the national economy (Lea and 
Chaudhri, 1983:16). Meanwhile, 'approach' is a theoretical 
notion relating to the strategy of planning, whilst, a 
'programme' refers to the practice of rural development.
The Improvement Versus The Transformation Approaches 
The Improvement Approach
In the early 1960's the World Bank mission in Tanganyika 
offered two distinct but often not mutually exclusive 
approaches to rural development: the improvement and trans­
formation approaches (Hunter, 1962; Long, 1977). The
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improvement approach takes the existing social and economic 
structures as such, and attempts to pin changes on the 
diffusion of green revolution techniques (eg seeds, fertil­
izers etc) to small farmers. In contrast, the transform­
ation approach implies a total transformation of the 
existing socio-economic structure of the rural community 
into new forms of organisation and production. The 
improvement approach typically entails community develop­
ment programmes of which the major feature is the mobilis­
ation of ' human and non-human resources, and better 
organisation of the traditional forms of leadership and 
cooperation. The rationale behind the improvement approach 
is that it is cost-efficient, manageable and involves very 
little supervision and government intervention. Interven­
tion by government agencies is in the form of extension 
workers supplying small farmers with information concerning 
the efficient use of fertilizers, best crop mix and 
broadening the knowledge of poor farmers on the merits of 
green revolution. Responsibility for providing incentives 
to small farmers to produce for the market lies with 
government institutions established to provide credit with 
minimum interest rates. Another source of incentive 
derives from increased product prices.
The improvement approach is often taken to imply a wider 
coverage in respect of the different aspects of rural 
society; for this reason it is likely that the improvement 
and transformation approaches overlap. Such efforts in­
clude the provision of health services, educational
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programmes and village industrialisation and electrific­
ation. This undertaking entails that extension agents be 
trained to advise and/or guide those who adopt new 
innovations. For reasons of efficiency, small farmers 
could be organised into cooperative units since this would 
mean better management of human and material resources. 
For example, single-purpose cooperatives were sponsored by 
colonial governments (as part of community development) to 
facilitate produce marketing through marketing boards 
established for that purpose (Allan, 1965; Long, 1977). In 
contrast with the transformation approach, the improvement 
approach implies persuasion and requires the effective par­
ticipation of all groups concerned. But evidence shows 
that 'improvement' has been used, ideologically, as a 
device for the creation of a class of progressive farmers 
to cushion any likely uprising on the part of the majority 
of population living at near-subsistence levels. This has 
been observed by Allan for Tsarist Russia which was 
"inspired by the model of the English yeoman farmer and 
their policies gave rise to a class of relatively prosper­
ous middle-class farmers, the Kulaks, "who were later to be 
stigmatised as enemies of the revolution and the people" 
(Allan, 1965:403).
To stimulate greater participation of the villagers in the 
context of improvement, governments run demonstration 
farms, often called state-farms, the purpose of which is to 
show "the level of increased yields possible under new 
methods" (Long, 1977:147). For the same purpose, and due
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to the reluctance of poor farmers to undertake risky 
ventures, an improvement project got started by a minority 
of progressive farmers who are quick to adopt new techni­
ques. Such farmers are, usually, strategically placed, 
economically or politically, to adopt new innovations. A 
non-forecasted result of this type of approach is that it 
often creates a progressive elite dominating the local poor 
farmers and controlling government services and facilities 
(see eg Apthorpe, 1970).
One of the disadvantages of the improvement approach is 
that growth and income distribution will be difficult to 
achieve at least in the short-run. This holds true in 
spite of the fact that 'improvement' has often resulted in 
substantial increase in agricultural production. Thus Long 
maintains that -
"From an economic point of view, the improvement 
approach appears to have achieved a great deal. There 
have been rapid increases in peasant production in 
developing countries during the last twenty or thirty 
years and this is mainly due to improved smallholder 
agriculture" (1977:148).
The second disadvantage of the improvement approach is that 
it implies a considerable period of time to achieve an 
overall growth in the traditional agricultural sector. 
This is due to the slow adoption of green revolution tech­
niques coupled with time-consuming extension education. 
The inescapable outcome is, too often, a differential
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access to productive resources with concomitant socio­
economic differentiation in the social strcuture. Other 
sociological problems involved in the improvement approach 
are, by and large, indigenous and are closely related to 
people's attitudes about social change in general. Poor 
economic attitudes of peasants, lack of commitment on the 
part of extension workers to the needs of the rural people 
are common underlying sociological problems of planned 
social change. It is argued, very often, that peasants 
resist innovation basically for non-material reasons (see 
eg Foster, 1965). However, the fact that thousands of 
farmers remain unaffected by extension programmes probably 
can lead to negative outcomes. Extension agents are con­
strained by logistical problems in reaching the remotest 
parts of the rural sector; poor communication and trans­
portation facilities lead to the reinforcement of this 
problem. Furthermore differences in qualification and 
skill between poor farmers and extension agents renders 
receptivity a bit difficult. Finally the larger the size 
of villages to be covered by an individual extension agent 
the less efficient the programme is likely to be. Hunter 
maintains that it is very difficult to make community 
effort a self-sustained process at least in the long-run 
when increased differentiation accompanies the commercial­
isation of traditional agriculture (Hunter, 1962). Such 
differentiation impinges on the traditional values that are 
the hallmark of village cooperation and cohesiveness.
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One can safely argue that existing systems of land tenure 
will in the long-run be a limiting factor in agricultural 
improvement. Traditional practices of land inheritance 
ultimately lead to land fragmentation that renders future 
land utilisation a wasteful task. The problem becomes more 
acute when land holdings are coupled with a belief that 
land belongs to the ancestors and that spirits require that 
land should not be alienated. Thus, to achieve the objec­
tives of modernising traditional agriculture with minimal 
sociological problems, a' transformation approach has been 
suggested.
The Transformation approach
This model of rural development aims at a radical change in 
the social and economic structures of the rural society. 
It entails the supplanting of the traditional pattern of 
labour organisation, land holding and resource utilisation 
by one based on the economies of scale and size. Examples 
of the transformation approach are the large plantation 
enterprises like the Gezira scheme and the resettlement 
project of the Haifa populations in Sudan (see e.g. 
Gaitskell, 1959; Barnett, 1977). The Gezira scheme was in 
principle an initiative from the colonial administration to 
organise peasant forms of production into modern efficient 
units to serve the needs of foreign capital by producing a 
highly demanded cash crop - cotton. To ensure effective 
participation a model of cooperativeness was worked out 
between the tenant, management and the administration. The 
proceeds of cotton had then to be divided between the three
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partners: 40% went to the tenant, 40% to the Government and 
20% to the cotton companies. Extra advantages to the 
tenant included extension education, the development of 
health services and credit to hire cotton-picking labour. 
However, despite the fact that initiative for the scheme 
came from the Government it was discovered later that the 
new system of management for running the scheme could not 
function well unless traditional forms of family authority 
were incorporated in the new venture. The aim then was to 
create .a new form of cooperative structure combining the 
advantages of traditional and modern leadership (The Sudan 
Government, 1972). This broadened the planning base, as 
locals were encouraged to participate in the planning pro­
cess through the so-called locally elected village 
councils. The scheme as it stands today could best be 
described as a major achievement in national development. 
Writing on The Agricultural Development of the Middle East, 
Keen passes the judgement that "the Gezira is, in fact, an 
illustration of how agricultural progress and rural 
development can best be made" (1972:30). The same holds, 
sixteen years later.
Land reform projects are another implication of a trans­
formation approach. The characteristic feature of this is 
the negation of the existing socio-economic system. The 
institutional forms of the traditional social structure are 
deemed to be the major constraints against efficient 
resource utilisation, labour mobilisation and capital form­
ation. Because the transformation approach involves
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massive financial investment, programmes are usually run 
under a rigid bureaucratic structure. Such management is 
likewise present in land reform projects introduced to 
change the traditional tenure system. Such policy derives 
impetus from the recognition by ambitious governments that 
the existing agricultural sector is marked with land- 
holding disparities that threaten equitable distribution of 
income. A prerequisite to any policy aimed at improving 
the well-being of small farmers should be the reallocation 
of landholdings to spread the benefits of innovation into a 
wide base. Examples of a land reform programme that have 
been repeatedly (and ironically) cited by planners are the 
collectivized farming system advocated by the Soviet 
government and the cooperativisation of agriculture in 
China (de Kadt and Williams, 1974); Land reform policies 
are said to correlate with socialist or communist orienta­
tions. As a matter of fact, land reform programmes are 
usually undertaken by a planned economy with the primary 
purpose of bridging the inequities between large and small 
subsistence farmers. But the experience of collectivised 
agriculture in China shows that such programmes are not 
confined to the reorganisation of agriculture. Rather it 
is aimed at fostering agricultural production both for 
local self-sufficiency and national development.
The economic implication of land reform policy is that it 
leads to maximum mobilisation of labour for effective re­
source utilisation. Furthermore, the large-scale farm is 
said to have the advantage of achieving greater returns and
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of curbing rural unemployment. External financial assist­
ance is often called for to finance land reform plans, 
coupled with mechanisation and the importation of green 
revolution techniques such as fertilizers, sprayers, etc. 
Such production inputs would no doubt increase production 
costs. This high cost of input would be offset by the 
large quantity of surplus product resulting from the use of 
high yielding crop varieties. The counter-argument 
directed against land reform programmes states that large 
units are not necessarily more productive. It has been 
proved that small-scale units yield more output per acre 
than large-scale farms. The other part of the criticism 
establishes the fact that tasks such as planning, marketing 
and input provision entail a burden on the state appara­
tus. Developing countries, due to the distinct character 
of their economies need not copy the model of advanced 
capitalist and socialist countries (Johnston, 1979).
The sociological problems inherent in land reform as a 
transformational device include conflict between poor 
peasants and agricultural workers on the one hand, and 
between cooperatives and governments on the other. Such 
problems are in practice likely to be due to government 
establishing adverse pricing policies which are unaccept­
able to the direct producer. For this reason it is often 
argued that the transformation approach can ensure only a 
moderate improvement in the overall economy.
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Some Categories of Programmes
More recently the World Bank drew up a variety of categor­
ies of rural development programmes that could directly 
eradicate rural poverty and unemployment. We turn to 
investigate these different development programmes.
1. The Integrated Rural Development Programme
The integrated rural development programme as viewed by 
World Bank officials is a coordinated approach whose 
purpose is to offer better employment opportunities and 
more equitable income distribution in the rural sector of 
Third World countries. This objective is to be achieved 
through the utilisation of local human and natural res­
ources with the assistance of imported technology and 
scientific research. It is so comprehensive and broad that 
it covers almost every aspect of the rural sector: liter­
acy, non-formal training, business, plantations, small 
farmers, forestry, public works, rural craft, social infra­
structure, construction of feeder roads and provision of 
inputs (ILO, 1979).
Experimental projects, pilot and intensive research work at 
the grassroot level are usually undertaken for the purpose 
of identifying potential advantages and contraints. 
Information is collected as regards land settlement, 
employment and infrastructure. The second step is the 
formulation of a coordinated programme that emphasises the 
participation of local people. Participation is stressed 
in the integrated rural development programme as a necess­
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ary condition if the benefits are to reach the rural poor 
(of Salmen, 1987).
The comprehensive strategy for the Sudan suggested by the 
International Labour Office (ILO) mission in Sudan in 1976 
is an illustrative example of an integrated rural develop­
ment programme. The report devoted considerable attention 
to growth, employment and equity for the rural sector of 
the Sudan. Putting into consideration the diverse 
structure of Sudan economy, the report urged "decentral­
isation" to allow effective coverage of the whole agricul­
tural sector of the national economy. For that matter, and 
to guarantee that subsistence farmers are reached by the 
programme the report recommended an "institutional frame­
work consisting of rural development centres in' each of the 
approximately 200 districts in the country, possibly under 
the aegis of a special ministry separate from the one 
involved with modern irrigated and mechanised farming" 
(ILO, 1979:14).
Issues covered in the report include rural labour markets, 
education and training, health and nutrition, animal 
husbandry, irrigated agriculture, mechanised rain-fed 
farming, construction, industrialisation, and traditional 
subsistence agriculture. The recommendations in the ILO 
report, however, proved too expensive so the Sudan govern­
ment followed only some of them in the Basic Programme for 
Agricultural Development 1977-1985.
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The major problem involved in an integrated programme is 
that it is very difficult to finance by a developing 
country, like the Sudan, burdened by balance of payments 
bottlenecks. Intensification of agricultural inputs 
requires sizeable government expenditure, a problem 
accentuated by the vastness of the whole country. Add­
itional cost will be incurred through farmer education, 
improved efficiency of crop marketing and credit for sub­
sistence farmers.
However, there are other reasons why the Sudan government 
fails to accept the ILO's policy objectives in its 
entirety. Policies involving income and land redistri­
bution, Marxists would argue, are more likely to be met 
with political opposition. This is substantiated by the 
fact that state machinery is part and parcel of the 
interest groups normally dominating modernized farming. 
Eric Clayton, for instance, notes the following -
"According to Emile Rado, ’the failure of the ILO’s 
policy objectives to gain political acceptance in 
developing countries themselves' was a fundamental 
weakness: it is evident 'the reason why' is that the 
pursuit of objectives of fuller employment and greater 
equity often conflicts with other goals that matter 
more to those in power in developing countries" 
(Clàyton, 1964:312).
In reaction to this the ILO turned its attention to 
policies that directly meet its objectives of reaching the
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majority of the rural poor. In the mid-1970's it suggested 
'Basic Needs' as an essential target of rural development. 
This was thought to be more humanitarian as it gives par­
ticular emphasis to the least disadvantaged group.
2. The Basic Needs Programme
The important aspects of this programme are the following. 
The first component relates to the encouragement of co­
operative units. National governments are advised to 
promote cooperatives and to provide them with the necessary 
credit, marketing facilities and infrastructural improve­
ment. The underlying assumption is that small farmers be 
mobilised and made to participate so as to initiate their 
own cooperatives. Secondly, agrarian reform is a thrust of 
the Basic Needs programme, as a measure of justice and 
equality (ILO, 1979). It is considered that farmers' 
associations and workers' organisations are the best insti­
tutional channels to pursue and guard their interests. 
Thirdly, agro-based industries and public works can provide 
ancillary employment opportunities for the mass of the 
populations. Finally, the programme is to be extended to 
cover issues such as credit, marketing, training, feeder 
roads, construction and health facilities.
Modernising traditional subsistence agriculture is thought 
to be achieved at two levels (a) the individual conditions 
of life and (b) the overall national economy (Mehta, 1984). 
A direct attack on poverty requires the elevation of the 
existing social structure to levels commensurate with
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modern technology. The training and provision of extension 
education for small farmers under such a programme help the 
latter adopt innovation and change their attitudes towards 
commercial production. The Basic Needs programme is prom­
ulgated to attain two complementary objectives. In the 
short-run it is hoped to assure a decent way of life by 
fulfilling the minimum human needs of shelter, clothes and 
food. The attainment of this goal, it is suggested, would 
contribute to the long-term objective of self-reliance. To 
translate these qualitative targets into monetary terms, it 
is suggested that the target population be looked at -
"not merely in terms of economic poverty and depriv­
ation in the sense of low incomes and lack of access 
to economic resources, but also in relation to con­
ditions of exploitation and oppression through social 
structures that deny people not only economic facilit­
ies but also human dignity and freedom of initiative" 
(ILO, 1979:10).
The underlying assumption of the Basic Needs model, how­
ever, renders commitment to its policy objectives question­
able, viz, that Third World governments are willing to 
divorce their centralised control for the sake of solving 
social and economic problems. It will be a mistake to 
believe that power-holders are likely to opt for policies 
and programmes that would utterly upset the status quo. It 
is for this reason that rural development programmes, in 
general, have led to rising frustration among the local 
populations of developing countries.
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A recent shift in national and international policy has 
seen a great emphasis put on sub-Saharan Africa’s 
development. This reflected a third category of
programmes; the Accelerated Development Programme.
3, The Accelerated Development Programme in 
Sub-Saharan Africa
This type of programme is very different from the other 
categories of programmes, in that it is meant to rehabili­
tate previous programmes to achieve a desirable rate of 
economic growth for the whole economy. The programme was 
initiated by the Berg Report of the World Bank in the early 
1980's in its agenda for developing those sub-Saharan 
African countries which failed to achieve a desirable rate 
of economic growth in their programmes of the 1960 *s and 
1970’s. The objective of the report was to foster the 
growth of the private sector (hence different from Basic 
Needs). Encouragement of the private sector enterprises 
was justified on the grounds that the private sector has 
already portrayed features commensurate with the goals of 
the new strategy (World Bank, 1981). This model to a large 
extent represents another version of the ’growth poles' 
strategy in which the bulk of investment is concentrated on 
areas of significant growth potential to serve as a nucleus 
for development. The rest of the population is assumed to 
benefit from 'trickle down' of accelerated growth.
As a result of this programme, arid and semi-arid regions 
where little by way of private sector exists continued to
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receive meagre attention (Allen, 1987:438). This increased 
attention to the private enterprise signaled a radical 
shift from previous rural development policies where the 
public sector had traditionally received the lion's share 
of government spending. The World Bank shift of policy is 
said to be due to the recognition that previous concen­
tration on the public sector led to substantial decline in 
foreign exchange revenue due to the bottlenecks in Africa's 
export production (World Bank, 1981). Stagnation in agri­
cultural production could also be attributed to the on­
slaught of famine and drought that had impacted the sub­
sistence sector during the 1970's and mid-1980's. The 
second part of the accusation directed against previous 
state-sponsored development programmes is that state 
intervention ultimately resulted in increasing disincent­
ives to farmers in relation to its adverse pricing 
policies. As an alternative the report has shown great 
concern for fostering the managerial capabilities of 
private enterprises to spearhead the process of agricultur­
al development. However, the public sector is not entirely 
excluded. In Clausen's words, "the public sector will have 
to meet the extensive needs for infrastructure, education, 
health and other services" (World Bank, 1981:V).
The objectives of the Accelerated Development strategy for 
sub-Saharan African countries are well stated in the World 
Bank Report of 1981: "it will help generate the resources 
Africa needs to consolidate its political and administra­
tive forces, educate and improve the health of its people,
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and find out what will work and what will not" (1981:7). 
To help achieve the above-mentioned objective, inter­
national assistance has shown a positive commitment to 
release larger aid flows to African governments. It is 
suggested that aid be raised from $4.9 to $9.1 billion to 
achieve a level of growth of 2.5% in regional per capita 
income by the end of the decade. As a reaction to the 
Bank's report, African countries invested a great deal of 
their foreign aid into the rehabilitation of previous pro­
jects, with high priority to productive projects. The 
World Bank report, however, identified the following 
obstacles to Africa's development. First, over the past 
twenty years the critical constraint has been the scarcity 
of skilled manpower. It emphasized that in sub-Saharan 
Africa over three quarters of the cadre were foreign 
(1981:9), a problem mainly attributable to unavailability 
of advanced educational facilities.
Secondly, political instability in most African states 
thwarted efforts to achieve sustained economic growth. The 
ill-effects of international violence has been (a) "high 
priority to short-term political objectives" (b) "large- 
scale displacement of people" and (c) "diversion of 
resources to military spending" (World Bank, 1981:11). 
Thirdly, the colonial heritage is considered as a 'relic' 
ill-suited for African future development. The structure 
of the economy inherited by the post-independence African 
countries is described as dual, with conflicting peripheral 
and modern industrial sectors. Fourthly, being located in
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the tropics is in itself an obstacle to development. The 
tropical zone is faced with inadequate rainfall, recurring 
drought, population diversion and desertification. 
Finally, population pressure meant that more people are to 
be fed from subsistence agriculture. This, in turn 
triggers off rapid migration from rural to urban towns. It 
has been estimated that population growth rate in Africa 
during the 1970's was approximately 2.7% per annum 
(1981:14).
The report, then, draws the conclusion that to arrest the 
inherited structural problems African governments are 
advised to utilise their substantial potential natural and 
human resources and harness them for future economic 
growth. However, the outlook still seems bleak insofar as 
drought, rural-urban migration and famine continue to 
persist.
The Critique of Rural Development Programmes
Lele (1975) in her assessment of rural development prog­
rammes in Africa, has summarised the limited effectiveness 
of these programmes in six main points. In the first place 
their weakness lies in the inflexibility of development 
policies due to an emphasis on specific target or types of 
crops. Second, the dearth of a research base and the 
limited knowledge on which programmes are based adversely 
affected programme policy and consequently its objectives. 
Thirdly, there is the problem of launching technologically 
inappropriate projects, largely due to limited knowledge
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and expertise. Fourth, the programmes are run under the 
sponsorship of often foreign administrative institutions 
inappropriate to the local conditions of African states. 
Fifth, these programmes are undertaken in the context of 
poorly understood socio-cultural and institutional environ­
ment. Finally, national policies themselves do not react 
to the likely impact of the projects in the implementation 
phase so as to make corrective action (Lele, 1975:176).
Lele, however, came under heavy attack from anthropologists 
for biasing her analysis towards the exogenous factors in­
fluencing rural development. Most of her attention is 
devoted to considering such components as agricultural 
extension, credit provision, marketing, the diversification 
of the productive activities, training and project admin­
istration. As a result she attributes project ineffective­
ness to bias in strategy toward export crops and the 
neglect of food production. But it is well recognised that 
projects are influenced both by external and internal fact­
ors. The internal factors are referred to as the rural 
milieu by David (David, 1976:95). The external factors 
include -
"the skilled human capital that can be made available 
to direct a development programme, the information 
that describes the resources endowment of the area and 
technology that is available to transform the resource 
endowment into desired consumer goods" (1976:95-96).
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According to David, the rural milieu refers to the 
indigenous social organisation in the community and goals 
shared among the groups in the local community. The second 
part of the attack directed by David is that the conflict 
between the values of the traditional economy and those 
embodied in the market economy is not given due attention. 
Plainly David's critique of Lele's analysis of the pro­
grammes also applies directly to the programmes themselves.
Yet again, another critique of rural development projects 
comes from Latin America in which the basic assumptions on 
which rural development are based are questioned (see eg 
Mabogunje, 1980:103). These critics point out that these 
development projects derive their impetus from modernis­
ation theories, which are imbued with the proyestismo 
ideology which assumes that -
"production in the inefficient antiquated agrarian 
sector in under-developed countries can be stimulated 
simply through modernisation efforts involving massive 
injections of advanced technology and outside capital, 
without any fundamental change in the existing 
agrarian sector" (1980:104).
The fact that the value system and traditional forms of 
production organisation ultimately come to have bearing on 
the modern agricultural practices is widely recognised. It 
is observed among certain Nigerian farmers that the 
adoption of export crop cultivation was influenced by 
adhering to the traditional farming methods (1980:101).
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Traditional techniques continued to be used along with the 
cultivation and processing of export crops which meant that 
Nigerian farmers' response to the economic situation was 
incomplete.
Dogma In Development Planning
Critics such as Singh (1986) designate programmes of 
development as 'dogma' in development planning mainly 
because such programmes are wedded to preconceived 
ideologies (eg crude modernisation theory), as substitute 
for full empirical research.
1. Rural Fundamentalism
Promoters of rural development have recently been criticis­
ed as being rural fundamentalists (Singh, 1986). In 
contrast to the developed world whose development resources 
are concentrated in the urban sector, rural development 
planning stresses the importance of the rural sector. 
Singh states that -
"in their enthusiasm to promote the cause of rural 
development, the promoters of this school of thought 
usually lend their disregard or underplay the linkage 
between the rural and the urban subsectors of the 
economy" (1986:25).
This outlook makes promoters of rural development rather 
similar to economist proponents of the dual economy model, 
which conceives of, on the one hand, a separated
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agricultural, unorganised traditional sector, and on the 
other hand a modern economically advanced urban sector in 
Third World countries.
2. Agricultural Fundamentalism
The second ’dogma’ - to use Singh’s term - in rural 
development theory is that of agricultural growth being 
taken as the engine of development. In contradistinction 
to industrial fundamentalism, this school of thought 
considers the concentration of investment resources in 
agriculture as a prerequisite for income generation. In­
come generated from this source is expected to be trans­
ferred to finance rural industrialisation (Singh, 1986). 
Its main concept is self-reliance. This school, again, 
pays little attention to the linkage between agriculture 
and industry, both the so-called forward and backward 
linkages. Criticism argues that if agriculture is to be 
self-sustaining it should rely on industrial inputs at 
cheap prices that can only be manufactured locally. To 
secure the necessary inputs it is necessary to foster 
industrial progress on an equal footing with agriculture. 
Furthermore, the argument goes, industry stimulates agri­
cultural growth as the former provides marketing outlets 
for goods produced in the agricultural sector. Consequent­
ly, development of both sectors of the national economy is 
further facilitated as the two subsectors become mutually 
reinforcing. One example repeatedly cited for linking 
traditional agriculture and industry is the integrated 
rural development strategy in Israel (Singh, 1986).
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Agricultural fundamentalism, moreover, does not escape the 
criticism directed to it concerning income redistribution - 
"Agricultural fundamentalism has generally resulted in 
growth without development mainly because of the lack 
of the linkage between the agricultural and non- 
agricultural sectors and partly because of the 
distribution of income being skewed in favour of big 
landlords" (Singh, 1986:26).
3. Planning Fundamentalism
Rural development planning provides the framework within 
which rural development is to be achieved. In addition, 
planning constructs general guidelines for sound goal 
achievement. With the attainment of independence nearly 
all developing nations are engaged in planning their 
economies, including the Sudan. It is argued that planning 
qualifies a developing nation to secure foreign aid as it 
represents a sense of commitment to development. Being 
ill-suited to 1ÏL issez-faire economic principles, developing 
countries are obliged to adhere to state regulation. How­
ever, counter-arguments see planning as a recurrent 
development dogma unless it reveals concrete benefits from 
the utilisation of scarce resources within the shortest 
time scheduled (Singh, 1986; Mehta, 1984). As stated 
earlier, policy-makers are influenced in their development 
plans by the dominant theoretical schools of thought. 
Wenger remarks the following -
"Already it can be seen that the selection of experts 
by the government or agency involved in itself
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represent value judgement, which can affect the nature 
of the policy which will be ultimately adopted" 
(Wenger, 1982:7).
Thus, the experience with rural development exhibits 
considerable divergence between theory and practice which 
is, perhaps, attributable to arm-chair professionals who 
are usually divorced from the rural scene, but, more 
importantly, often influenced by western ideologies that 
are inimical to local values and traditions.
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CHAPTER 3 
The Setting;
Social and Economic Organisation in the NuJba Mountains
Prior to investigating the Habila scheme proper we need to 
furnish basic ethnographic data on the Nuba Mountains 
region as this relates to the socio-economic background of 
the scheme and to major relevant social trends and socio­
political structure. The aim is to bring to the fore the 
social and cultural factors impinging on and directly 
affecting the process of rural development in the region. 
The basic sources upon which this description draws include 
Nadel (1947), Tothill (1948), Henderson (1953), Barbour 
(1961), Nasr (1971), Iten (1979), Stevenson (1984) and 
Baumann (1980; 1984; 1987).
The Nuba Mountains cover an area of approximately 30,000 
square miles in South Kordofan, Sudan, situated between 
Long 29° and 31°31’E and Lat 10° and 12° 30’N. The area 
lies between the 450mm and 850mm mean annual isohyets, and 
the soil is composed of rich clay and gardud (ie mixture of 
clay and soil). It is well watered by the summer rains 
which provide rich vegetation with acacia and heavy grass. 
As part of the savanna formation, rainfall starts at May or 
June and lasts until October. Fertility of the land 
increases gradually as one moves from the north to the 
south where a network of wadi beds (valleys) is manifest.
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The area is surrounded by a chain of sporadic hills which 
rise up to 3,000 feet above the plains and 5,000 feet above 
sea level.
The Nuba are a diverse ethnic group speaking a variety of 
dialects, but in common use the Arabic language as a 
lingua franca. The majority of the Nuba have professed 
Islam, though a few are still pagans and Christians. The 
population numbers approximatley 800,000 people who are 
predominantly agriculturists, practicing subsistence 
cultivation. The main crops grown include dura, cotton, 
sesame, tobacco and vegetables. Dura is the main staple 
crop for the inhabitants and occupies most of the area 
under cultivation. Cultivation is generally practiced on 
three main types of farms. In the vicinity of the family 
household there is the house farm run exclusively by women. 
Women use this farm for the cultivation of crops such as 
okra, chillies, pepper and beans for home consumption. In 
the neighbourhood of the hills there are the hill farms, 
and further, in the plains, there are the far farms. The 
latter types are used by men, in collaboration with women, 
for the cultivation of dura and other crops. The Nuba also 
keep animals such as cattle, goats, sheep and donkeys. In 
addition, some poultry and pigs are raised though the 
latter is in decline with the spread of Islam throughout 
the region. The animals are valuable for supplying milk to 
the household members and as a means of storing wealth. 
Animals also provide part of the bride-wealth and consti­
tutes ceremonial expenditure on such occasions as
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cicatrization, circumcision and marriage. Donkeys on the 
other hand are the main means of transportation for the 
Nuba peasants.
Cattle is grazed by the young Nuba while the elders take 
care of the farming activities and the domestic affairs. 
In the wet season the cattle are taken further to the north 
in the Qoz to avoid crop damage in the far farms. In the 
dry season the cattle graze close to the family farms so as 
to provide manure for the preservation of soil fertility. 
In the near past cattle was also kept as a symbol of 
prestige and social status; but with the increasing circul­
ation of money in the economy this practice has declined in 
importance. Cattle are largely in the ownership of other 
settled tribes in the area such as the Baggara Arabs, the 
Messiriya and the Hawazma. The Baggara and the Messiriya 
follow a life of subsistence cultivation and cattle rais­
ing, though subsistence farming is recently gaining import­
ance over animal husbandry. This has led to the increasing 
sédentarisation of these groups with the consequence that 
pressure on the land is becoming manifest.
Land Tenure and Agricultural Operations
The predominant form of land tenure prior to the intro­
duction of the Habila scheme and the issuing of the Unreg­
istered Land Act of 1970 was the traditional communal 
ownership of land. The Unregistered Land Act stipulates 
that all unregistered Land belongs to the government. This 
mainly applies to that part of the agricultural land which
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was traditionally labelled as the no-man's-land and was, 
therefore, accessible to every member of the community. In 
the traditional system of communal land ownership, member­
ship in the community entitles individuals to hold land. A 
recognised member establishes the right to particular land 
by clearance, borrowing or inheritance. Distribution of 
land and the settlement of disputes over land between 
community members was the responsibility of the village 
shaikh. At present, with the exception of land claimed by 
the state under the provisions of the Unregistered Land 
Act, individual use applies to all cultivable land in the 
region. In accordance with tradition, land is seldom, if 
at all, sold or purchased. In the patrilineal Nuba societ­
ies land is inherited by the elder son or divided equally 
by the sons. In the matrilineal societies, on the other 
hand, land passes to the sister's son or to the brothers. 
The matrilineal system is nowadays giving way to the patri­
lineal kinship system and as a result most of the land 
passes from father to son.
Women's contribution in agriculture is indispensable; no 
less valuable than that of men. In addition to running 
domestic household affairs Nuba women assist in the culti­
vation of the family farm, mainly in sowing, winnowing and 
planting operations. In the traditional system, it is they 
who are engaged in the brewing of beer for the work parties 
recruited on a reciprocal basis. Each family owns a small 
plot of land cultivated by family members. The different 
types of farms - the hill farms, house farms and the far
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farms - are designed to take advantage of the different 
ecological niches in the region. This advantage is not, 
however, fully exploited since family land cannot be 
expanded sufficiently, given the low level of technology.
The techniques of agriculture remain traditional and simple 
as the bulk of the agricultural work is carried out by 
hand. The agricultural tools include the axe for cutting 
the bushes, the torea for weeding, the munjal for harvest­
ing and the dagqaga for threshing the crop. These tools 
are manufactured by the local smiths, especially those 
residing in the big urban towns such as Kadugli and 
Billing. Most of the peasants get their tools on purchase 
from the market at relatively low prices.
Community Solidarity and Allegiances
The Nuba are characterised by their strong community sol­
idarity and inter-community allegiances which find express­
ion at celebrations of harvesting (locally called the 
orinyate), and also in wrestling between members of differ­
ent communities. This stimulated a sense of competition 
between the various villages as well as individual 
community pride and cohesion (Baumann, 1987). In the near 
past, features of a particular community which 
distinguished it from others used to be explained at the 
supernatural and the cultural levels.
For example, Nadel has shown that the Nuba farmers of Tira 
and Moro were considered by other neighbouring communities 
as excellent farmers not because they "concentrated more
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completely on agricultural work but also because they 
possessed a certain magic which no other tribe could 
emulate" (Nadel, 1947:22). These are the cultural factors 
seen at the macro-community level.
There is also considerable cultural variability between the 
Nuba indigenes and the Arab settlers in the area. Baumann 
argues that the category, Arabs, in the Nuba Mountains 
region includes the Baggara Arabs whom we mentioned earl­
ier and, in addition, a group of Jellaba merchants and 
officials from the northern and western parts of the Sudan
(1987:63). But in spite of the fact that the majority of
the Nuba communities continue to cling to their traditional 
customs and values, they are receptive to Islamic ideology 
and the Arab ways of life and material culture. The pene­
tration of Islam and the Arabic language was facilitated by 
the presence of the Arab settlers who possess a culture 
seemingly superior from the point of view of the indigenous 
communites. Complete assimilation of the Nuba in respect 
of the Arabic and Islamic culture is restricted due to the 
hostility between the Arabs and the Nuba villagers. The 
origin of this hostility goes back to the pre-colonial era 
and was concomitant with the inter-tribal wars of that 
time. Jackson observed that in the early days of the 
immigration of the Baggara into the Nuba Mountains, they 
seized the fertile land and "drove the Nuba back into their
fastness" (Jackson, 1955:172). As a result the Nuba
occupied the less fertile land in the neighbourhood of the 
hills and continued to pursue a very low level subsistence
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agriculture. Related to this is, also, the fact that the 
Nuba populations became distributed into wider and sparse 
settlements thereby restricting inter-community solidarity 
and cohesion. The position which the Nuba have occupied 
vis-a-vis the Arabs since then is one of the underdog; "the 
hill Nuba never succeeded in asserting themselves against 
the Arbs as did the Fur" (1955:201). The Arabs, by rel­
egating the Nuba to the less fertile land were able to 
command the bulk of the fertile land. In consequence they 
were the first in the region to use hired paid labour in 
place of family labour. They are also responsible for the 
introduction of the recent changes in the Nuba economy at 
large. In 1947 Nadel observed that rifles, clothes, salt 
and iron were the items first introduced by the Arabs in 
the tribal economy (1947:70). Paid labour was recruited by 
minority Jellaba merchants to work on cotton plantations 
which since the 1920’s received encouragement on the part 
of the colonial administration. The rural markets came to 
be dominated by these merchants, who could supply sugar, 
tea and clothes which came to be increasingly in demand by 
the local villagers. The magnitude of change in the local 
economy could be discerned from a geographer's description- 
"The weekly markets bring Nuba and Baggara together, 
and give the merchants a chance to sell their imported 
wares. With the growth of the cotton trade, the Nuba 
beginning to come to market in lorries with a sack of 
their produce, rather than to ride there on donkeys, 
they buy sugar and tea and ornaments for the women, 
and there is increasing demand for coloured robes for
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and iron were the items first introduced by the Arabs in 
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minority Jellaba merchants to work on cotton plantations 
which since the 1920’s received encouragement on the part 
of the colonial administration. The rural markets came to 
be dominated by these merchants, who could supply sugar, 
tea and clothes which came to be increasingly in demand by 
the local villagers. The magnitude of change in the local 
economy could be discerned from a geographer's description- 
"The weekly markets bring Nuba and Baggara together, 
and give the merchants a chance to sell their imported 
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the women to wear on special occasions. The larger 
markets depend less on the Nuba or Baggara than on the 
official, police, and soldiery for their customers" 
(Barbour, 1961:177).
The term Jellaba bears some derogatory connotations. It 
refers to those rich merchants coming from the Northern 
provinces of the Sudan to amass wealth in the less favour­
able and economically backward regions so as to further 
their own advancement. Such derogation derives from 
notions held on the part of the indigenes that such 
commercial orientation implies manipulation and deceitful 
mercantile practices. This outlook is reinforced by the 
villagers’ recognition that engagement in trade of this 
type jeopardizes communal moral values since at- the altar 
of mercantile values modern trade transforms face-to-face 
and personal relations into new impersonal ones. For this 
reason the Jellaba are given little respect by the Nuba 
peasants who in turn came to treat them with circumspec­
tion. All in all, the Jellaba and other Arab groups, by 
virtue of their solid mercantile base, have theoretically 
become well equipped to respond to any state-initiated 
approach for the development of the region. The Nuba 
peasants, working as they do on smallholdings, could not 
produce over and above subsistence requirements. The 
profile of their traditional agricultural economy portrays 
a very poorly developed local infrastructure. Their 
rivals, the Jellaba, are progressive groups but on their 
part do not make any contribution to community development
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since their efforts are directed toward extracting wealth 
from the region. Baumann describes the position these 
groups occupy in the local economy and the role they are 
apt to play, which effectively leads to the sabotage of 
rural development, he states that ~
"The settlement of Jellaba merchants that in most 
towns of the Nuba Mountains has taken place from the 
1950s, has been culturally antagonising and socially 
divisive, and it has done little for productive rural 
development" (1987:195-196).
Policies Toward the Nuba
The totality of conditions surrounding and shaping the Nuba 
people's material existence today cannot be adequately 
understood without reference to the colonial administra­
tion's 'Nuba policy' of the 1920's and 1930's. The encour­
aging economic development that took place in the region 
with the introduction of rain-cotton schemes opened new 
horizons for the Gillan (the then Governor of Kordofan 
region) administration as regards enhancing Nuba mental 
capacity to make development a self-sustained process. For 
Gillan, the Nuba problem was twofold: the existence of
different Nuba 'stocks', stages of civilisation, multiplic­
ity of dialects and cultures on the one hand, and the 
contiguity between these Nuba stocks and the Arabs on the 
other (Henderson, 1953). Having defined the Nuba problem 
in such terms, Gillan posed the following intricate 
question -
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"Can we evolve a structure or a series of structures 
to fit all these cultures and stages of civilisation? 
Can we at the same time preserve all that is best in 
the Nuba side by side with an Arab civilisation? 
...Can the Nuba ... maintain his traditions and cul­
ture in the face of these new conditions, and what 
steps can the government take to help him" (1953:497).
Explicit in educational policy for the Nuba was the idea of 
fostering schooling modelled as close as possible upon 
Christian establishments. However, the closeness between 
the Nuba and the Arabs was one of the bottlenecks in res­
pect of Christianisation becoming a sustained process. 
This is so because the administration believed that accul­
turation of the Nuba in respect of Arab material culture 
would of necessity imply their conversion into Islam (Nasr, 
1971). It had also become plain that the introduction of 
rain-grown cotton cultivation stimulated the migration of a 
considerable proportion of the hill populations into the 
plains. Such migration brought the Nuba villagers into 
even closer contact with the Arabs (Nasr, 1971; Baumann, 
1987).
For Nuba educational policy to achieve its target of pres­
erving the Nuba culture and tradition intact from Arabic- 
Islamic influence the Arabic language had to be excluded 
from being the principal medium of instruction (Nasr,1971). 
It was believed, Nasr argues, that the selection of the 
Arabic language as a medium of instruction would be
- 75 -
irrational since it implies the exposure of Nuba pupils to 
Arabic literature and, consequently, greater Islamization. 
To reduce the influence of Arabic on the indigenous people 
a policy of separating Arab and Nuba pupils was then 
advocated. Pupils of Arab extraction could also receive 
missionary education with the consent of their parents. As 
for Nuba pupils, while they were separated, "Gillan for a 
time successfully advocated teaching [them] Arabic by using 
a transliteration in Roman script" (Baumann, 1987:13). 
However, the success of this primary schooling was largely 
piecemeal since an array of practical and technical diffi­
culties later presented itself. According to Nasr, the 
government discovered in 1930 that the four government 
Kuttabs (Ar: Muslim elementary schools) located at Kadugli, 
Billing and Rashad town were also teaching Islam to Nuba 
pupils. "The schools", he posits,"were becoming centres of 
propaganda for Islam" (Nasr, 1971:24). A decree was then 
issued to stop instructing Nuba pagans Arabic and 
Mohammadan religion, but it did not have any concrete 
success. As a complement to these problems were the tech­
nical and practical difficulties the missionaries faced 
with respect to Romanized transliteration of Arabic. To 
quote Nasr -
"The technical difficulty was that of Arabic vowels, 
and the practical difficulties were two: to find
suitable native teachers (the government and mission 
would not accept a Muslim Arab teacher), and to 
provide literature. A certain ex-soldier was found
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and appointed as a teacher, and it was hoped that 
other native teachers would turn up. A Nuba Arabic 
Reader was written in Roman script with additon of a 
few extra symbols, duplicated and sent out in a hurry 
with a number of errors" (1971:25-26).
In the face of these difficulties it became apparent to 
Gillan that a 'Nuba renaissance' independent of Arabic- 
Islamic influence was not forthcoming. Arabicization, in 
the meantime, gained an increasing momentum, a phenomenon 
attested to by the fact that a considerable proportion of 
the Nuba adopted Arabic language as the basic lingua 
franca. However, despite the practical difficulty inherent 
in Nuba educational policy Gillan never set himself the 
task of correcting his policy to meet the interests of the 
Nuba people. He foresaw the continuation of such policy 
being likely to end up in one of two possible outcomes. As 
quoted in Baumann -
"Even if the experiment is eventually a failure it 
probably does not matter. What does matter is that 
for the next 20 years or so the Nuba should have the 
best chance of finding his place in the sun. If he 
fails (or if we let him fail) he will become a 
third-rate Arab and may as well write in Arabic 
character if he writes at all. If he succeeds he will 
remain a Nuba in whatever type of character he finds 
he can write" (1982:12).
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Ethnographie research undertaken during the Newbold (the 
successor to Gillan) administration in the 1930's came up 
with findings which later provided guidelines for sound 
future educational policy. Paradoxically, such research, 
provided by Nadel in his monograph The Nuba (1947), turned 
out to be instrumental in carrying Gillan's Nuba policy to 
its limits. The monograph helped isolate those aspects of 
the Nuba culture and beliefs most inimical to Islam, and 
which could safely be encouraged. "According to Newbold", 
Nasr argues, "the Kujurs [Possession and rain priests] who 
are bulwarks against Islam were the only support the 
government had against crime and immorality in some areas" 
(Nasr, 1971:30). However, in another context, Newbold 
plainly admits that with administration being his prof­
ession and responsibility, the secular administration of a 
country should be influenced by the Christian ethic and 
virtues (Henderson, 1953:462). The mission, for its part, 
was not sympathetic to enhancing the Nuba belief in the 
supernatural nor to the fostering of native practices. 
While government looked upon the Kujurs as instrumental to 
ensuring control and social order, the mission looked upon 
them as "pagan witch-doctors and foes" (Nasr, 1971:30).
Meanwhile, the British administration made great strides 
towards introducing the native administration system in 
order to involve traditional leaders in the running of 
local affairs. Such leaders as the mek (Ar: Paramount
chief) and the shaikhs (Ar: village chiefs), were consid­
ered ideal as the agents for project execution in the
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various territorial units to be affected by the agricultur­
al policy (1953:495). Illiterate though the mek and the 
shaikhs might be, the administration was able later to 
integrate them in the native administration system, to 
adjudicate on matters of Nuba law. Ironically the Kujurs 
were also often to be incumbent in such chiefly office, 
but according to Nasr, they enjoyed limited judicial power 
as regards the preservation of social order.
These facts historically underscore the present day weak 
and fragmented nature of traditional leadership in the Nuba 
Mountains region. Moreover, from among those Nuba 
villagers who were successful in getting access to primary 
education a sizeable number took to labour migration in the 
1950's (Baumann, 1987; Nasr, 1971). The rain-grown cotton- 
schemes' performance continued to deteriorate due to the 
impact of World War Two as well as the World Depression of 
the 1930's. The economic infrastructure of the region in­
herited at independence was characteristically poor, 
supporting sparsely populated villages in fragmented admin­
istrative units. Administratively, the traditional 
leaders, the shaikh or village chief, were ill-equiped to 
handle local matters related to village welfare. To some 
extent the government did succeed in unifying the fragment­
ed ethnic groups, but this unification was only secured 
spatially. This was the inevitable outcome of the 
commercialisation of the economy, the slight improvement in 
feeder roads and communication, and the expansion of trade.
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spearheaded by the progressive Jellaba group. This flour­
ishing trade was stimulated by the abolition of the Closed 
District Act in 1937, which encouraged the immigration of 
Arab traders into the region (Nasr, 1971). The Jellaba 
trading activities and their coexistence with the 
indigenous Nuba villagers accentuated the cultural heter­
ogeneity characteristic of Nuba society. Paradoxically the 
intensified contacts between these diverse ethnic groups 
have ushered in a heightened cultural consciousness among 
the Nuba. "It is only recently", Stevenson argues, "with 
the increased contacts all over the hills, that some sense 
of a common Nuba-ness has developed" (Stevenson, 1984:11). 
However, this sense is not overtly expressed beyond the 
boundaries of the local community since it does not entail 
the dissolution of inter-community rivalry (eg as manifest 
in wrestling and sometimes open hostility between communit­
ies). For Baumann, the analysis presented at another level, 
while a sense of common Nuba-ness obtains -
"This 'Nuba-ness'... tends to be defined not on the 
strength of what one Nuba group may share with 
another, but on what separates them from the Arab- 
Sudanese populations of the region. To define one­
self or one's group as Nuba inevitably stresses the 
distinction from groups which are summarily called 
Arab, be they Baggara cattle nomads, or merchants or 
administrators originating from the Northern 
provinces" (1987:9).
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Not only does such a separation between the Nuba indigenes 
and Jellaba and other Arabs continue to define the position 
of one group vis-a-vis another; it is also deliberately 
maintained by the Jellaba since these people occupy the 
commanding heights of the economy - their exclusive control 
over domestic trade. While chiefly office may be the pre­
rogative of native elders such prestige never puts them in 
an advantageous position in relation to the Jellaba. The 
latter, however, by virtue of their Northern extraction, 
have, since independence, come to dominate modern state 
machinery (Shepherd, 1983:298). Due to the lack of an edu­
cated elite from the region the post-independence state 
still continues with its reliance on chiefly office for 
running village affairs. The shaikh's experience with 
native administration is deemed sufficient to qualify him 
for mediating between the people and the rural Councils. 
The shaikh's role in local government itself is confined to 
the collection of property and poll taxes. The meagre tax 
revenue generated from the few privileged and propertied 
groups has meant that the regional government had little by 
way of resources at its disposal for advancing facilities 
and social services to accelerate economic development. In 
1971 the people's Land Government Act was passed to encour­
age popular participation via the creation of a system of 
elected rural councils answerable to provincial commission­
ers at the regional level. Under the provisions of this 
act regional governments have been made administratively 
autonomous, and have been empowered with more staff and 
given separate financial responsibilities. The assumption
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has been made that régionalisation is the most efficient 
way of redressing the dualistic economic structure since 
each independent region would be committed to its own 
progress. However, the people's local government system 
has met with severe criticism on the part of students of 
political economy. Adams, for example, comments -
"financial powers were not devolved and the potential 
for non-sectoral integrated planning and implement­
ation at the provincial level was poor between 
officials in the provincial and district HQs and the 
people in the countryside" (1982:32).
The havoc the local government system wreaked not only in­
hibited the economic growth of the less advantaged Regions 
but also drained them of their resources in favour of the 
urban centres and the central government in particular (cf 
Rodinelli, 1983). As a consequence labour migration of the 
Nuba villagers to the urban cities took enormous propor­
tions, motivated by the search for off-farm employment 
opportunities. One other factor contributing to labour 
migration relates to the disparity in the levels of living 
between the Nuba villagers and the progressive Jellaba. 
This is reflected in the differential lifestyle of both 
groups. In his ethnographic description of the Jellaba 
group. Manger maintains that-
"Diacritical features like dress (jellabia), language 
(Arabic) in some places, house type and religious 
piety make them stand out from the locals, especially
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in places like the Nuba Mountains which traditionally 
was, a non-Arabic, non-Muslim area"(Manger, 1984:215),
The drift of large numbers of villagers to urban towns 
testifies to the growing recognition on the part of these 
migrants of wealth being a criterion of social status. In 
addition to urban industral or manual employment the period 
also witnessed the recruitment in the big cities of Nuba 
adults as soldiers (Baumann, 1987; Nasr, 1973). The 
migrants and urban-based soldiers occasionally return to 
the home village and continue to display concern for their 
own village’s development and welfare (Baumann, 1987). This 
moral commitment to one's village community is bolstered by 
the migrants consolidating their power in connection with 
their gradual participation in the national government. The 
union these urban-based Nuba people formed, The General 
Union of the Nuba, despite its limited success in the nat­
ional parliamentary elections of 1964 is still "well rem­
embered and enjoys considerable sympathy among the urban 
Nuba" (1987:19). Indigenous leadership, however, remained 
sporadic and politically insignificant. With the intensive 
support mirgrants offer their village communities in the 
face of mounting poverty, the dominant trend which con­
tinues to take shape, is the development of consciousness 
among the Nuba populations. This consciousness emanates, 
inter alia, from the intensified ties the migrants and 
settlers have successfully established as a counteraction 
to the disintegration of communal solidarity concomitant 
with the forces of rural-urban migration. At the present
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time the position of the Nuba could be implied in the 
following statement: A growing concern on the part of the 
various communities, expressed in the desire to form co­
operative institutions, to allow the villagers to have a 
share in the economic and political process of the country. 
Communities studied by a number of anthropologists which 
displayed a concern for creating cooperatives as a positive 
step toward that end include the Miri (Baumann, 1987), Kao, 
Nyaro and Fungor (Iten, 1979), and the Moro (Salih, 1984). 
This attitude, however, may be contrasted with the sceptic­
ism expressed towards cooperatives whose structures imply 
the inclusion of outsiders, eg the Arabs, officials and 
Jellaba traders. Involvement in cooperatives with such 
indisciminate organisation is looked askance at as leading 
to the accentuation of the inegalitarian relationship be­
tween these progressive groups and local villagers.
Development in The Region
The Nuba Mountains region represents a paradox of being one 
of the most backward parts of western Sudan while, at the 
same time, being "potentially better suited to balanced 
development than any other part of the country away from 
the Nile" (Barbour, 1961:179). The country has long been 
neglected on the part of the colonial administration and 
the post-independence development plans. In common with 
other parts of western Sudan, the Nuba Mountains province 
was declared by the colonial administration a closed area 
in 1913 in accordance with the Closed Area Ordinance of 
1902. The aim was to restrict the spread of Islam and Arab
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influence and to "build up a series of self-contained 
racial or tribal units with the structure and organisation 
based upon the indigenous custom" {Ayoub, 1976:177). But 
due to the failure to achieve this goal, the order was re­
pealed in 1929. The colonial government made an intense 
effort to put the economic potential of the area into use 
and succeeded in introducing short staple American cotton. 
In 1924 it established the Nuba Mountains Cotton Corpor­
ation which was assigned the responsibility of ginning and 
marketing cotton production. It was also assigned the 
function of freely distributing cotton seeds to the Nuba 
farmers who were willing to cultivate cotton in their own 
landholdings.
Peak commercial development in the region was witnessed 
with the establishment of eight ginneries as cotton pro­
duction showed enormous success in the 1920's and 1930*. 
During World War Two the production of cotton showed 
continuous decline and later by independence in 1956 re­
corded its lowest production target. The expansion of 
cotton and trade was spearheaded by the Jellaba merchants 
and this engendered change in the structure of the local 
economy. The reason behind the decline in cotton produc­
tion in the area was that cultivation of dura came to be 
more important as a result of rising food prices; this 
culminated in the late 1960's and 1970's (see eg Salih, 
1984:200). But most importantly cotton itself was also 
competing with dura and sesame for scarce labour, though,
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as well as this, cotton's price has been declining (Thimm, 
1979:29). Table 1 shows this trend of declining cotton 
production since the mid-1960's (see page 89).
In 1967 a rehabilitation project was implemented and the 
Nuba Mountains Agricultural Production Corporation (NMAPC), 
a state-sponsored organisation, was made responsible for 
the promotion of modernisation in the region. The Corpor­
ation's major job was the provision of tractors and 
services to groups of farmers who undertook the initial 
operations of clearing and weeding by manual labour. Today 
the size of holdings currently in operation varies from a 
minimum of 12 feddans to 26 feddans but, according to 
Thimm, the majority of the Nuba farmers continue to culti­
vate their own traditional farms (Thimm, 1979).
The importance of the NMAPC and the modernisation projects 
under its sponsorship is that it led to the creation of 
employment opportunities for the local inhabitants who 
could combine traditional cultivation with hiring out their 
labour in the schemes. The magnitude of this could be seen 
in the following description by Baumann -
"Wage-labour on large-scale schemes in some areas, 
earnings from small-scale cash-cropping in others, and 
income remittances from labour migration have combined 
to introduce cash transactions into even remoter parts 
of the Nuba Mountains" (Baumann, 1987:18).
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other benefits derived from the schemes include better 
access roads which "have come to the region earlier than 
could be expected without the scheme" (Thimm, 1979:32). 
However, the schemes are not without their own short­
comings. Organisational and administrative problems due to 
the shortage of skilled manpower adversely affected the 
schemes'policies and its operational efficiency (Baumann, 
1987:18; Thimm, 1979:32). Furthermore, being biased to­
wards the production of cotton as a main cash crop, with 
only little attention given to food crops, the scheme could 
not succeed in contributing to self-sufficiency in food 
production. Dura occupies only a smaller proportion of the 
total cropped area despite being in greater demand by local 
villagers. The prospect of the scheme to expand into the 
areas which have not been affected by modernisation such as 
south-east Nuba Mountains is still bleak since a host of 
problems persist to adversely affect the schemes perform­
ance. Thimm summarises these problems in the following -
"From the outset of the scheme, progress was erratic 
for a number of reasons. The original programme to 
acquire 60 new tractors per year could not be met, and 
as a result of lack of workshop facilities, spare 
parts, and fuel shortages, the areas to be modernised 
fell drastically. This situation was compounded by 
the lack of technical personnel, adequate housing, and 
transport, which meant that the supervision of the 
scheme was impossible. In specific locations problems 
of domestic water sources, ... soil exhaustion result­
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ing from monocropped cotton, and difficulties with 
farmers who owned and migrated with livestock delayed 
progress" (Thimm, 1979:32).
Cotton schemes introduced since 1924 and later rehabilit­
ated in the 1960’s were and still are ill adapted to bring 
about a total transformation on the regional economy. The 
need to foster food production in the Southern Kodofan 
province led the government into invoking large-scale 
mechanisation as the appropriate means towards achieving 
that target.
— 88 —'
Table 1 Cotton Statistics NMAPC (Nuba Mountains Agricultural Production Corporation)
Acreage Produc- Average Price per Net Pro-
1965/66
1966/67
1967/68
1968/69
1969/70
1970/71
1971/72
1972/73
1973/74
1974/75
1975/76
1976/77
(Fed)
221291
271690
142835
202361
227103
171642
195726
135700
115393
103511
92667
tion(KT)
587595
765340
363497
542655
65698
353465
515151
461820
221723
211429
319342
Yield (KT) ceeds(KT/Fed) paid to NMAPC1st 2nd (LSIOOO) grade grade
115033.5 346132
Source; Iten (1979),pl53.
2.65
2.81
2.54
2.68
2.86
2.11
2.63
2.39
2.0
4.0 
3.5
3.0
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
2.0
2.4
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
3.0 
3.2
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9
1.9 
2.5
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
164.6 
66.4
188.7
183.2
877.2
2.75 231.2
2.75 n.a.
3.0 n.a.
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CHAPTER 4 
The Habila Scheme
The Habila scheme is described by a number of scholars, 
most of whom are economists, with specific reference to 
major economic issues such as income redistribution, 
employment and production efficiency. Affan (1978), 
Kersany (1983), O’Brien (1978) and Saeed (1982) have dis­
cussed these issues and their work will form the basis of 
my description of the scheme. However, the cooperatives 
established as part of the scheme are not analysed in any 
of these writings and are merely made mention of in pass­
ing. These are my concern. Although there is a dearth of 
extensive facts about these cooperatives it is evident that 
they were unsuccessful; my analysis is intended to bring to 
bear the broader social and cultural factors which will, 
almost certainly, have underpinned this lack of success.
The Habila scheme is a large-scale, state-sponsored mech­
anised scheme introduced in Southern Kordofan in the early 
1970's and later extended in 1975/76 with the objective of 
getting rural development underway. The scheme bears the 
characteristics of the 'transformation approach' in devel­
opment planning (see p47) and it is therefore essential 
that we designate it as such. We have stated in chapter 2 
that in spite of the differences inherent in the two main 
theoretical approaches to development practice - the 
improvement and the transformation - they may still over­
lap. We have established that the transformation approach
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advocates radical change in both methods of production and 
types of the production unit, as well as population dis­
locations and movements and state intervention. The Habila 
scheme fits squarely in this definition for three main 
reasons. Firstly, it is state-sponsored and involves the 
collaboration in the undertaking of international financial 
institutions such as the World Bank and its International 
Development Association (IDA). Such joint effort provided 
the required technological package and capital which 
enabled the projects to get underway. Secondly, it entails 
the replacement of traditional smallholder agricultural 
units by large-scale mechanised farms based on the recruit­
ment of wage labour. Thirdly, it has as its primary objec­
tive the formation of agricultural cooperatives as an 
efficient means of improving the incomes of the participant 
cultivators. The latter objective is justified on grounds 
of equity and to spread the benefits of the project into 
the whole region. As concerns population movements, the 
scheme was meant to attract a large proportion of migrants 
from neighbouring regions, especially Northern Kordofan and 
Darfur and the Southern provinces. Thus, the scheme was 
meant to revolutionise the overall structure of the trad­
itional sector in the Savanna belt. The ILO report recomm­
ended mechanisation policies to deal with labour shortage 
and rural unemployment. It states that-
"As long as income opportunities in the traditional 
sector are low, mechanised rain-fed and irrigated 
agriculture are capable of transforming income from 
the modern to the traditional sector via the mech­
anism of labour migration" (1976:25).
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The main thrust of the Habila scheme is that large-scale 
mechanisation of rain-fed agriculture supported by 
intensive capital investment is sufficient to harness 
domestic resources for home consumption as well as for 
export revenues. The policy towards mechanisation of the 
savanna belt in Southern Kordofan and particularly in
Habila had the following components. The first was to put
otherwise uncultivated land resources under cultivation 
lest its fertility degenerates over time. This was 
justified by the fact that population pressure over land is 
minimal and the land itself not claimed by the community. 
This uncultivated land was traditionally named 
no-man's-land (see Nadel, 1947), and the government
therefore had good cause to make possession of it under the 
provisions of the Unregistered Land Act of 1970. Secondly, 
there is the component which relates to the efficiency of 
machinery as opposed to labour-intensive operations in the 
clay-plains of Southern Kordofan region. According to 
O'Brien the traditional system of cultivation was
considered to be incapable of making efficient use of land 
since it is based on a pattern of long fallow cultivation. 
This system requires that a farmer should at any one time 
have access to "like five times as much land as he needs to
cultivate .. . for it takes a number of years for the
natural vegetation to grow up again and improve the soil 
of abandoned plots" (1978:2). The other part of the 
argument is associated with the low production in 
traditional agriculture relative to mechanised farming 
(O'Brien, 1978:2), the underlying assumption being that
expansion of cultivation is possible only under
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conditions of mechanisation, thanks to the labour-saving 
property of machinery.
The third component of the mechanisation policy relates to 
the production of dura and sesame for the self-sufficiency 
of the local population as part of the objective of improv­
ing people's quality of life in general. The fourth 
component of mechanisation is the state's emphasis on 
production of a cash crop to facilitate foreign exchange 
(1978:2).
The Habila scheme is situated between Lat 11° and 12°N and 
Long 24° and 34° E in the Southern Kordofan province. The 
scheme as we see it today has been implemented in two 
phases. The old Habila of 1968 was supplemented by the New 
Habila in 1970 as part of the Horizontal Expansion Strategy 
which is basically concerned with the utilisation of the 
vast fallow reserves in the western savanna for agricul­
tural expansion. The project was selected to provide a 
nucleus for spreading the benefits of development to the 
rest of western Sudan which had been hitherto neglected in 
post-independence national development plans. Thus, the 
scheme was incorporated in the Five Year Plan of the econ­
omic and social development 1970/71-1975/76 which visual­
izes huge investment in agriculture to accelerate the 
economy's rate of growth.
The Mechanised Farming Corporation was established in 1968 
as a supervisory unit and was assigned the responsibility
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of providing loans to farmers and to run the state farms. 
The World Bank and the International Development Associ­
ation contributed a sizeable financial support for the 
importation of tractors and agricultural inputs. In the 
Five Year Plan of the 1970/71 - 1975/76 a fund of £13.4 
million was devoted to the Mechanised Farming Corporation 
for investment in mechanised farming. Of the total area of 
4 million feddans supposed to be put into use in the
western Sudan, the plan demarcated an area of 0.3 million 
feddan in the clay plains of the Nuba Mountains. This was 
assumed to achieve a target of 50,000 tons of dura and
sesame (El Hassan, 1976).
The government allotted the land mainly to private farmers 
for a 25-year lease period after the issuance of the Un­
registered Land Act in 1970. (This perscribes that land 
outside individual ownership is the legal property of the 
state.) Eligibility to the leased land and to loans is 
subject to the condition that applicants should be Sudanese 
and should necessarily be residents in the scheme area.
Secondly, no occupant should have more than one holding of 
the standard 1,500 feddans. These conditions, according to 
El Hassan have never been satisfied and most landholder 
lessees were, in effect, absentee landlords (El Hassan, 
1976; Saeed, 1982). The main crops under cultivation are 
dura and sesame but a tendency towards dura mono-culture 
was also shown. The Mechanised Farming Corporation 
recommends following a rotation system in the pattern,
dura-sesame-fallow, as specified in the Ten Year Plan 1960-
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1970 to facilitate expansion in dura production. Generally 
the scheme can be divided into three main types of farms. 
The first is the private sector dominated by private 
investors who provide tractors with credit assistance from 
the Agricultural Bank of Sudan. The second type is the 
supervised schemes, also held by private farmers and 
financed by the World Bank in collaboration with the 
Agricultural Bank of Sudan. In this category are the old 
Habila projects under direct supervision of the Mechanised 
Farming Corporation. The third type are the state farms 
whose main job is to undertake experimentation and demon­
stration. These are run by agricultural officials in an 
attempt to show the benefits to be derived from farming in 
this way so as to attract future participation. The co­
operative farms fall under the category of supervised 
private schemes (see above) financed by the World Bank and 
the Agricultural Bank of Sudan. These farms basically 
consist of several individual farmers pooling their land, 
for the purpose of economy of scale; they are encouraged in 
doing this by the government who will provide them with 
extension services and credit. Generally, services to 
investors in the scheme include easy interest of approxi­
mately 8-9 per cent on loan from the Agricultural Bank. 
Under the provisions of the Promotion of Agricultural 
Investment Act 1976, encouragement was made in the form of 
partial tax exemption and exemption from customs duties for 
imported machinery (Simpson and Simpson, 1978:23). Accord­
ing to Saeed (1982) individual farming enterprises, state 
farms and cooperative farms have these characteristics:
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firstly, most of the agricultural operations such as land 
clearance, preparation, sowing and harvesting are under­
taken by different types of discs and tractors. Secondly, 
all three types of farms depend on hired labour, both 
permanent and seasonal. The seasonal labour, especially 
required where landlords are absentee (this includes co­
operatives) for undertaking the weeding and harvesting 
operations. The permanent labourers are tractor drivers, 
assistants, ghafirs (guards) and wakeels (agents). The 
agents are managers in the scheme who carry the managerial 
function on behalf of the absentee landlords or scheme 
owners. Thirdly, the standard farm size ranges between 
1,000-1,500 feddans. Dura and sesame occupy, in theory, 
1,000 feddans in the 1,500-feddan type and the remaining 
500 should be left fallow as prescribed by the Mechanised 
Farming Corporation. Dura is extensively cultivated in the 
area devoted to fallow thereby infringing the regulations 
of the Mechanised Farming Corporation. Fourth, cooperative 
schemes and individual private farms are entirely unaffect­
ed by extension services which are exclusively devoted to 
state farms (Saeed, 1982:178-179).
The distribution of the three types of farms is presented 
in the table below as revealed for the season 1975/76:
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Table 2:
Habila Mechanised Schemes 
in operation 
(1975/76)
Sector Operating Licensed
State 6 30
Private 189 205
Cooperative 7 15
Total 202 250
Source: Saeed (1982), pl78.
The table shows that individual private farms are the pre- 
dominanet forms of farms in the scheme area, making a total 
of 189 schemes out of 202. The cooperative farms in oper­
ation account for approximately 50% of the total number of 
cooperatives licenced by the state. According to Saeed 
almost "every season cooperative schemes are either rented 
to private investors to compensate for the cost already in­
curred by members of the cooperative or liquidated by the 
cooperative authorities of Billing" (1982:180). (The co­
operatives are also reported to be highly inefficient, but 
no specific data about this has been given. ) The reasons 
behind the low interest in cooperatives will be empirically 
examined in chapter 7. Suffice it here to present part of 
the arguments advanced for the bad performance of cooper­
atives. It is argued that -
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"the official administrative body, the regional office 
of the Ministry of Cooperation, which is supposed to 
supervise the societies has failed to provide super­
vision or facilities which enable the members of these 
societies to efficiently direct their affairs. No 
follow up, regular revision and auditing of the finan­
cial and agricultural performance of these farms takes 
place. The office lacks basic information about these 
societies" (1982:180).
Wage Employment
The feasibility of the Habila scheme should, also, be
assessed in terms of the contribution it makes with respect
to income distribution and wage employment. The centrality 
of income redistribution derives from the fact that the 
scheme is launched in an area that is predominantly peas­
ant, people deriving the bulk of their annual income from 
abysmally low level subsistence agriculture. The other 
source of income is the tapping of gum arabic (1982:171). 
Wage labour as we mentioned earlier is practiced in 
private, state and cooperative schemes. It draws mainly 
from the local supply as well as from migrants from the 
neighbouring regions. Saeed has noticed a substantial rise 
in wage rates during the harvesting period due to shortages
in the labur supply (1982:177). This has resulted in
higher proportions of land being devoted to dura cultiva­
tion, in contrast to sesame production, as the latter is 
less-profitable (Affan, 1978:29). Besides, crop yield on
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the traditional farm is one factor affecting labour supply 
in respect of the mechanised farms (Saeed, 1982:177); 
distance, availability of wage level information to mi­
grants and competition from other schemes could be cited as 
other important determinants. As a solution to the problem 
of labour shortage a system of labour recruitment was 
practised in the early phase of the scheme. Under this 
system the cost of transporting labour to the scheme area 
is usually borne by the owner of the scheme. However, 
during the 'rainy season this practice tends to be less 
effective due to logistic difficulties. Of the various 
agricultural operations, labour is demanded for weeding and 
harvesting of dura and sesame crops. Labour input and the 
corresponding wage rates are presented in the following 
table:
Table 3:Labour Input and Wage Rates
Operation
WeedingHarvestingsesameHarvestingdura
Labour input per farm
1390
570
3230
Mandaysperfeddan
1.6
3.9
4.1
Wage Rate (piasters per individual)
65
80
42Source: Affan (1978),p31.
Due to differences in the geographical background of 
labourers the effect of wage labour on income distribution 
varies considerably with implications for equity. This is 
especially true insofar as the former capitalist system of 
labour recruitment, in which the cost of transporting hired 
labour was borne by the scheme owner himself, is no longer
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practised. Peasants from the scheme area can thus consid­
erably improve their well-being by hiring out their labour 
in the schemes and at the same time continue to cultivate 
their traditional farms. This combination of activities is 
rendered difficult for immigrant labourers due to distance 
and transportation bottlenecks. Distance works to cut off 
the migrant from his own home village, who thereby devotes 
a lesser amount of labour to the family farm. In addition, 
a good amount of income generated from wage labour is spent 
on return transportation at the end of the harvesting 
season. Availability of wage labour in the scheme is, 
also, affected by macro-economic factors related to the 
performance of the agricultural labour market in general. 
As stated by O ’Brien -
"The costs of finding work and travelling to the place 
of work, which have previously been a separate part of 
the wage bill incurred by employers, are now entering 
into the general labour market as elements of the wage 
rate. Paradoxically, the formation of a national lab­
our market thus entails a régionalisation at the same 
time, as workers seek to cut costs by finding work as 
close to home as possible" (O'Brien, 1983:30).
Thus, labourers from Northern Kordofan and Darfur find it 
prudent to supply labour in the Habila schemes rather than 
the Gezira or the Rahad. The implications of this on irri­
gated schemes are far reaching. The amount of labour de­
flected into employment in the Habila schemes could lead to 
a substantial rise in the level of wages in the irrigated
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schemes, to attract more labour. This process feeds on 
itself thereby impelling employers in Habila to raise the 
wage rate. One other effect on the Gezira scheme is re­
ported by O'Brien in respect of cotton-picking labour. 
O'Brien reported that due to the mounting costs of cotton- 
picking operations the management of several schemes, in­
cluding the Gezira, in 1978, "had suspended cotton-picking 
labour recruitment activities" (1983:29).
However, local peasants are not fully satisfied with wage 
labour in the schemes since home production for family 
consumption still rides high in traditional agriculture. 
This attitude persists despite the high wage rates offered 
in mechanised farms relative to the level of wages in the 
rural areas in general. The ILO, for instance, remarks 
that mechanised farms, in 1976, pay 40 to 50 piasters per 
day besides food and medical care to labourers (ILO, 
1976:276). To make peasant traditional farming a viable 
enterprise, a Nuba peasant responds to both opportunities 
(ie family farming and wage employment) at the same time. 
The common trend is for the demand for labour to increase. 
This, in addition to the aforementioned reasons, stems from 
the fact that the amount of labour demanded rises prop­
ortionately to the farm size in operation in the corres­
ponding season. The size of land is shown to be expanding 
due to deteriorating fertility and to the cultivation of 
the unauthorised land (Shepherd, 1983). Thus the total 
area cultivated in the mechanised lands of Habila in 1975/ 
1976 was 170,490 feddans (Saeed, 1982:168), but in 1979/80
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it was as high as half a million feddans (Salih, 1984:210). 
However, the overall employment effect of mechanised 
schemes, according to Affan, is not high. The table below 
shows the overall situation with respect to seasonal labour 
in the private and supervised sectors:
Table 4:Seasonal Labour in the Private and Supervised Sectors
Operation Total Man- Length No. ofdays req'd period personsreq’d Time
Weeding Harvesting - 300,000 22 14,000 Aug-SeptSesame Harvesting - 68,000 15 4,500 OctoberDura 700,000 90 7,500 Dec-Apr
Source: Affan (1978), p32.
The overall employment effect falls well below the expected 
rate of labour absorption. Of the 10,000 to 14,000 seas­
onal jobs per 100,000 feddans the schemes are expected to 
generate only 7,000 to 8,000 are actually reported for the 
peak season which lasts for only three weeks (Keddeman and 
All, 1978:8). As a result of this low labour absorption 
ratio, the ILO report concludes that the scheme, in fact, 
tends to accentuate inequality by "making the rich richer" 
(ILO, 1976:273).
As sound measures to redress the inegalitarian effect of 
the mechanised farming the report suggests a levy of tax on 
scheme operators and a creation of cooperatives to attract 
more tenant participants (1976:273). But both attempts at
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redressing inequality are ruled out in respect of the 
situation of the Habila scheme. Shepherd adduces suffic­
ient evidence for this -
"It is difficult to incorporate local people into
mechanised farming since the level of capital 
accumulation locally is so low. The [existing] less­
ees are completely strangers to the area... and in the 
eyes of local people make no contribution to the 
area: they avoid local taxes which are in any case 
exiguous, they take away their dura and their trac­
tors,.., These grievances would be exclusive in 
Darfur, are still politically significant in Kordofan, 
and will undoubtedly contribute to the present region- 
alistic orientation of Sudanese political life" 
(1983:316).
Problems identified in the mechanised schemes in general
relate to a failure to follow the rotation system as 
stipulated by the Mechanised Farming Corporation. In 
addition, illegal expansion into undemarcated land has 
resulted in an interference with the grazing lands of the 
cattle nomads. Most affected of these are the Baggara 
Arabs who have traditionally depended on the ecological 
niche of the Southern Kordofan province during the dry
season. As a result, environmental degradation and compet­
ition for grazing and soil infertility have made investment 
in mechanised farming less encouraging. But this process 
of illegal expansion on unauthorised land and declining 
soil fertility started to feed on itself: in order for
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investment and consequently productivity to be viable under 
the declining soil fertility, the only possible alternative 
is to expand the area under cultivation.
In terms of profitability to private investors, it has been 
estimated that an annual average profit of up to LS20,000 
could be realised in good agricultural seasons (see eg 
Shepherd, 1983:308). However, the production profile por­
trays a declining productivity over the life period of the 
scheme, particularly during the 1970’s.
Table 5 furnishes data on this declining trend from 1970 to 
1976.
Table 5Average Yield in Habila Scheme (1970-76)(metric ton)
Yr:1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 1976/77 
0.479 0.382 0.382 0.377 0.269 0.231 0.316
Source: Saeed (1982), pl69.
The schemes to a large extend succeeded in creating wage 
employment for local people as well as for migrants who 
could supplement their income on traditional farming. Not 
only did labour migration result in improving the levels of 
income for seasonal labourers but it contributed, in turn, 
to redressing the problem of urban unemployment. Prior to 
the introduction of the scheme the majority of seasonal 
migrants either sought employment in the Gezira scheme in 
the Central region or concentrated on the urban centres, 
which could hardly absorb these unskilled workers. Income
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derived from seasonal migration is estimated to be in the 
range LS50 to LSI00 for one season and the number of recip­
ients averages between 7 to 10 million persons (Keddeman 
and Ali, 1978:4). One of the most dramatic effects of
seasonal migration has been its contribution to inter­
regional balances, as testified to by the ILO report for 
the Sudan (1976).
Effects on Traditional Agriculture and The Nuba Peasantry
One of the major objectives of the Habila scheme is to
genuinely contribute to the self-sufficiency of the local 
population and to improve the quality of their life. The 
stimulus to improve the well-being of peasants and their 
families originates from the recognition that traditional 
agriculture as such is incapable of making a significant 
transformation of the pre-existing socio-economic struc­
ture. This holds true, it is presumed, so long as invest­
ment in peasant smallholding is very low. It has been 
argued that small farmers "do not produce and earn enough 
to lift themselves from dire poverty" (ILO, 1976:XVIII). 
The assessment of the Habila scheme, therefore, should be
based on the scheme's effect on local producers in terms of
popular participation, to see the degree to which it has 
achieved its objective of reaching the rural poor. We have 
already mentioned that the cooperatives which are meant to 
attract participants are falling apart and therefore do not 
command interest among the Nuba villagers. Before investi­
gating the nature of the villagers' response to the crea­
tion of cooperatives it is essential, here, to adduce some
- 105 -
evidence for the low investment in traditional peasant 
farming.
Economic Explanations for Low Investment: 
towards the importance of social variables
One of the major obstacles retarding traditional agricul­
ture in the Nuba Mountains province is the lack of credit 
facilities. The absence of credit institutions which could 
provide sufficient credit to small farmers at the appropri­
ate time implies that less capital could be devoted to 
investment in agriculture. This could also result in the 
cultivation of only a smaller quantity of land, as the 
amount of capital at the farmer's disposal is very limited. 
One of the devices the local producers adopt is to rely on 
relatives or a merchant of acquaintance as the only means 
to secure credit. The other factor relates to the absence 
of pricing policy for food crops, which might stimulate 
greater investment in traditional farming. The argument 
points to marketing bottlenecks that constrain small 
farmers to sell their farm output at the farm gate at very 
low prices. This problem is accentuated by competition on 
the part of large-scale capitalist farmers (associated with 
the Habila scheme) whose presence can dampen the price 
level of food crops. A third factor is the unavailability 
of fertilizers and improved seed varieties to small farm­
ers. Part of the argument advanced in this connection 
attributes the failure on the part of small farmers to 
apply fertilizers to the absence of extension education 
(Affan, 1978). Another argument may see the absence of a
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subsidised fertilizer policy as the reason for low 
investment in traditional agriculture. The subsidised 
fertilizer policy guarantees cheap fertilizer delivery to 
small farmers and is meant to enhance the economic 
efficiency in terms of cost reduction. One other possible 
explanation is that given the remoteness of the Nuba 
peasants' settlements from the urban centres, it would be 
very difficult for a peasant to get adequate information on 
market behaviour. Such information is the sine qua non for 
rational decision-making for investment in traditional 
agriculture.
Speaking in terms of cost efficiency, Theodre Schultz 
(1964) argues that in contrast to mechanised farming, 
investment in peasant farming is not attractive to
peasants, nor is it a rational decision for peasant
producers. It is argued that investment in traditional 
agriculture increases net returns only slightly. Further­
more, it would be very discouraging to small farmers since 
such decisions are necessarily made under conditions of
risk and uncertainty. Testing Schultz's assumption for 
traditional agriculture in the southern Kordofan region one 
finds that net returns in peasant farms do not reveal what 
Shultz postulates. Table 6 shows that investment in
peasant farms, contrary to Schultz, could be highly 
efficient and rewarding;
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Table 6:Items for Producing a Feddan of Dura in both Traditional and Mechanised Sectors Habila (1975/76)
Item Traditional Mechanised Units
Yield 366.0 453.5 K.gPrice 34.4 43.0 p.tGross return 12.590 19.673 LSTotal cost 7.050 13.430 LSNet Return 5.540 6.243 LS% of net return to total cost 84.3 46.6
Source: Saeed (1982), pl70.
It is clear from the table that investment in traditional 
farming makes a percentage net return in peasant farming of 
84.3 which is absolutely high. Also in comparison with 
mechanised farming, traditional argriculture generates high 
percentage of net return on investment.
This indicates that to explain the stagnation and lack of 
innovativeness and investment in peasant agriculture in 
terms of efficiency or economic variables alone is not 
sufficient (cf. Baric, 1967). It has been argued that 
improvement in traditional techniques to generate such net 
returns may "affect social relations upon which rational 
farming depended and that, therefore, economic action 
cannot be separated from the social context in which it 
operates" (Ortiz, 1967:191-192). This, as I perceive it, 
squarely applies to the context of both the traditional 
Nuba peasant (as discussed here) and to the Habila scheme.
The Habila scheme has injected a massive technological 
package into the area and sizeable capital inputs, yet it
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especially failed to attract peasants to form cooperative 
societies to improve their lot. On the contrary, the Nuba 
peasants have continued to undertake traditional culti­
vation in the home areas at that low level of investment 
mentioned above. It is my contention that low innovative­
ness and investment in peasant farming (be this in the 
home areas or in connection with the Habila scheme) should 
receive a social diagnosis as a complement to economic 
factors. The inadequacy of economic explanation alone is 
testified to by the fact that economists have encouraged 
the Nuba peasant to participate in the scheme thinking that 
basic economic bottlenecks (capital, technology, etc) have 
been removed, yet to no avail.
It is therefore essential that we pose our assumptions for 
the forthcoming anthropological exposition. We assume, in 
line with Baric, that under given circumstances, to 
consider a course of action financially less profitable or 
more profitable "is not necessarily a sufficient explan­
ation of the emergence of a certain form of behaviour in a 
field of action which is essentially social as well as 
economic" (1967:261). Secondly, we assume that albeit that 
behaviour is intrinsically social and economic we can 
"meaningfully distinguish social and 'economic* in an 
empirical situation" (1967:254). In this connection we 
would consider as 'economic* "those aspects of behaviour 
which are specifically related to the material advantage of 
a mixed socio-economic act*' (1967:254).
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The drastic avoidance of the new economic opportunities 
afforded by the Habila scheme - tractors, credit, etc - can 
be related to social factors which previous discussion in 
the literature has only partly touched upon but never set 
itself to examine empirically and explain. But first, in 
the following chapter, I set myself to explain low invest­
ment in the traditional peasant farming by reference to the 
context of the total situation (social and economic) in 
which decisions to invest are made. I shall indicate that 
the Habila scheme's presence indeed seems to reinforce the 
pre-existing trends in traditional agriculture and could, 
therefore, bar peasant effective participation in the 
scheme especially as active members in cooperatives. For 
example, we shall see that the Habila scheme prompts 
migration outside the area (as people’s materialistic 
desires increase). This is ironic, since presumably the 
scheme was devised to have exactly the opposite effect.
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CHAPTER 5
Socio-Cultural Factors in the Nuba Mountains Region
Major explanations, and implications, relating to the Nuba 
peasants' lack of commitment to cooperatives in the Habila 
scheme are presented here. Explicit in the discourse is my 
predilection for actor-oriented/meaning-oriented approach­
es. It follows that the failure of cooperatives will be 
understood in terms of both strategic and cultural con­
siderations. In this chapter, I shall deal with matters 
relating to kinship, labour migration (or mobility) and 
conspicuous consumption and the ideology of consumerism, 
and their effects on investment in peasant farming. In the 
next chapter, I shall present, more extensively, the reason 
for the lack of commitment among present-day Nuba peasants 
to cooperative schemes.
Kinship
For the majority of households in the Nuba Mountains 
region, kinship constitutes the core social relationship in 
which people's life is embedded and finds expression. 
Anthropologists (eg Faris, Nadel and Stevenson) have des­
cribed the Nuba society as a kinship society. The dominant 
kinship terminology in most of the Nuba tribes is the 
classificatory type, in which kinship terms include people 
who are both biologically close and biologically distant. 
Kinship is also extended to cover sociologically signifi­
cant relationships. A mother's brother may adopt a 
sister's son and consider the latter as a family member.
Ill -
The kinship system, generally speaking, is very elaborate. 
Nadel described it as follows -
"As a father's brothers and sisters are classified as 
'fathers' and 'mothers' (married to other 'mothers'
and 'fathers'), the children of brothers and sisters 
are themselves 'brothers' and 'sisters' to each other, 
and sons and daughters to the parent generation"
(1947:101).
The principal social groupings identified in the region in­
clude the nuclear family, the lineage, the clan and clan 
sub-division, the village and the tribe (Stevenson, 1984: 
95). With the exception of those parts of the south west­
ern Nuba Mountains studied by Faris, today most of the
societies in the region are classified as patrilineal 
kinship groups (Faris, 1968:45). The smallest social unit, 
the nuclear family, consists of a man, his wife or wives 
and their unmarried children; it shares the same household. 
However, the sociologically extended kinship terminology 
and the reciprocal identification of parents-in-law and
children-in-law imply that an elaborate network of social 
relationships allows for great cooperation among such 
units. Cooperation between close and distant kin is ex­
pressed on a number of occasions and centres around various 
forms of social activities. For example, in the land 
tenure system, where access to land may be secured through 
borrowing, one turns to kinsfolk rather than an unrelated 
neighbour. In the majority of Nuba communities mutual 
obligations between family groups entail that economic
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transactions, in the strict sense, are avoided (Nadel,1947; 
Baumann, 1987). Furthermore, some anthropologists, such as 
Baumann and Nadel, have observed that clan cohesion exists 
not only to bind specific individual households, but also 
tends to strengthen responsibilities to the village commun­
ity at large (Baumann, 1984:43). Thus Nadel adopts the 
terminology 'symbiotic clan structure', to refer to -
"a form of social segmentation (more specially clan- 
structure) in which every section, as a section, 
assumes certain specific duties (religious or 
political) on behalf of the community at large"
(Nadel, 1947:9).
Such cooperation was made extensive use of in connection 
with agriculture, both in the near past and also to a
lesser degree, in the present-day now that forces of the 
money economy tend to prompt the migration of family
members (see chapter 6). Mutual cooperation between close 
kin is, of course, a phenomenon common throughout African, 
Asian and Latin American societies. Baric, meanwhile,
observed among Yugoslavs that solidarity and identity of 
the family is so central that this solidarity centred on 
property (Baric, 1967:266). In such a society, almost all 
family members find support from the land held in common 
and for this reason land continues to be inalienable prop­
erty. However, Baric posits that due to migration of some 
of the family members to towns, the maintenance of land, as 
opposed to expanding it or investing in it to increase 
productivity is the dominant practice. Baric considers
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this as one of the sociological factors impeding expansion 
and investment in traditional agriculture (see Baric,1967).
One of the likely impacts of the introduction of the Habila 
scheme is its effect on the familial social order, relating 
to difficulties which will be encountered in respect of new 
rules of social interaction. The Nuba peasants are mainly 
concerned with the continuity of familial ties as these are 
assumed to be the proper means of social security and group 
solidarity. Therefore,’ in face of the scheme, kinship came 
to be stressed because such values constitute a guard 
against a possibly hostile environment, and also because, 
for cultural reasons, the existence of an individual was 
still thought to be without meaning if not embedded in a 
kinship network. Colson noted among the Gwembe Tonga that 
as a result of the implementation of a resettlement scheme 
the villagers clung to family associations (Colson, 1971). 
In the context of the Habila scheme the villagers' clinging 
to kinship relationship is reinforced by the peasants' lack 
of faith in the scheme's administrators who fail to provide 
for effective grass-roots participation. Their hostility 
to the state is reflected in the resistence which they 
voiced in respect of the construction of the scheme; "they 
have strong legal case against both the state and the 
capitalist owners of the scheme" (Kersany, 1983:38). The 
Habila land (from the point of view of the Nuba peasants), 
though unused, arguably belongs to the indigenous popula­
tion. Firstly, as the Nuba peasants find it irrational to 
get involved in the cooperatives, thanks to the previous
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bad experience with traditional forms of cooperation, they 
remained isolated from active participation in the scheme 
(I shall discuss this at length in chapter 6). Secondly, 
no concrete benefits in terms of social services were 
provided on the part of the state to help local people cope 
with the new situation. Such a state of affairs has been 
described by Kersany as follows -
"There were only two dispensaries in the area, one at 
Habila and the other at Tukma, both staffed by non­
trained Farash. Medicines were very scarce. Apart 
from a very small quantity of penicillin, none were 
available at Habila dispensary... Even where present, 
medical facilities were beyond the reach of most of 
the population, given the inadequacy of transport 
facilities between the different villages... Even the 
single school offered very irregular services, being 
forced periodically to close because of shortage of 
food supplies. It is almost beyond imagination to see 
pupils starving while their own district produces 
thousands of tons of grains every year" (1983:42).
Assistance under such circumstances could only be secured 
through acts which might be validated by existing norms and
values. Islamic conventional teachings provide such
validation. Islam encourages mutual help between close 
kin, especially at times of need. Resort on the part of 
the Nuba peasants to kinship association is appropriate in 
that the family, traditionally, was the basic unit for
providing subsistence needs for its members. Moreover,
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under economic pressure, the development in this social 
group of a feeling of 'belonging together' means the en­
hancement of the family as an intact social unit.
In most of the traditional societies in Sudan, land remains 
inalienable because the family head considers it the prop­
erty of the ancestors and therefore to be retained and 
passed down to the next generation. Today, due to kinship 
solidarity, most of the households located in the project 
area assured their livelihood from family cultivation of 
the bildat (family farm) plus wage labour in the scheme. 
It has been estimated that in 1978, irrespective of the 
composition of the family (eg sex ratios) a full 82.1 per 
cent of the traditional agricultural operations was 
carrried out by family members (Kersany, 1983:41). The 
contribution of the young children to family security was 
widely recognised by the actors themselves who remarked 
that "the existence of mechanised farms near their villages 
has obliged them to keep children away from school in order 
to prevent their animals from straying into the farms and 
attract fines" (Affan, 1978:27). Where some of the family 
members are divorced from home by getting work abroad, the 
migrants' contribution to the family continues in the form 
of remittances (Kersany, 1983).
Such kinship association, together with cultural consider­
ations which require the maintenance of land for genera­
tions, provide some of the reasons for the peasant's lack 
of emphasis on the 'economics' of farming. It even con­
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strains development efforts aimed at emphasising instit­
ution building and the organisation of traditional people 
into forms of modern cooperative. This conflict between 
cooperation at the level of the family and that at the 
macro-level (eg cooperatives) is repeatedly emphasised in 
the literature on rural development. Thus Weintraub and 
Margulies state that -
"traditional family orientations which can perhaps 
support and advance a smallholding in conditions of 
limited capitalisation, initial mechanisation, and 
partial or protected market integration, will be a 
liability in more intensive production and greater 
commercialisation. Similarly, kinship relations which 
can sustain traditional or quasi-traditional 
cooperation will not be capable of making a fully- 
fledged modern cooperative work" (Weintraub and 
Margulies, 1986:48).
The difficulty of transforming cooperation at the family 
level into a fully-fledged cooperative institution arises 
mainly due to failure to reconcile (the often divergent) 
kinship values and cooperative values (see Dore, 1971).
Labour Migration
The combination of self-employment in the family farm with 
seasonal employment is commonly cited in respect of peasant 
societies experiencing some sort of socio-economic change 
(Hunt, 1966; Baric, 1967; Yudelman, 1964). From an econom­
ic point of view, labour migration to towns for work in the
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wage economy in the context of some of the family members 
remaining in the subsistence sector can be shown to be 
quite a rational decision. It has been argued that a host 
of factors combine to make seasonal migration a necessary 
option. Yudelman (1964) states that cash incomes in 
traditional agriculture are low; yet along with the secur­
ity provided through kin groups traditional land farming at 
least enables households to maintain themselves at low cost 
by producing subsistence crops. In addition, in the wage 
economy' average monetary returns to labour are so low that 
they could not support a whole family. In these circum­
stances a combination of occupations is ideally necessary 
(1964:131).
Despite the advantages brought by occupational mobility its 
overall effect on peasant farming is to retard investment 
and consequently agricultural expansion (Baric, 1967; 
Yudelman, 1964). This trend is widespread throughout 
African subsistence agricultural societies. It has been 
argued that in traditional agriculture there exists surplus 
labour, to the extent that labour can be withdrawn without 
reducing productivity. However, the adverse effects of 
seasonal labour migration on subsistence agriculture imply 
that this claim finds no empirical verification. Thus 
Yudelman states that -
"On the whole, however, the periodic and sustained 
absence of the most productive elements in the labour 
force must retard agricultural development. Although 
there is under-employment in African agriculture, it
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is not necessarily the size of the labour force that 
is of overriding imortance in considering the relation 
among land, labour and capital in peasant agriculture. 
The composition and quality of the labour force is as 
important as its size" (1964:133-134).
But, all in all, such reduction of revenue in subsistence 
agriculture is offset by income from wage employment. 
Seasonal employment is likely to continue for it leads to 
family incomes more substantial than would' be the case 
without wage employment. The implication of this for 
policy-making is that if the rural labour force is to be 
stabilised and to be made to commit itself to agricultural 
development then the levels of monetary income available in 
the subsistence sector should be raised to levels 
equivalent to that of combining self-employment with wage 
employment (see also Yudelman, 1964). However, this 
solution is impractical for two reasons (as applied to the 
Habila scheme). First capitalist farmers in the scheme 
cannot rationally raise the level of wages over and above a 
certain optimal level (the level where the marginal produc­
tivity of labour equals the average wage rate). Any 
increase in the wage rate above this level would entail a 
loss for the capitalist farmer. Secondly, by increasing 
the wage rate the amount of labour supply in the scheme 
rises spectacurly since this lucrative wage attracts more 
labour. The resulting surplus labour in turn works to 
dampen the level of wage rate (Lewis, 1954). As we shall 
see, the Nuba peasants make use of the lucrative employment 
in the scheme which in turn retards peasant agriculture.
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Social mobility in the Nuba Mountains region is the hall­
mark of younger adults. Historically, mobility and 
seasonal migration were necessitated by the population 
being increasingly exposed to the demands of modern life. 
In the early days of the introduction of the money economy 
the immediate response of the Nuba farming population was 
the migration of the younger adults to neighbouring regions 
to procure for themselves and their families the means of 
livelihood. Nadel (1947:511) noted that the migrant adults 
were engaged as soldiers and labourers ; and brought with 
them habits, interests and desires from distant places. Due 
to the persistence of this migration land is left to be 
cultivated by the elders, wives and children. The point to 
be established, however, is that the migrant groups do not 
sever their linkage with their families and the home 
village.
The most mobile people among the Nuba farmers happened to 
be the villagers from Dilling, Nyma, Heiban and Tabak. In 
addition to the material reward of migration there were 
psychological incentives "to wander about and see the 
world, or to live the attractive life of soldiers or pol­
ice, who seem to have everything one can desire" (1947:77). 
With the introduction of the Habila scheme the peasants 
have now come to desire what they can see in the hands of 
capitalist farmers and the scheme administrators, even 
though, as we have noted, they have been reluctant to par­
ticipate in certain aspects of the scheme (viz coopera­
tives) .
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The Habila scheme has certainly contributed to the national 
economy in terms of increased food supply (dura and ses­
ame), but, ironically, due to exporting these crops outside 
the region the local communities are far from being self- 
sufficient (see Kersany, 1983). Having voiced their 
resistence to cooperative schemes the different households 
have to seek extra sources of employment for their viabil­
ity. Land, for cultural reasons cannot be abandoned, lest 
the whole family fall into ruins.
To provide for the extra needs which the introduction of 
the scheme inspired, individuals drew on past experiences 
so as to cope strategically with the new situation. Migra­
tion from the Nuba Mountains province to other regional 
centres took phenomenal dimensions (Baumann, 1987). The 
reasons for such migration have included the feeling of 
relative deprivation in the scheme area; coupled with the 
emerging consumerist ideology. One measure of the relative 
deprivation is the lack of welfare services which neither 
the private capitalist farmers, nor the state is willing to 
provide. To see the magnitude of labour migration the 
following table is presented (which shows the effect which 
labour migration had on the age and sex composition of the 
population).
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Table 7Population of South Kordofan Province and Southern Jebels District (percentage) as shown in the Sudan National Census of 1973
AgeUnder 15 - 29 30 - 44 45 - 59 over 6015both m f m  f m f  m fsexesSouthKordofan
Province 46.3 8.4 12.4 8.0 8.3 5.0 4.9 2.5 2.7Southern
Jebels 45.7 7.6 13.0 7.7 9.7 5.3 6.0 2.0 2.8Source: Baumann (1987), p34.
The overall effect of labour migration on the local economy 
is its restriction of agricultural expansion. The potent­
ial family labour actually engaged in cultivating the 
family farm during the agricultural season is considerably 
reduced. This explains to us, from the sociological point 
of view, the reasons for the low agricultural productivity 
and investment in peasant bildat. There is yet another 
possibility, or strategy, which the Nuba peasant adopts to 
cope with the new demands. The fact that the scheme pro­
vides extra employment opportunity for the local popula­
tion encouraged the peasants to hire out their labour in 
seasonal employment. Here the best strategy for the 
individual peasant to adopt is to combine bildat cultiva­
tion and wage work in the scheme. Table 8 shows the con­
tribution to the peasant from combining bildat and seasonal 
employment in the schemes.
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Table 8Household Income from Bildat Cultivation and Seasonal Employment in the Habila Schemes(1975/76)
Mode of Activity
SeasonalemploymentBildat
Household income in LS mms
64.53061.590
Both 126.120
Source: Affan (1978), 33.
AggregateMandays
155329
484
Av. prod’n Av. wages/ Mandays in LS mms
0.4160.187
The table makes it clear that a peasant's income from com­
bining bildat cultivation and seasonal employment far 
exceeds the income he would derive from the exclusive 
cultivation of bildat. Through this combination a peasant 
gets a double benefit. Firstly, his bildat becomes the 
focus of family relations and security. Secondly, he 
enjoys the material benefits of gainful employment in the 
scheme (cf Baric, 1967). As Baric generally described such 
a situation in peasant agriculture tends to have implica­
tions in that "the necessity of modernising [peasant] 
agricultural methods and of investing for greater product­
ivity does not seem to households to be very pressing" 
(Baric, 1967:271).
This exposition has far reaching theoretical implications. 
It refutes and reduces to absurdity the Neo-Marxists' argu­
mentation for the persistence of petty-commodity production 
as the necessary outcome of capitalism's domination and 
exploitation of non-capitalist modes of production.
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Analysis from the perspective of articulation-of-modes 
blurs us from recognising the real incentives and motives 
which guide the actor’s behaviour and meaningful actions 
(cf, Meillassoux, 1975). What appears to the individual 
peasant (as an actor) is the pre-existing possibilities 
which he purports to exploit from the niche he is occupy­
ing. Though engaging in petty farming, not only is the 
peasant receiving material rewards, but also, as we have 
demonstrated, ensuring social support and security for the 
whole family. Contrary to what articulation theorists may 
argue, if we are to account for low productivity and 
investment in traditional agriculture then it is essential 
that we view it in terms of what we now call the social 
variables associated with investment in traditional agri­
culture and the specific circumstances under which that 
investment takes place (see eg Baric, 1967).
The behaviour of migrants and their motivations allows us 
to come to grips with the individual's efforts to strike a 
balance between what traditional life on the one hand, and 
modern life, on the other, may provide. Thus, O'Brien 
quotes Mitchell who states, with respect to labour 
migration, that -
"The circulary migration of men here may be seen as a 
device to maintain and preserve the unity of the 
family where they cannot achieve this because of the 
paucity of local economic resources. The circulation 
of migrants between town and country in terms of this 
argument stems from the separation of places where the
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rules and disciplines. The obligations and values of the 
new type of society differ from those of the traditional 
community and may conflict with them. The fact that most 
of the migrants are unskilled implies that the new jobs 
open to them in towns are the ones which are less remunera­
tive and most labour demanding. For example, apart from the 
few who may be working in factories or as soldiers a large 
number of Nuba migrants in Khartoum are to be seen working 
in construction. The system of social security attached to 
such a job is unsatisfactory. This means that such 
migrants rely on family and community, through whom 
security is established via the norms and moral values of 
the traditional society (Baumann, 1987). As regards access 
to traditional land and farms, which materially provides 
basic security, a person's physical presence is essential: 
a person's failure to be available to the village community 
from time to time may imply that his land reverted to the 
community. Physical presence, then, legally entitles the 
returning migrant to his land rights as perceived by the 
community (Baumann, 1987).
There are yet other sociological reasons for the persist­
ence of this circulary migration. One point relates to the 
recognition of authority in African societies in general. 
Hunter (1962) argues that in most societies in tropical 
Africa authority is recognised in age, traditional office 
and in high lineage strata. This differs from authority in 
the urban sector which depends on experience and technical 
skill. The Nuba migrants in the urban centres lack these
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latter attributes and feel alienated. A labour migrant's 
bond with the traditional community thus comes to be 
reinforced since these bonds take on moral connotations. 
Baumann has demonstrated in respect of the labour migrants 
of Miri, a tendency for experiences of independence and 
freedom to stimulate a feeling for change, while at the 
same time the individual complies with community morals 
(1987:192). The community's appreciation of the migrant's 
contribution to his home village in the form of new goods, 
presents or gifts to relatives provides an extra stimulus 
to keep those home ties: by and large, people return
because they like to be admired, ie for prestige. On the 
other hand local villagers have recognised the importance 
of migration to urban towns since such migration brings new 
ideas and broadens knowledge (via exposure to the mass 
media, etc) which can be used to solve conflicts and 
problems in the tribal society. It is argued that despite 
the fact that the Nuba depend on elders for the settlement 
of minor disputes in the household or between different 
families, labour migrants have become actively involved in 
such mediation (1987:203).
Another point concerning morality is that labour migrants 
in the urban centres who can succeed in establishing houses 
there would be in a position to receive kin who were newly 
migrating but who were faced with accommodation problems. 
By and large, labour migrants are considered as assets to 
the village community. Most importantly labour migrants 
from the Nuba Mountains have been observed to show a
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concern for developing the local infrastructure of their 
villages, for the presence of the Habila scheme awakened 
the inhabitants to new values even though it did not 
positively contribute to rural development. Baumann states 
that -
"If a labour migrant invests in a village mill or 
shop, but is credited for serving the traditional 
self-reliance of his home community, such trust 
encourages his better motives and promises 
gratification beyond financial interests"' (1987:192),
This concern for village development coupled with moral 
gratification makes labour migration a self-regulatory 
process. But it amounts to an investment in the local 
infrastructure and not in traditional agriculture. The 
burden of producing for household consumption is then 
shifted to women. But given that everyone appreciates the 
migrants' contribution to the village community, "the wife 
of an absent labour migrant obliged to cultivate her own 
Far Farm is more lik^y to cope with her personal and 
economic plight when coping enhances her moral standing as 
a farmer growing her own crops" (1987:192).
There are also both push and pull factors of rural-urban 
migration which are not economic. On the one hand, life in 
the village community for a migrant who is accustomed to 
the urban way of life seems relatively harsh; but spending 
one's holidays in the community among one's kin and friends 
strengthens the migrant's bonds with them (1987: 197). The
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fact that these holidays tend to be arranged to coincide 
with the community's celebrations and festivities testifies 
to the high values attached to the local culture. And 
customs concomitant to village morality are both appreciat­
ed and governed by strict rules and obligations. "Being 
times of celebration, music, and dance, seasonal festivals 
allow for a reaffirmation of affective bonds that would be 
more difficult to experience in workaday reality" (1987: 
203). This persistent labour flow from towns to the home 
community and the concomitant clinging to communal 
obligation implies that the assimilation of Nuba migrants 
or their enculturation into the urban way of life is an 
incomplete process.
On the push side of labour migration, commitment to the 
community's ideology of self-reliance necessitates taking 
recourse to urban cities which promise better employment 
opportunities and income. Labour migrants are basically 
concerned with what they can bring back to their villages 
from towns rather than blindly calculating the opportunity 
cost of labour migration in terms of output forgone in 
traditional agriculture. But even when such urban employ­
ment is highly remunerated, the way such migrants spend 
their income does not encourage saving. The bulk of this 
income, as we have seen is dissipated in the form of 
prestations to friends and kinsfolk. The other part goes 
to investment on local infrastructures. Low investment in 
traditional agriculture in the Nuba Mountains is partly 
attributed, sociologically speaking, to labour migration.
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The impact of labour migration on the peasant economy can 
be read from Baumann’s sweeping generalisation -
"The depopulation caused by labour migration is a 
severe threat to the agricultural subsistence of 
numerous Nuba communities in all parts of the 
Mountains" (1987:74).
Conspicuous Consumption and the Ideology of Consumerism: 
their effect on Investment in Peasant Farming
Conspicuous expenditure and the ideology of consumerism 
have characterised the Nuba society at two distinct but 
interrelated phases of development. The first relates to 
the pre-scheme phase; the second to the post-scheme phases. 
It is possible to detect a process of historical develop­
ment behind this phenomenon as it is observed today. We 
have alluded to the harvest celebrations in chapter 3. It 
has been argued that maximum crop cultivation was, in the 
near past, accompanied by what was locally called the 
orinyate celebration, translated by Nadel as "celebrating 
the filling to the brim of a granary" (1947:49). Pride in 
the display of wealth was universal throughout the Nuba 
Mountains area. The amount of yield generated from the 
farm would become known to the community before it was 
moved home for consumption and storage. In the harvesting 
season the farmer, his wife or wives and their children 
would set to harvest the family farm. The cutting of the 
crop was usually done by the father and his wife while the 
younger children would collect the yield. "The heaped up 
grain stacks on which the grain is left to dry are visible
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to every one, besides a lucky harvest is soon revealed by 
the farmer himself" (Nadel, 1947:49). In an orinyate 
celebration the head of the household is assumed to serve 
beer, porridge and meat which is lavishly consumed by the 
participants. Despite the fact that this social elaboration 
provided a strong economic incentive to individual enter­
prise, it is argued that "the restricted system of storage 
precludes in most tribes the distribution of produce over 
several years" (1947:49) since the surplus product of one 
year cannot be used to balance the deficit in the following 
year. Thus, traditionally, the orinyate and storage 
inadequacy were the main factors which acted to restrict 
the accumulation of wealth and consequently agricultural 
development. The tendency of the Nuba farmers to opt for 
lavish consumption was overtly expressed by the actors 
themselves as Nadel indicated that "public opinion even 
demands that the surplus of a successful year should be 
converted into immediate liberal expenditure". The 
magnitude of this tendency is such that it -
"renders the food economy of the tribe most 
vulnerable. It prevents any effective insurance 
against the perennial risks of locusts, droughts, or 
failures of the crops. It is not surprising, then, 
that famines visit the Nuba hills with sinister 
regularity" (1947:50).
During the years when this form of crop failure occurred, 
the farmers respond by planting more cash crop (sesame) for 
exchange against grain should the next season's harvest
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prove a failure as well. This implies that sesame contri­
buted to the household viability merely in terms of the 
amount of grain it was exchanged for; rather than contri­
buting directly to domestic consumption or to capital 
accumulation.
The post-colonial phase did not witness any significant 
change in the infrastructural base of the Nuba Mountains 
region, apart from a few improvements in road building and 
health facilities (see Kersany, 1983). Other significant 
changes were the development of trade, market exchange and 
the rapid monetization of the economy. With the introduc­
tion of the Habila scheme the ideology of conspicuous 
expenditure has been supplanted by an ideology of consumer­
ism. Two factors are responsible for the development of 
this consumerist ideology. The first relates to the local 
people's 'emulation' of luxurious consumption which is now 
exhibited on the part of private owners of the scheme. The 
other, as we shall see, relates to the uncertainty under 
which the Nuba peasants undertake their transactions.
State farms, cooperatives and private schemes work under 
flexible laws of supply and demand which directly impinge 
on peasant production and consumption decisions. In the 
Habila scheme area it has been found that under certain 
favourable economic conditions the rich farmers opt to 
market agricultural output within the confines of the 
Southern Kordofan region thereby maximizing returns to 
capital. However, under seemingly less propitious economic
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conditions rich farmers resort to smuggling and divert the 
distribution of output to the neighbouring province, 
thereby attracting sizeable revenues. "So, for example, 
merchants in Habila may sell their dura in Wau or elsewhere 
in the Southern region where prices can be higher than in 
Kordofan" (Shepherd, 1983:309).
These changing rich men’s strategies affect the ordinary 
peasant since he is subjected to work under constantly 
changing economic opportunities implied by the laws of. 
supply and demand: the peasant producer can no longer be 
certain about market prices for his crops. This distorted 
structure of the economy is accentuated by the state's 
intervention to fix crop prices immediately after the 
harvesting of the agricultural produce (the Mechanised 
Farming Corporation assumes the task of fixing crop prices 
and marketing state farm's output). In the private 
schemes, on the other hand, such operations are carried out 
independently of the Mechanised Farming Corporation. These 
fluctuations in market prices trigger off response on the 
part of the peasants. It becomes rational for them to 
weigh consumption over investment. This is also partly 
attributed to the peasant's inability to withstand private 
scheme owner's competition with respect to labour and other 
agricultural inputs.
The institutionalisation of the shail (ie mortgaging farm 
produce for cash payment prior to harvesting) in the scheme 
area is a clear manifestation of the development of
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consumerist ideology. Due to the absence of credit 
institutions which can provide financial assistance to the 
Nuba peasants, the peasants have found it prudent to 
exploit the advantageous social relationship established 
with local villagers (eg traders and shopkeepers). Both 
Affan (1978) and Kersnay (1983) have documented the 
prevalence of shail in the scheme area. However, Kersany 
remarks that this form of moneylending accounts for the 
development of usury capital, the principal beneficiary of 
which is the capitalist. The writer goes further and warns 
planners against the development of the shail, and consid­
ers this warning as -
"central to the recommendation for the creation of 
efficient credit institutions which might alleviate 
and remove altogether the possibility of the 
development of this most notorious and exploitative 
institution" (Kersany, 1983:44).
Against this I would argue that a peasant's decision to 
mortgage his crop in shail dealings is guided by a concern 
to provide for present consumption rather than uncertain 
future consumption. The money secured via the act of 
shailing is eventually converted into consumption expend­
iture at the expense of modernising traditional 
agriculture. However, the benefits from this consumption 
behaviour to the individual peasant should not be under­
estimated. Given the fact that possible advantageous 
economic opportunities are entirely absent (due to rapid
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economic change as well as the absence of welfare 
services), the peasant’s rational decision lies with 
’perceived' other possible advantages, viz, to consume 
rather than to invest in agriculture.
This analysis refutes Marxist students who argue that the 
shail system is a necessary mechanism for peasant exploit­
ation on the part of rich farmers. Considerations of the 
relations of peasants with non-peasants in the light of 
exploitation will not help us understand this social aspect 
of peasant socio-economic behaviour. This holds true 
insofar as the individual actor is concerned. The point to 
be established is that considerations of individual 
motivation under the specific circumstances surrounding and 
influencing such behaviour should be given primacy over 
materialistic emphasis. Low investment in traditional 
agriculture should, therefore, be explained in this light. 
We have provided a sweeping critique in chapter 1 arguing 
that under certain circumstances examining the relations 
peasants have with non-peasants in terms of exploitation is 
theoretically dangerous. In this connection those who 
argue against the development of the shail system base 
their argument on the often unfounded assumption that the 
price at which peasants mortgage their crops to money­
lenders are so low that such prices do not cover the costs 
of production. The discussion is almost always directed at 
calculating the allegedly high rates of profit which accrue 
to the money-lender when selling the crops secured through 
the shail dealing. It should be recognised that the
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transactions a peasant makes with a money-lender take place 
in a totally different environment from those made between 
the moneylender and others at the post-harvest period. 
Secondly, the peasant when shailing his crop is not enter­
ing into his calculations the values which would accrue to 
the money-lender upon selling the mortgaged crop since he 
is not part of this transaction, nor is he directly 
affected by it. What usually happens is that the money­
lender takes the crop immediately after harvesting and 
markets it away from the farm gate.
Two other facts can be well established which show the in­
complete images students of exploitation hold about 
peasants. It is almost universally accepted that peasants 
are considerably restricted from marketing their crops in 
towns due to transportation difficulties. In the case of 
the Nuba peasantry it is a common fact that during the 
harvesting season and prior to the sale of crops the amount 
of money at the peasant's disposal is considerably limited. 
This means that marketing the crop at the farm gate saves 
him the cost of transportation which he cannot afford to 
pay. One thing which exploitation students ignore, or fail 
to appreciate, is the value of the services the money­
lenders provide for the peasant - a failure which basic­
ally stems from the onesidedness through which exploitation 
is analysed. Thus, Hunt quotes Caint who warns community 
development agencies against interfering with and eliminat­
ing Chinese middlemen -
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"If Community Development agencies view the situation 
simply as indicating a need to eliminate the Chinese 
middleman they are apt to be disappointed in the 
results of their efforts. It is not always possible 
to make a realistic estimate of the value of the 
middleman's activities and sometimes there is a 
tendency to forget that these often include hauling 
the crop and providing credit - both of which are 
expensive services. There is also the matter of 
risk-taking since the assumption that prices will rise 
after the harvest is not always borne out" [my 
emphasis] (in Hunt, 1966:175).
The peasants' awareness of these practical difficulties 
involved in production and marketing prompts them to 
actively engage in shail transactions. The implications of 
this for rural development programmes and the Kabila scheme 
itself, insofar as it intends to attract future participa­
tion of the Nub'a. peasants, is that if scheme administration 
is to eliminate shail merchants by actively addressing 
these problems, then it should provide "a rather 
considerable government subsidy to meet costs which are now 
represented in the middleman's interest charges" 
(1966:176). Hunt goes on to make it plain that middlemen 
are often the target of criticism despite the sound 
training and experience which makes them competent in this 
field. Furthermore, the middleman's services are unrecog­
nised and he is often taken as a scape-goat for the simple 
fact that too often the middleman is of a different ethnic
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stock (1966:176). The fact that the Jellaba merchants in 
the Nuba Mountains area come from the Northern provinces 
makes them the target of the same criticism.
The other fact which exploitation theorists fail to fully 
grasp is associated with the unique way peasants evaluate 
their transactions. It is well proved that even the 
selling of the crop below the price of production appears 
to the peasant as gainful since he can obtain in its place 
something which is useful (O'Brien, 1977:47). Ironically, 
we can adduce evidence even from within Marxist discourse 
which testifies to the above argument and therefore amounts 
to a critique of the latter. Thus O'Brien quotes Marx 
who states for peasants that -
"For peasant owning a parcel, the limit of exploita­
tion is not set by the average profit of capital, 
insofar as he is a small capitalist... The absolute 
limit for him as a small capitalist is no more than 
the wages he pays himself after deducting his actual 
costs. So long as the price of the product covers 
those wages, he will cultivate his land, and often at 
wages down to a physical minimum. It is not 
necessary, therefore, that the market price, rises, 
either up to the value or the price of his product. 
This is one of the reasons why grain prices are lower 
in countries with predominant small peasant 
proprietorship than in countries with a capitalist 
mode of production" [my emphasis] (in O'Brien, 
1977:47).
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Thus from the point of view of the actor (ie peasant) 
market price changes are not necessarily the factors which 
prompt him to undertake transaction dealings through the 
shail. Exploitation students should, then, appreciate the 
fact that the returns a peasant draws from shailing his 
crop are based on the calculations, described in Marx's 
words ( in this case Marx seems to be adopting an actor- 
centred view) which set the prices of production at an 
imperceptibly low level. Under these circumstances 
exploitation becomes a complete over-simplification of the 
facts. The importance of shail remains as long as this 
practice ensures the peasant his means of subsistence. 
Again, from within Marxist discourse we hold that in 
peasant farming "outputs are sold as a function of subsist­
ence" (Banaji, in O'Brien, 1977:47). This tendency to 
weigh consumption over profit maximisation and accumulation 
and which is further reinforced by what we have called a 
Gonsumerist ideology makes peasant farming survive even at 
a very low level of investment.
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CHAPTER 6
Nafeir as a Form of Traditional Cooperation
One aspect of the Habila scheme that has continued to 
receive enormous attention on the part of planners and 
Sudanese professionals is the creation of agricultural 
cooperatives. For the purpose of attracting participants 
to the scheme the state farms were instituted to demon­
strate the benefits of the scheme to small farmers. Co­
operative institutions are greatly emphasised (both for 
development in general and for development in Kordofan in 
particular), for the following reasons:
1. The regional government's capacity to offer social 
services in the form of credit for individual farmers is 
considerably limited. This is attributable to the limited 
resource base of the whole region and the meagre regional 
budget at the disposal of the regional administration.
2. The attempt to raise agricultural production by under­
taking agricultural operations on an individualistic basis 
has failed, but, also, even when production is increased, 
benefits tend to accrue to a minority of scheme owners.
3. The ineffective manner in which production is trad­
itionally organised and the small size of farm which 
traditional farmers put into cultivation, could be reversed 
by launching organisational forms based on cooperativism.
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4. Rural-urban migration should be curbed. By virtue of 
their disciplinary nature, cooperatives function to 
stabilise members in the region.
5. More importantly, the Nuba farmers have traditionally 
displayed concern for developing communalistic institutions 
through the formation of self-help groups (the nafeir).
6. Cooperatives, in general, have the advantages of 
offering training at the village level (eg training in 
management and commercial skill), and of establishing 
'secondary powers' - to use Hunter's terminology - which 
means "authentic organisations of the community as against 
the state" (Hunter, 1962:115).
Partly for the above-mentioned reasons Sudanese scholars 
like Omer (1982) have repeatedly recommended cooperatives 
as a blueprint for transforming traditional agriculture in 
the Kordofan region. In a paper presented to the Kadugli 
Conference for the Development of the Kordofan region, held 
in October 1980, Omer suggested the creation of production, 
credit and marketing cooperatives to spearhead rural 
development in Southern Kordofan province. He believed 
that backed by a sustained government involvement such an 
undertaking would lead to greater efficiency and to the 
raising of personal income per capita. Complementary to 
this, a reduction of peasant dependence on traditional 
credit institutions would be achieved. In turn, the small 
farmers would be in a position to devote more of their cash
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revenue to saving, with the consequence of greater 
prospects for investment in agriculture. The cummulative 
effect would be, according to Omer, "to reduce the 
possibility of tax burden on farmers, and [in general] 
would create a favourable atmosphere which would otherwise 
be difficult to bring about" (Omer, 1982:21). However, 
Omer seems to be aware of the potential constraints which 
are obviously likely to arise when projects imposed from 
outside and instigated without due attention given to local 
circumstances. The form of cooperatives he recommends 
reflects the thinking of the 'improvement approach' -
"The sort of cooperatives suggested must first and 
foremost be organisations that are closely associated 
with indigenous socio-cultural factors, that largely 
avoid the application of unquestioned 'imposed' 
models, and that reduce the impositions of institut­
ions on the people" (1982:21).
Ironically, and despite the seemingly sound recommendations 
which scholars whole-heartedly offer in favour of coopera­
tives, empirical investigation has shown that, in the 
context of the Habila scheme, cooperative institutions 
among all institutionalised forms of developing traditional 
agriculture, have commanded little interest. Affan, for 
instance, in his research on Habila scheme explicitly 
reveals the Nuba peasants disillusionment with cooperatives 
- a phenomenon which, he contends, finds no readily avail­
able explanation. In previous chapters I have elaborated 
some of the economic factors pertaining to this, and have
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introduced some socio-cultural and strategic factors in 
terms of which we might begin an explanation. In this 
chapter we investigate the key 'social factors' which 
scholars believe facilitate peasants' acceptance of co­
operativism - the existence of traditional forms of 
cooperation (nafeir). We investigate the subjective condi­
tions that gave rise to such traditional forms of coopera­
tion; we look at how these forms functioned, and at the 
reasons for their gradual disintegration. It is my conten­
tion that the assumption that the traditional forms could 
be a foundation for agricultural cooperatives is painfully 
erroneous. Not only have the traditional cooperative 
systems ceased to exist in their traditional forms but, due 
to the persistence of the very conditions which have led to 
their disintegration, they can no longer provide a sound 
basis for modern cooperative institutions.
The dissolution of traditional institutions of cooperation 
is, of course, commonly described in anthropology in res­
pect of the ravages of commercialism on peasant society 
(Faris, 1987; Holy, 1987). (Also some anthropologists, 
like Abdullahi (1987) argue that traditional cooperative 
institutions have certain socio-cultural values which 
perpetulate them.) The culmination is, perhaps, the 
individualism which Foster (1965) describes in his paper on 
'the image of limited good'. Thus the reports on the 
individualism that has developed in Nuba socio-economic 
structure and which seems to stand in opposition to a 
successful implementation of cooperatives, finds its
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counterpart in many other countries. A common trend which 
accompanies the commercialism of peasant agriculture and 
which is repeatedly cited in the literature on peasantry 
has been "the growth of a new stratum of worker-peasants, 
who supplement their agricultural, mainly subsistence, 
production by hiring out their labour" (Shanin, 1971:250). 
Prior to the full commercialistion of agriculture and the 
development of wage labour communal work groups were the 
only means of attracting labour as a supplement to family 
labour. Such recruitment of labour is usually governed by 
rates of reciprocity and is based on ties of kinship and 
neighbourhood. Tasks for which group labour might be 
recruited include digging of wells, house construction, 
land clearing, weeding, etc. As an incentive to partici­
pants, beer and sometimes meat may be served upon the con­
clusion of the particular task. It has been argued that 
communal labour groups do not increase the total labour 
supply; but, in practice people are committed to work for 
longer hours than when they work individually (de Wilde, 
1967:86). Certainly, communal labour is usually recruited 
for the most labour-demanding tasks such as weeding and 
well digging.
One factor concomitant with commercialism, and which 
influences peasant production and the mode of labour
organisation, is competition from mechanised farming
schemes. Given the fact that peasants and rich scheme
owners compete for the scarce agricultural inputs and 
factors of production the ultimate result is for the small
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farm to disintegrate. This is mainly because rich farmers 
can solicit wage labour which would otherwise be summoned 
by peasants on the farm work parties. Furthermore, rich 
farmers can easily divert family labour from traditional 
agriculture and transform it into 'peasant’ wage workers, 
thereby affecting the spontaneous forms of labour 
mobilization. The development of commercialism and the 
accompanying growth of peasant-worker stratum in turn works 
to further precipitate small farm disintegration. As 
peasants are transformed into worker-peasants, it too often 
happens that these peasant-workers, especially able-bodied 
men flee to cities which promise better paid jobs and 
security. The family production unit left behind thus 
finds its capacity to mobilise labour increasingly reduced.
A wide range of studies on African agricultural systems 
have emerged which stress the dissolution of communal 
labour forms. Hunter (1962), for instance, remarks that 
Nadel in 1936 noted a trend towards the rapid weakening of 
the efako cultivation (based on communal labour) among the 
Nupe of Nigeria, with much the same trend occurring for the 
Hausa qayya. The main blow to communal labour forms came 
from competition between cultivators due to the spread of 
the cash economy (Hunter, 1962:111). The effect of the 
cash economy on the pre-existing socio-economic structure 
of traditional societies is also to further social 
inequality. De Schlippe, in his study of the beer party 
among the Zande of the southern Sudan, argues that communal 
labour tends to maintain the inegalitarian relationship
— 145 —
between the social groups. The Zande family which can 
succeed in appropriating massive quantitites of cereal by 
mobilising beer parties will find itself in a position to 
acquire the bulk of the surplus since the family can 
capitalise on the initial surplus for further mobilisation 
(de Schlippe, 1956:148). One of the uses made of the 
surplus food generated through labour mobilisation is the 
fulfilment of social obligations. Other uses, as described 
by Allan (1965) include gifts for prestige, and generosity 
and for honouring important people. Allan cites Lynn's 
material from Mamprusi of Northern Ghana, that in this 
society the surplus in a good year was "used lavishly in 
religious ceremonies; so lavishly, it seems, that some 
enthusiasts found themselves short of seed by the start of 
the next season" (Allan, 1965:45). This lavish expenditure 
would severely affect poor farmers, in contrast to rich 
ones, since small farmers usually put into cultivation too 
small an acreage to yield a large surplus.
However, rich farmers also make use of surplus products to 
further their mercantile interests and personal advance­
ments. Where these farmers use part of the surplus in the 
form of prestige, it too often happens that it is used to 
honour important people such as officials, administrators, 
police and the like. This tendency to draw surplus via 
communal labour and to divert the surplus away from the 
original contributors or use it for recruiting wage labour, 
tends to widen the social distance between rich farmers and 
poor peasants. In turn, this would lead to the gradual
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dissolution of communal labour itself as a basic form of 
labour organisation. Thus, for the poor peasant the rich 
farmers represent the spectre of an outmoded exploitative 
strata whose aim is to manipulate their effort and infringe 
the rules of reciprocity. When state-designed plans are 
imposed, and which claim to be modelled on traditional 
cooperative patterns, such previous experience would ultim­
ately be invoked and so thwart development efforts.
Communal Labour in the Southern Kordofan Region
Communal labour, nafeir, as an institution, took its shape 
in the context of traditional subsistence agriculture and 
continued to exist in relation to its contribution to the 
objective of subsistence production. Historically, land in 
the Nuba Mountains was plentiful and, as a consequence, the 
population enjoyed easy access to it. The bulk of the 
usable land remained in what was described by anthropolog­
ists as no-man’s-land (see eg Nadel, 1947). The main 
problem was one of shortage of labour during the peak 
agricultural season. When family labour failed to effect­
ively undertake the agricultural operations, extra labour 
had to be mobilised from kin, age-mates, neighbours and 
occasionally guests (Nadel, 1947:54). Both sexes were 
entitled to recruit such group labour provided that the 
rules of reciprocity were not jeopardised. The organiser 
of a nafeir paid no financial rewards to the participants, 
rather he might serve beer (brewed by the women), tea, 
coffee and meat to entertain the guests. Recruitment was 
not supposed to exceed the length of one day at a time,
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though a person may organise group labour several times 
during the agricultural season. The frequency with which a 
nafeir could be organised depended on the recruiter’s 
ability to finance the enterprise and could therefore vary 
according to one's wealth and status (1947:54).
In the early times of Nuba settlement in the Southern 
Kordofan region (upon migration from the northern part of 
Sudan some hundreds of years ago), their life was described 
as revolving around inter-tribal wars and communal raids. 
The Nuba were known for their traditional anarchism and 
rebellion; and it would, therefore, not be a mistake to 
trace the rise of communal labour to those early days. 
Communal raids were concluded by the collective share of 
spoils among the raiders. It could also make sense to 
argue that this military mentality encouraged a propensity 
to cooperate in agriculture, or, generally, in economic 
spheres (see Manger, 1987). The colonial administration 
played a big role in the pacification of the area in the 
1920's and eventually the practice, ie communal labour, was 
fully developed and incorporated in the sphere of 
production in the Nuba economy. According to one source 
(Manger, 1987), the incorporation of the specific communal 
labour institutions into the Nuba socio-economic system has 
been the result of culture contact between the Nuba popula­
tions and the immigrants and the neighbouring Arabs. The 
Arabs, it is argued, by virtue of their commitment to Islam 
were able to precede other non-Muslim tribes in developing 
a feeling of cooperativeness among the members of the wider
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community. The neighbouring communities who are supposed 
to have been in contact with the Nuba for centuries were 
the Baggara Arabs. The latter are pastoral nomadic groups 
whose grazing routes bring them within the confines of the 
Nuba Mountains territory. The institution of ceremonial 
drinking of tea is the typical form of joint labour among 
the Baggara Arabs; which is followed by elaborate singing 
and praising rites. According to Manger (1987) this 
institution has been borrowed by the Nuba communities with 
some modification to suit their conditions. He quotes 
Arber who states that -
"... the Awlad Himeid who came north to Habania 
country in the rains picked it up [ie the institution 
of communal labour] and took it south where it caught 
on among serf-like communities of the Southern Kawahla 
at Errio, at Werne and at El Liri" (in Manger, 
1987:97) .
However, such alleged borrowing of the nafeir institution 
can only be proved by tracing it back to the early times of 
the Nuba settlement in the region since no ethnographic 
research has empirically established the absence of 
communal labour among the Nuba prior to their cultural 
contact with the Arabs. Moreover, a number of studies have 
been made which clearly establish the indigenous practice 
of communal labour among non-Arab societies, among them 
societies which had no contact with the Arabs at all (eg 
Worslty, 1971).
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Use has been made of the nafeir in nearly three spheres of 
production and exchange in the Nuba Mountains region (the 
following description applies to the recent past; as we 
shall see, the nafeir no longer fully functions today). It 
was extensively practiced for accomplishing the various 
agricultural tasks (eg planting, land clearing, digging, 
weeding, sowing, winnowing, harvesting and hunting). 
Secondly, it was used in the non-agricultural sphere such 
as hut construction, the digging of wells and repair of 
beds. Finally, it was extended to account for part of the 
bride-price in respect of the future husband’s particip­
ation in his in-laws' agricultural operations; this sort of 
bride-price effectively amounts to bride-service. The 
dominant parties around whom communal labour revolves 
include close kin, neighbours and in-laws. Participation 
was governed by strict rules connoting social obligation 
and reciprocation. Both types of reciprocity referred to 
in the literature were widespread in the Nuba Mountains 
area, viz, 'generalised' reciprocity and 'balanced' recip­
rocity (see Ziche and Salih, 1987; cf Sahlins, 1972). 
Generalised reciprocity is manifest in 'expectations' of 
help during times of stress or need, especially between 
close kin and neighbours. Balanced reciprocity, on the 
other hand, is more strict and is undertaken under the 
principle of rational economic claculation with respect to 
the 'instances of participation' of an individual in 
another's nafeir. In this type the individual can at any 
time claim back his effort from community members who 
happened to have summoned him for specific agricultural
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tasks. Such economic calculation underpinning balanced 
reciprocity, therefore, takes place where "more accurate 
accounts over services rendered to each other are kept and 
debits and credits have to [be] balanced within acceptable 
periods of time" (Ziche and Salih, 1987:137). Theoretic­
ally speaking, the difference between the two forms of
reciprocity is a matter of degree and the two can in 
practice overlap. But generalised reciprocity tends to 
prevail among close kin and neighbours (cf Sahlins, 1972).
In the case of the Nuba peasants, communal labour organis­
ation not only implies the pooling of effort (ie abstract 
labour) but also expanding the scope of the labour process 
by infuencing the forces of production. This obtains from 
the fact that a nafeir organiser summons not only the
groups’ labour, but also their implements. It has been the 
convention that in the Nuba Mountain area a participant
brings his own agricultural implements with him. One may
do so even if not asked (Nadel, 1947). Depending on his 
convenience it may happen that a peasant favours using a
particular kind of tool rather than using someone else’s.
Ritual display also enters communal work participation in 
the Nuba hills area. In the immediate past, work in a
priest’s nafeir was socially as well as economically 
valued. Spiritual satisfaction draws from one’s ’nearness’ 
to holy men, the manipulators of good and the disposers of 
benevolence. Religious incantations performed by a priest, 
or a so-called Kujur, on behalf of the community or a
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particular individual are believed to ensure a favourable 
future and better material rewards. In the context of 
agriculture this ritual performance is related to 
increasing agricultural productivity and output (Nadel, 
1947). For this reason an individual would participate in 
a priest’s nafeir even if not personally asked. Rain- 
making is also a pre-requisite for a prospective agricult­
ural season. In addition to rain-making a priest was also 
believed to have the ability to ward off pests, birds and 
locusts. The priest’s attachment with and manipulation of 
the sky’s spirits would ultimately influence these spirits 
to release plenty of rain. The spirits of the earth, on 
the other hand, shoulder the responsibiity of warding off 
and minimizing environmental hazards.
The priests, however, do not participate in communal work. 
This is related to the fact that the nature of their 
activity necessitates privacy and seclusion. But this does 
not mean that priests are exploiting nafeir labour without 
contributing to the morality of reciprocity. By ritual 
performance the priest is actually contributing to that 
objective. For this reason the priest was not treated on 
an equal footing with rich farmers who were accused of 
failure to reciprocate in communal labour. While the 
priest is physically absent from active nafeir, his ritual 
contribution could be fully appreciated by the community. 
The place ritual performance occupy in the social life of 
the Nuba, and with special reference to agriculture, is 
succinctly stated in Nadel’s monograph as follows -
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"Every important phase of the agricultural year is 
accompanied by some ritual event which similarly 
transforms rational motives into supernatural prom­
ises. Signals for coordinated and well-planned 
efforts become repeated sacred guarantees against 
failure and misfortune. These rituals may be of a 
very specific and detailed nature as in Haiban or in 
Koalib, when nearly every cultivated plant and every 
phase of its cultivation have their separate rites, 
their own priestly experts, and command special magic 
gestures symbolic of the growth which these rites are 
meant to ensure... In most tribes priests are charged 
with fixing the date of these 'signal rites’ and 
organising the beginning of the agricultural activity 
which the rites are meant to satisfy" (Nadel,1947;44).
A priest may have his farm weeded without even his 
knowledge. This would be done for reasons of loyalty for 
the expiation of one’s sins or ritual failure. From the 
view point of ideology, Marxists would argue that such 
’alliance’ with the priest functions to mask the exploit­
ative relations between the priest and the communal group. 
The argument is based on the examination of the economic 
relations of production and exchange embedded in nafeir 
recruitment. However, exploitation judged on the part of 
the individual actor may be entirely non-existent. While 
Marxists emphasize the material aspect of any transaction, 
an actor would be in a position to weight the ritual 
satisfaction over the material rewards. In respect of
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different strategies of allocating labour, to opt for one 
choice or another is a matter of the individual’s sole 
value judgement rather than of an external observer.
There is also another aspect of the nafeir which relates to 
the ritual domain. Sanctions against failure to partici­
pate in a priest’s nafeir differ from those regarding the 
nafeir of an ordinary individual. In the case of a 
priest’s nafeir the sanction is levied less socially than 
spiritually. The priest was believed to control and affect 
both the material and non-material aspects of the Nuba mode 
of life. His spirits would at any time inflict misfortune 
on misdemeanour. This would cause severe illness whose 
treatment would lie with the priest himself (see Baumann, 
1987). The individual suffering the affliction of spirits 
is therefore obliged to attach himself to the priest. Such 
notions tend to uphold the communal labour system’s smooth 
functioning, for the benefits of the priest and, presumably 
the other participants.
Another type of dealing obtaining in the nafeir system of 
labour organisation relates to bride-service (Nadel, 1947; 
Faris, 1987). Once an individual gets betrothed his rel­
ationship with his in-laws is remodelled and governed by 
specific rules and social sanctions. Such an individual’s 
labour becomes part and parcel of his in-laws' labour, 
which could be pooled at any time to accomplish specific 
tasks (eg in-laws’ nafeir) . A betrothed young male was 
required to participate in many of his in-laws’ activities
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without, however, being rewarded. His labour was, in 
effect, considered part of the bride-price he was obliged 
to secure in respect of his future wife. The length of 
time spent in bride-service varied, depending on the age at 
which a person was betrothed, his ability to accumulate 
enough wealth within a relatively short or long span of 
time, his parent's help in providing bride-wealth and the 
conventional age of marriage ( for both sexes ) set by the 
community. Faris (1987:72) estimates the minimum bride- 
service period to be as high as five years, on the 
assumption that adulthood starts traditionally at 12-13 and 
marriage normally occurred at 18-20 years of age.
Work in bride-service ranges from simple agricultural tasks 
such as winnowing, sowing and threshing, to heavy work such 
as digging and weeding. Off-farm work consisted of re­
pairing agricultural implements, repairing beds, house 
thatching, or fence building. Such obligations relating to 
marriage and its binding rules could also, again, be 
denounced by Marxists as ideologically masking some sort of 
exploitative relations. It was very difficult for a be­
trothed male to contravene the rules of bride-service as 
these are linked to a web of adverse consequences. The 
community's overall evaluation of the betrothed's relation­
ship with his in-laws tends to reinforce the notion of 
compliance. The Nuba used to relate the matter to consid­
erations of honour, a value which is the hallmark for the 
whole Sudanese community. Bride-service, therefore, came 
to directly affect one's reputation (see Faris, 1987).
— 155 -
While an acquiescent betrothed was reputed to have 
diligence and manliness, a non-compliant was subject to 
rejection on the part of his in-laws. With regard to the 
latter case, an individual whose attempt at marriage had 
been declined would have a much more limited chance of 
being accepted as a husband in the future. Yet, is bride- 
service really exploitative? That it need not by any means 
be seen as such comes from the fact that it may also be 
seen (by the actors) that bride-service labour constitutes 
one component of the marriage transactions, a result of 
which was that the betrothed man gets a wife.
Due to considerations of shame, the decision to get be­
trothed in the Nuba community had to be made with circum­
spection. This is also because bride-service often 
conflicted with one's own allocation of time. It might 
happen that a betrothed man should have to make a decision 
between working on his own farm or his in-law's. The 
opportunity cost of opting to work for his in-laws was the 
output forgone from his own farm. To work for in-laws was 
usually the favoured choice as it related to honour and 
reputation. The situation would be more complicated in a 
case where the betrothed had to decide between participat­
ing in a nafeir arranged for a close neighbour and that of 
a bride-service. If the decision went in favour of the 
latter, an excuse might be accepted, on grounds which the 
whole community agreed - in terms of priority of recruit­
ment or of call for recruitment.
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There was also some sort of variability in the labour one 
could summon on behalf of assisting in one's bride-service. 
The nafeir institution was involved here. Following from 
the full recognition of the importance of bride-service in 
the community at large, one would find it imperative to 
summon a neighbour's, friend's and age-mate's labour to 
help accomplish a specific task related to bride-service. 
Faris states that -
"of course the personnel at any specific bride-service 
labour party is peculiar, and will change slightly, 
substantially, or even totally depending on the 
particular task, the size of the party, or specific 
temporal circumstances - though a group of age-mates 
from a specific village section may find themselves 
together frequently in various tasks" (Faris,1987:73).
The organisation of group labour on this basis does not 
imply the transfer of 'obligations' to the in-laws, though 
the labour has been organised by the betrothed on their 
behalf. The task group would usually debit such obli­
gations at the expense of the betrothed alone even if the 
cost of beer, tea and meat is shared by the in-laws as 
well. This testifies to the variability and complexity of 
labour party organisation under bride-service conditions. 
It also tells how the rules of reciprocity tend to overlap 
and take a multiplicity of forms.
Marriage eventually alters the picture and increases the 
scope of reciprocal obligations on the part of in-laws (see
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eg Nadel: 1947). The couple in neo-local residence,
establish their own work group relationships which serve 
their own household’s interests independently of the 
husband's in-laws. The father-in-law now comes to depend 
entirely on his own entitlements and obligations for the 
mobilization of communal labour. Marriage, therefore, 
announces the structuring of fresh social relationships 
within the community. This links with yet another matter. 
At any particular point in time the larger the number of 
betrothed daughters the more economically advantaged the 
household becomes. In this respect, the household's age/ 
sex profile is important in the first place. In the Nuba 
Mountains areas, as is the case with most parts of the 
Sudan (as I, being a citizen, know it), it is the male 
birth which is greatly valued. The male sets to work as 
early as seven years of age, doing the simple tasks such as 
running errands, bird-scaring on the farm, and planting. 
Contribution to household production and consumption tends 
to increase each time an individual male passes through 
adolescence. A household whose sex ratio is biased toward 
the male births is likely to contribute more to its 
subsistence and viability than one of a balanced sex ratio 
or one with a shortage of males. If we look at the 
development cycle of the household, the pattern of labour 
organisation becomes more complicated. Households with 
large numbers of females are not, in reality, completely 
denied youthful labour throughout the life cycle of the 
household. As females enter adolescence and get betrothed 
the economic condition of the household is altered. More
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labour could be mobilized, not only by the betrothed's 
personal contribution in the form of labour, but also by 
his ability to organise communal labour for his in-laws as 
part of the 'bride-price*. Such a household's advantage 
expands as more of its females get betrothed. But, 
generally speaking, with the development of a household 
cycle a process of contraction and expansion becomes 
evident. As we said, marriage functions to restore the 
household to its previous equilibrium point. Thus, we may 
argue that in the context of the Nuba social structure, 
females play vital roles in maintaining household viability 
in terms of bride-service. Moreover, the viability of such 
a household obtains not only as a result of such labour 
mobilization, but also from the minimisation of expendi­
ture. Meat, beer or porridge to entertain the nafeir 
workers are usually paid for by the betrothed.
The cost of labour mobilization on behalf of bride-service 
is threefold. First, there is the accumulated debt in 
terms of future obligations to reciprocate. The second is 
the opportunity cost of the betrothed's work in bride- 
service. And the third is the financial expenditure for 
the entertainment of participants. The betrothed gets 
rewards in terms of reputation and amicable relationships 
with his in-laws. In the near past it has become customary 
that celebrations during the harvesting season were, as we 
mentioned, to be monopolized by those who produced the 
maximum agricultural output (the so-called orinvate cele­
bration). If the betrothed's in-laws happened to achieve
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the orinyate, ie filled its granary to the brim, then he 
was likely to be honoured by the community as well as by 
his in-laws.
The male betrothed's family of orientation also incurs some 
cost. The ability of the household to mobilize its own 
potential labour becomes increasingly reduced as more and 
more of its males opt for betrothal. It is important that 
we look at bride-service at the level of the community at 
large. Every individual household .is affected by the 
development cycle of its members. This development cycle 
is influenced by the conventional child-spacing as well as 
the birth order of the sexes. Islam requires that the 
lactation period be extended for two years, so it could 
follow that the child-spacing period be two years. 
Generally the shorter the child-spacing period for a 
household who happens to have too many male children in the 
birth order, the smaller the potential labour this 
household would lose in case the males got betrothed since 
the females would eventually get betrothed, thus being 
instrumental in restoring the lost labour. If a household 
whose daughter is betrothed delays her marriage, this means 
greater potential bride-service. The family of orientation 
of the betrothed male incurs more loss in terms of outflow 
of its labour potential due to this delayed marriage. This 
process of betrothal and delayed marriage is essential for 
understanding the transfer of advantages between all house­
holds, channelled through the system of communal labour and 
bride-service.
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The contribution of bride-service to agricultural produc­
tion may be seen to be quite significant from the fact that 
in respect of agricultural work put into traditional Nuba 
peasant farming, it is estimated that approximately nine 
mandays per household per annum are spent in threshing 
while 12 days are spent in weeding (Faris, 1987:77).
The Dissolution of Nafeir
More recently, the development of commercialism which in 
the Nuba Hills area was heralded by the introduction of 
rain-grown cotton schemes, has resulted in the rapid 
dissolution of the nafeir and its replacement by wage 
labour. As late as 1969 Faris noted the dissolution of 
nafeir among the class of priests. Only three priests were 
then reported to have been able to organise communal labour 
(1987:78). It is, however, worth mentioning that at this 
period of time the conditions of living in Sudan in general 
were deteriorating considerably, a state of affairs which 
led to the dethronement of the government and its replace­
ment by the Nimeiri regime. In addition to the increasing 
commercialisation of agriculture, the rising prices of food 
products could be held responsible for the disintegration 
of the nafeir system. Another reason for the disintegra­
tion relates to the failure of the priests to carry on 
effectively their function of rain-making which was 
accentuated by the community’s disregard of the priest's 
supernatural qualities. The Nuba people would even 
exercise sanctions over a priest's ritual behaviour, and 
would "chastise or even beat him should he fail in his 
ritual speciality" (1987:79).
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Another influential class which traditionally tended to 
dominate communal labour with little, if any, reciprocity, 
were the policemen, chiefs and government officials (Nadel, 
1947; Faris, 1987). The government servants and officials 
also include the Jellaba since their profession is always 
connected with administration. In the early period of the 
monetization of the Nuba economy the rich men came to sub­
stitute their 'obligatins' to nafeir workers with payment 
by tobacco (Faris, 1987:79) and later to hire wage labour 
instead (Nadel, 1947:57). By virtue of its financial 
standing, this class was able to manipulate communal labour 
for its own individual self-interest, thanks to the salar­
ies the officials would monthly receive. At the time of 
Nadel’s research the social repercussion of this socio­
economic change were evidently imminent. The effect was 
that such changes "tend to further - and perpetuate - 
economic inequality" (1947:57).
Today the dissolution of the nafeir system in the Nuba 
Mountains region is empirically confirmed. One case has 
been reported of the pooling of group labour for working 
communally on commercial agriculture. Once paid, in kind 
or in cash, the wages were divided equally among the group. 
Faris, who documents the disintegration of this type of 
nafeir argues that "in 1980 labour recruiters came to the 
region to attempt to solicit young men to engage in this 
activity, but not with very much success" (1987:79).
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By and large, the tendency towards the increasing commerc­
ialization of agriculture which in the past affected the 
mode of labour organisation and production has finally 
brought the nafeir system to its ruins. As Nadel (1947) 
noted the nafeir's tendency to increase inequality and to 
favour the rich in the wake of a monetized economy also 
meant that ideology of democracy was likewise put in 
jeopardy. The break up of the nafeir following the move 
toward commercialised agriculture has also affected and 
altered the previous form of bride-service. "This is no 
longer possible in modern conditions, for [the future 
bridegroom] will often be away from home on wage-labour" 
(Stevenson, 1984:105). For those reasons we would argue 
that in line with Hunter (1962), traditional communal forms 
such as the nafeir will become difficult to re-arouse since 
these forms died with the absence of the principle on which 
they were based. These conditions (according to Hunter, 
and as we have seen) which gave rise to the traditional 
communal forms were communal life and subsistence agricul­
ture (1962:111). But also, under conditions of commercial­
ism, the actors perceptions of the undesired inegalitarian­
ism associated with 'traditional cooperation' will have 
been sharpened. It is for this reason, we argue, that the 
enthusiasm of the Nuba peasants for participation in 
cooperatives in the context of the Habila scheme has not 
been aroused.
To sum up, the dissolution of the nafeir system of trad­
itional cooperation is a necessary outcome of the actors'
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consciousness of its likely ominous consequences. 
Professor Nadel was able to forecast the change in the 
system of production and labour organisation from his 
understanding of the actors' socio-economic behaviour as 
well as from their perceptions. We should therefore under­
stand the actors' rejection of the nafeir system as "a 
phenomenon that changed the pattern of traditional agricul­
ture from one of comparatively large, cooperative, produc­
tive groups with a kin base to one of small farms" (cf 
Baric, 1967:275). So it is that Nuba peasants attach low 
priority to cooperatives today. We are able to substant­
iate this only insofar as our analysis is closely related 
to the actors perceptions as well as their meaningful be­
haviour. The persistence of the peasant mode of agricul­
tural labour organisation and production which superceded 
the decline of the nafeir system may be well appreciated in 
the fact that peasant farming combined with hired wage 
labour form the optimal adaptation to the modern conditions 
whereby household viability can be guaranteed (see chapter 
5). This new mode of life is irrevocable insofar as the 
actor's conception of the situation is concerned; Nadel 
argues as follows -
"The steady growing numbers of labourers from the Nuba 
Mountains proves that the new demands have necessitat­
ed a completely new means of livelihood, which is 
bound to dislocate the customary organisation of pro­
duction and partly even social orqanistion at large. 
[My emphasis] (1947:82).
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There is one fact which is quite evident. The changes in 
social orqanistion allowed the Nuba peasants to exploit the 
new niche they occupied in such a way that potential costs 
implied by previous transactions could be avoided. The 
decision of a Nuba peasant presumably to strike an optimal 
balance that could assure him the procurement of the means 
of livelihood (without engendering revolutionary change 
which might jeopardize the security he derives from 
exploiting the different possibilities from the niche he is 
occupying), soley reflects his understanding of the 
alternative means open to him in any particular social 
situation. Under such circumstances rationality can be 
detected only insofar as the anthropologist is capable of 
understanding and thereby forecasting the individual’s 
meaningful socio-economic behaviour. In terms of ration­
ality, it is clear that past Nuba pattern of behaviour and 
the present pattern are intimately interconnected. For 
similar argumentation, some anthropologists state that -
"we know that the traditional cultivator is in fact 
capable of rational decisions and motivations; and 
when he marks time, it is often because within the 
existing agrarian system he has no margin for risk 
taking and no access to proper rewards ; because the 
innovations offered do not appear to him appropriate, 
or because he has actually had previous unhappy 
experience with a similar pattern" [my emphasis] 
(Weintraub and Margulies, 1984:42).
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To substantiate our claim that the dissolution of the 
traditional nafeir system is partly responsible for the 
present-day Nuba peasantry's lack of enthusiasm for Habila 
cooperatives, we must make a retrospective analysis (or in 
other words, interpolate). The importance of this analysis 
derives from the fact that a sceptical anthropologist would 
be glad to know if modern agricultural cooperatives could 
have proved a success (in terms of arousing people's 
enthusiasm) had the state implemented the scheme before the 
full development of commercialism in the Nuba economy. 
From my tracing back the past patterns of socio-economic 
changes which had taken place in the Nuba economy and 
social structure, the answer should be in the affirmative, 
other things remaining the same. When Nadel wrote about 
the Nuba, inequality, though imminent, had not been fully 
institutionalised. The few changes in the socio-economic 
system that had occurred were the introduction of money by 
the colonial administration? which later replaced the trad­
itional barter system of exchange. The colonial government 
introduced the money economy for the purpose of extracting 
taxes from the Nuba peasantry. Cotton was encouraged both 
because it was a source of foreign revenue for the govern­
ment which undertook its marketing; and because it provided 
a source of cash income for the immediate producers, 
thereby settling their tax payments. The first response on 
the part of the peasantry was the intensification of agri­
culture which led to increasing the scope of agricultural 
cultivation -
"Large tracts of land are being worked, new crops have
been introduced; and everywhere the cultivation is 
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still of the traditional kind, the new land in the 
plains on which it is practised, where weeds and grass 
grow faster than on the stony hillside and rain and
watercources constitute new dangers, demands more
constant attention" (Nadel, 1947:56).
The above new pattern of readjustment reflects the
individual's response in order to satisfy subsistence needs 
as well as to produce a surplus for the payment of taxes.
In the face of increasing demands of the modern economy and 
the expansion of cotton cultivation, communal labour, 
nafeir, was resorted to for the accomplishment of the 
various agricultural tasks concomitant with the process of 
intensification. "No Nuba farmer would think of planting 
cotton unless full granaries enable him to employ group
labour" (1947:56). The new changes in the economic life of 
the community entailed the transformation of the nafeir 
institution to cope with the social change. More specific­
ally, during the early 1940's (recall that inequality was 
not yet developed) the colonial government made an attempt 
to introduce modern agricultural cooperatives to increase 
the operational efficiency of the agricultural system. The 
colonial state was encouraged to initiate cooperatives by 
the presence of the nafeir which was fully active at that 
time. The Nuba peasantry demonstrated a positive response 
to the state initiative. A report on the Administration of 
Sudan (1950) has described the state of affairs as follows-
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"The object of the scheme in 1944 season was to 
discover the agricultural needs of the Nuba and to see 
how these needs could be applied on cooperative lines 
to large-scale agricultural settlements. The first 
season showed that the Nuba were capable of developing 
a real feeling of communal responsibility and coopera­
tive effort" [emphasis mine] (1944:165).
This, arguably, testifies to our claim that the disappear­
ance of the past ideology which legitimated the smooth 
functioning of communal labour, and which eventually led to 
the breakup of the nafeir, has today blocked the state's 
attempt to organise modern cooperatives for transforming 
traditional subsistence agriculture. Initially, the 
transformations which the nafeir system witnessed were the 
necessary outcome of modern changes to which it was 
actually adjusted. But later on this whole system became a 
fetter on the smooth functioning of the society which was 
traditionally grounded on the ideology of equality and 
democracy. The fact is that with the rapid commercialis­
ation of agriculture particular classes, as we have seen, 
tended to manipulate nafeir labour for furthering their 
economic expansion. This in turn came to conflict with the 
rules of reciprocity and democracy. Communal labour for 
cotton cultivation interfered with the existing norms of 
social obligations and balanced cooperation. "The irregu­
lar distribution of cotton-growing in every Nuba tribe at 
once rules out strict reciprocity" (Nadel, 1947:56). 
Finally, and the factor which has perpetuated the inevit-
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able dissolution of group labour among the Nuba peasantry, 
the permanence of economic inequality brought about by the 
utilisation by a minority class of group labour in cotton 
cultivation largely explains the peasant's unhappy 
previous experience with cooperation.
Today the nafeir provides additional sources of labour 
mobilisation only at the level of the kinship domain and 
that of closely-knit neighbours. As social distance (due 
to inequality) is becoming wider the only avenue which can. 
provide security for the individual is to cling to one's 
kin group. A number of anthropologists have emphasized 
that in times of crisis it is kinship that is primarily 
invoked for help and security (Colson, 1971). Participa­
tion in the Habila scheme today both in cooperatives and 
the private schemes is confined to the same upper strata 
that had traditionally acquired the privileged position in 
the Nuba socio-economic structure.
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CHAPTER 7
The Importance of Building on Local Institutions 
as a Pre-requisite for Rural Development
This chapter intends to make an extrapolative analysis for 
examining the importance of building on the traditional 
institutions, such as the nafeir, as a pre-requisite for 
rural development. Linking rural development programmes 
with the pre-existing institutional forms is commonly cited 
in development literature in terms of concepts such as 
enthusiasm and popular participation. One reason is that 
rural development schemes, as we have argued in chapter 2, 
too often fail to provide real benefits to the target popu­
lation. The target group which is meant to be directly 
affected by planned programmes often suffer deterioration: 
there is no fundamental improvement in the total socio­
economic structure of the rural society. One factor which 
keeps peasants from effectively participating in state- 
designed schemes, again repeatedly cited in the literature, 
is the peasants' lack of confidence in such attempts, their 
view being that such schemes would not benefit them 
(Huizer, 1971; Hunter, 1962; Worsley, 1971).
Hunter (1962) seems to be pessimistic about the relevance 
of old traditions and about policy-making relying on 
peasant enthusiasm for project design, and describes such 
enthusiasm as a "wasting asset" (1962:111). One example 
Hunter cites refers to the Ibo of Eastern Nigeria. In this 
society almost every village was found to be contributing
- 170 -
free labour, material, and also cash for state-initiated 
schemes for improving village infrastructure such as 
bridges and the building of markets. Despite such an 
encouraging atmosphere upon which to launch development 
programmes. Hunter argues that there is the danger that 
such enthusiasm be exploited. He maintains that -
"the essence of local enthusiasm is in achieving 
something which local people urgently want, which 
genuinely expresses their need, not in labouring on 
part of a scheme conceived. by a distant government" 
(1962:111-112).
Too often when planners design programmes of change which 
claim to have some relevance to the pre-existing communal- 
istic institutions, it is the materialistic aspect of 
cooperation that is stressed. There exists ample litera­
ture which shows that traditional cooperation have 
ideological underpinnings which may transcend materialistic 
overtones. Worsley, for example, states that cooperation 
can refer to -
"an ideological commitment, and in this sense we 
rightly think of cooperation as a special kind of 
institution because its policies and arrangements are 
conditioned (negatively) by limitations on individual­
ism and competition and (positively) by stress upon 
mutual aid, the common good - at the extreme, 
socialist ideals of social production and/or social 
appropriation, of equality and participatory 
democracy" [his emphasis] (Worsley, 1971:24).
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The ideology underlying mutual aid and cooperation in its 
spontaneous (traditional) form differs from that of state- 
designed Gooperativism in that in planned cooperativism 
economic interests rule over the social and psychological. 
Furthermore, and in line with Worsley, modern agricultural 
cooperatives have contradictory demands in fostering 
democratic participation and in getting peasants to work 
with unfamiliar partners which can render cooperative 
development a difficult task. We have seen in the context 
of the Habila scheme that the majority of scheme owners are 
officials, police and Jellaba coming from other provinces 
of Sudan. As regards this last state of affairs, Saul has 
shown, in respect of cooperatives in Tanzania, that corrupt 
officials formed the basic obstacle to efficient operation 
of cooperatives. He showed that a minority of influential 
officials tended to manipulate cooperatives to expand their 
economic standing at the expense of the poor (Saul, 1971).
Joy (1971), however, argues that generalisations on whether 
the existence of some social factors can be conducive to 
state-initiated projects can be of little practical value. 
The danger inherent in generalisation is that the same 
factors which we attempt to generalise about are either 
uncontrolable or have too simple criteria by which to be 
identified (1971:62). He gives an example from Tanzania 
where cooperatives are viewed by officials as alternatives 
to private capitalist enterprise and are advocated for the 
simple reason that they can encourage desired attitudes 
between individuals and groups. It is argued that changing
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inter-group attitudes works to "pose extra, rather than 
different, criteria for success, for business efficiency 
criteria will still need to be met" (1971:62). If we are 
to come up with guidelines for policy-making, Joy suggests, 
we have to be able to specify the alternative 
organisational forms which can relate to the relevant 
technical, economic and social factors. This necessitates 
examining -
"how far past failures have been due to promoting 
cooperation in appropriate social environments and how 
they have been due rather to failure to understand how 
to design and manage cooperative enterprises in ways 
which recognise the significance of social - and for 
that matter technical and economic - factors in 
particular situations" (1971:62).
In chapter 6, we have, in effect, dealt with the obverse of 
this, showing how past success of cooperatives was due to 
favourable social and economic environments (see page 167). 
it is to the type of analysis described by Joy which we now 
turn in an attempt to provide guidelines for policy-making. 
Focus will be put on identifying solidary and egalitarian 
characteristics relevant for sound economic planning.
The break-up of the traditional system of cooperation has
opened up new opportunities for maintaining household
viability (eg labour migration and hired labour). The
peasant keeps his bildat holding outside the Habila scheme
and combines bildat cultivation with hiring out his labour
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to the scheme, or, otherwise, engaging in seasonal 
migration. According to Worsley, and indeed as I have 
argued, "it is wrong to label such prudence 'conservatism': 
it is simply rational, calculative instrumentalism (1971: 
24). But I infer that the break-up of the nafeir became an 
'invocation instance' in that previous bad experience with 
cooperation could be mentioned whenever new attempts aimed 
at building modern cooperatives are made. This has been 
perpetuated by the low frequency of inter-marriage between 
the poor Nuba and rich merchants and farmers, some of whom 
are Arabs (see eg Baumann, 1987:469). Inter-marriage is 
hindered by two factors. Economically, the Nuba peasants, 
due to low productivity of agriculture,cannot afford to pay 
bride-wealth. The latter is increasing astronomically with 
the development of the modern economy and the rapid 
commercialisation of agriculture. The second factor 
relates to ethnic differences and differences in rates of 
literacy and material culture between the Arabs and the 
indigenous people.
For cooperatives to be successful, recruitment should, 
logically, be on the basis of equality, thus implying the 
exclusion of outsiders, rich merchants and farmers. Baumann 
has noted that Miri Bara in the further southward part of 
the Nuba Mountains region exhibit a pattern in cooperative 
development where membership was recruited on the basis of 
kinship loyalty; and that this village managed to resist 
the spread of wage employment in traditional agriculture. 
This resistance in turn became a limiting factor in the
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spread of the money economy and trade. The village has 
therefore to be dependent on its local human and material 
resources for its own development. With this objective of 
self-reliance Miri Bara villagers could succeed with the 
establishment of a cooperative flour mill by relying on a 
kinship-based membership. The cooperative is presided over 
by Miri-born teachers and local farmers who are elected by 
village people. Baumann argues that such a cooperative has 
become an example on which development is to be based -
"when in subsequent years, more and more villagers 
felt the need for a small shop within the village, the 
flour mill was often invoked as a reminder that 
innovation was possible, and worked at its best, if 
outside merchants were kept outside" (1987:469).
Kinship solidarity, thus worked to foster modern cooper­
atives rather than to impede village development. The 
village also harnessed kinship solidarity to mobilise 
domestic labour in line with the traditional nafeir system. 
This was possible because an existing village norm was 
validated, viz, that, in Baumann's words, "cash payments 
within the community were seen as violating the interests 
of all concerned" (1987:469), for -
"it would insult a paid fellow villager by treating 
him like an outsider, and, to his employer, would 
amount to an admission of being without kin or 
friends" (1987:469).
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Another reason for the successful development of the co­
operative flour mill in Miri is that due to its relative 
isolation from the major trading towns (eg Kadugli, 
Billing, etc), the influence of outsiders in the local 
village economy was minimal (cf Riches, 1977). Traders 
gained little advantage from getting access to the village 
since its precarious market and trade, and the villagers' 
objective of self-reliance, imply high transportation costs 
and limited demand for external goods. This is further 
accentuated by the villagers' attitude toward outsiders, 
coupled with the pre-existing spirit of pride and compet­
ition. Such opposition on the part of insiders to out­
siders was a necessary reaction against the tendency of 
farmers to export investment resources to urban centres 
outside the boundaries of the Southern Kodofan region, the 
logic of which would be to hinder institutional develop­
ment in the interests of progressive outsiders. The 
magnitude of such capital expatriation could be seen from 
what Omer has to say about the situation -
"While this is only natural for the free movement of 
capital, what it does mean however is that what 
remains of that capital to be reinvested in the region 
is only that sum which makes that investment just 
viable" Omer, 1982:24).
Yet a success in cooperativism in the Nuba Mountains area 
is the exception rather than the rule. Baumann argues 
elsewhere (Baumann, 1980) that in the same village, ie 
Miri, an agricultural production cooperative has been
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attempted in the 1980's as a means to foster village 
development. As a sound basis for cooperative development 
the pre-existing flour-mill which was established through 
self-help initiative was to be extended and incorporated to 
form a full-fledged modern cooperative. But as in the case 
with other parts of Sudan in general, the undertaking 
started with the appointment of a committee composed of two 
distinct groups. The first category included the school- 
educated elite who presided over the committee; the second 
category included local farmers to represent the grassroots 
level. According to Baumann it was thought that such 
representation would be of much help in respect of promot­
ing the village cooperative, for two reasons. The school- 
educated elite on the one hand might solicit government 
assistance (credit facilities, tax exemptions, etc) thanks 
to its high standing which enables them to get things done. 
Local farmers, on the other hand, were touted in view of 
their having strong local support, with the aim of 
stimulating effective grassroot participation in the 
project. However, grassroot participation was hindered by 
communication bottlenecks involved in discussion-meetings 
between committee members and the public. In the modern 
context, traditional ijtimaa (meeting) separates local 
people from the committee since it was highly formalized 
and hierarchical in nature. The consequence of this 
division was that farmers found it very difficult to offer 
their own suggetions and state their problems. Differences 
in literacy rates between committee members and the public 
further blocked effective communication. There exists some
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difference between the modern version of institutions for 
decision-making and the traditional version. With the 
latter, Baumann posits, power is usually wielded by local 
shaikhs who arrive at conclusive decisions in an 
egalitarian fashion involving all members. So when it was 
recongised that the two groups were promulgating 
conflicting objectives, the idea of proceeding with the 
cooperative was repealed. It became apparent to the 
majority of small farmers that the elite's objective of 
commercialising the production cooperative did not match 
their objective of subsistence production, Baumann states 
it succinctly -
"Typically, the school-educated elite are cash- 
oriented, possess capital, however minimal, rather 
than time, will or expertise for agricultural labour, 
and rely on immediate market returns, rather than the 
preservation of land as a viable resource. By con­
trast, the village farmers, living on the subsistence 
of their own fields, can mobilise labour, rather than 
invest in cooperative shares, and depended for their 
future on the preservation of soil fertility" 
(1980:2).
A similar case has been presented by Abdel Ghaffar (1977b) 
for the Berta and Watawit in the Southern Funj in Sudan. 
The Watawit are progressive farmers and rich immigrant 
merchants in contrast to the Berta who are predominantly 
subsistence cultivators. By virtue of their advantageous 
economic standing the Watawit managed to wield power and so 
serve their own particular interests. Being a homogeneous
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group, the Berta devised communal labour (nafeir) for 
accomplishing those peak agricultural operations which are 
labour demanding (eg harvesting and weeding). Merchants, 
and rich farmers do not usually take part in communal 
labour. In the 1950's the state made an attempt at intro­
ducing mechanised schemes for the development of the area. 
The basic assumption had been made that the existing 
institution of communal labour would provide a sound basis 
on which new agricultural cooperatives could be establish­
ed. As a matter of fact the scheme proved a failure since, 
Abdel Ghaffar argues, it did not provide for grassroots 
interests and ideas about development.
Later on modernisation schemes aimed towards benefiting the 
lower strata have been introduced in this area. This
alternative was met with popular participation and could 
contribute to rural development. The new approaches 
stressed the exclusion of outsiders and the integration of 
the values, and beliefs of local people into modern
cooperative institutions. Thus the main reason behind the 
successful mobilisation of communal labour for the 
promotion of rural development is stated by Abdel Ghaffar 
as follows -
"this [success] is mainly due to the fact that village
members feel that it is consistent with their way of
organising production and therefore it will lead to 
improvement of their lives without having any drastic 
effect on the distribution of production. In other
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words its effects on social relations and social 
structure of the units in general is not negative" 
(Abdel Ghaffar, 1977b;65).
The implications of this is that the success of the modern 
cooperative is dependent upon its ideological imprint: the 
more stressed and the more real are the similarities 
between traditional and modern cooperation the more likely 
is the acceptance by local people. This necessitates the 
minimization of social costs concomitant with so-called 
modernisation values. Where local elites side with their 
kinship groups (eg Miri flourmill); where outsiders' 
influence on local affairs is minimal and the village 
economy is less monetized (as we have argued in chapter 6), 
traditional institutions are more likely to be conducive to 
rural development (see Worsley, 1971). Even so a state of 
affairs where various kinship groups identify with village- 
wide interests in the successful promotion of cooperatives, 
as in Miri, may not always be generalised for other situ­
ations. Riches (1977) has examined the possibility of 
cementing kin-based groups into larger communities in res­
pect of a state-directed cooperative among the Canadian 
Eskimo. The author showed that despite the cooperative 
ideals which aimed at building on Inuit values of egality 
and relations of kinship the cooperative proved a failure. 
The main reason was the development of a tendency for 
particular kin-groups to distort the cooperative by favour­
ing their own members, thus contravene ing the stated ideals 
(see Riches, 1977).
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An exceptional case, where traditional communal labour was 
conducive to individual advancement is the one presented by 
Barth (1967) for the Fur society in Darfur province in 
western Sudan. Barth indicated that the Fur economy is 
largely dependent on subsistence agriculture whose labour 
is mobilised in the form of work parties, "through the 
brewing of beer, labour is mobilised in direct proportion 
to the millet invested" (Barth, 1967:164), but labour 
cannot be directly exchanged for millet. The Fur society 
also attracts middlemen from the neighbourhood who 
specialise in the production of garlic, tomatoes, onions or 
wheat. However, the relationship between these outsiders 
and the Fur subsistence farmers is not antagonistic nor 
does it involve the dominance of one group by another. It 
happened that an Arab from the neighbourhood; who is 
commercial-minded was able to succeed in recruiting 
communal labour, rewarded the labourers with beer, and the 
surplus product was marketed at higher prices in the urban 
markets. The strategy this Arab merchant had adopted was 
based on buying millet from the local market at a very low 
price for the brewing of beer to be served for the 
participant labourers. As a cash crop tomato was 
cultivated with the assistance of communal labour. Later 
on the local Fur farmers followed the merchant's example 
with spectacular success (see Barth, 1967).
However, Barth's case cannot be generalised in respect of j
the social arrangements of the cooperatives with which we 
are dealing. First, the case applies to an individual vis- 
a-vis other groups, in contrast to the cooperative arrange-
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merits which are basically collective in form. Secondly, 
the individual Arab, since he complied with the existing 
rule of reciprocity was justified in mobilising communal 
labour for profit maximisation. Thirdly, and more import­
antly, the Fur society was undergoing rapid socio-economic 
transformation at the time the entrepreneurial activity was 
flourishing. Finally, all members of the society had equal 
access to labour resources; and hence the same possibilit­
ies of individual advancement were open to all.
The case presented by Abdel Ghaffar about the Funj people 
squarely fits with the Habila scheme in the early phases of 
scheme implementation. From discussion which I had with a 
post-graduate student at Omdurman (October 1987) who 
happened to be visiting the scheme area in the early 
1970's, concerning the response of the grassroots to the 
introduction of cooperatives, I gained the following 
impression -
"The agricultural Bank of Sudan established an office 
at Billing, the district headquarter, to provide 
credit for small farmers to promote agricultural 
development. The credit facilities were meant as 
payments for land clearance, harvesting and weeding 
costs. Its objective was to raise the level of in­
comes among small farmers living in the area. At 
first the Nuba farmers rejected the innovation on the 
ground that the idea was completely new to them; be­
cause local people themselves were not aware of what 
the Bank actually offered. This happened during the 
early years of the Nimerei regime (1970). Shortly
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after this, a few small farmers started to be more 
receptive and applied to the Merchanised Farming 
Corporation for land and credit provisioning. The 
majority of these applicants opted for private farming 
and these happened to be a class of rich farmers and 
Jellaba coming from outside Habila. Only a negligible 
number of the small farmers opted for cooperatives. 
In actuality the membership of such small farmers in 
the cooperatives was only presented insofar as they 
had a legal claim in the cooperative assets. Real 
participation in the running of cooperatives was en­
tirely absent. Small farmers found themselves alien­
ated from their produce which was not stored and 
marketed through the formal channels of cooperative 
board. In addition, the business-like nature of the 
institution requires at least some basic knowledge 
about 'accountancy'. This, the small Nuba farmers do 
not have. Eventually a considerable proportion of 
these farmers started to opt out of the agricultural 
cooperatives with the consequence that the Bank 
recorded that defaulting was endangering its lending 
capacity."
Affan's (Affan, 1978) examination of the existing agricul­
tural cooperatives at work in 1976 substantiates and 
corroborates my informant's observation. Affan presents 
the following table which reports the major job of farm 
owners :
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Table 9Functional Classification of Farm Owners by Major Job
Major Job % of farm owners
Farmers 11Cooperatives 6Non-farmers 83n = 18NB: The cooperative was for members of the Police force in Billing
Source: Affan (1978), p38.
As stated in the table, the existing cooperatives do not 
belong to the Nuba peasants, rather they are owned by the 
police force residing in the district headquarter 
Billing. We have also indicated in chapter 4 that the co­
operatives, in 1982, were experiencing liquidation on the 
part of the scheme management.
By and large, the cases presented in the foregoing lead to 
some conclusions about the relevance and/or importance of 
traditional institutions to rural development planning. 
Inspite of the varying focus of cooperative programmes and 
the differences in social and economic circumstances, there 
are some general features. First, national or locally 
initiated plans to foster cooperative development are in­
variably looked askance at by the so-called receivers of 
development inputs. Secondly, the cases reveal some 
regularities as regards experiences with traditional co­
operation. The cases, also, corroborate Baumann who 
insists that development must be "subject to social choices 
and agricultural values proper to the developing community 
itself" (Baumann, 1984:459).
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The general pattern is a reflection of the client’s 
indeed we should say the actor's - capacity to adjust to 
the content of development resources such that an opportun­
ity to benefit is created. This is revealed for the Nuba 
peasants who engage in labour migration or combine bildat 
cultivation with hiring out their labour in the scheme as a 
rational strategy. For Miri Bara, kinship solidarity 
represented the adjustment mechanism whereby the Miri-born 
educated teachers could successfully intervene so as to 
create a healthy atmosphere for the flour-mill cooperative. 
The Berta, for their part, were able to exclude outsiders 
and succeed with their production cooperatives.
In the Habila scheme failure to exclude outsiders impelled 
the Nuba farmers to opt out. Small farmers could easily 
distinguish the potential clients of development projects 
according to well-defined criteria. These include farm 
income, degree of subsistence orientation, ethnic group 
membership, progressiveness, social relationships and 
geographical location. The sort of adjustment, or rather, 
strategy on the part of small farmers for benefitting from 
the scheme (despite refusing to actively lease land in the 
scheme) is to get involved in seasonal migration as hired 
workers in the scheme. But on the other hand we have seen 
that this practice works to limit expansion in bildat 
cultivation since it diverts labour from agriculture.
Small farmers are of the belief that rich farmers are 
competitive and that indiscriminate participation in the
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scheme would entail less potential benefits. Outsiders are 
viewed as having an advantage over local people in terms of 
the availability of inputs, market opportunities, inform­
ation exposure and risk aversion (see Garforth, 1982). It 
follows, then, that small farmers confronted with prog­
rammes aimed at their betterment, are in a position to 
identify potential participants in terms of what they 
meaningfully categorise as 'nationally eligible' or other­
wise (1982:49). The costs and benefits of participation 
are weighed prior to decision-taking and could therefore 
influence the success of the project. We should also 
establish that the actor's decision is governed by the 
underlying principle which states that -
"where group membership is voluntary and the initia­
tive to form groups comes from elements within the 
community rather than from the whole community, there 
is a possibility that progressive farmers will still 
benefit (1982:56).
This implies that locality alone is not sufficient for us 
to infer that there exists a 'community of interests', and 
that development inputs would ultimately be equitably dis­
tributed among receivers. We finally conclude that 
"however suitable a foundation a traditional system 
apparently provides it will inevitably contain elements 
'dysfunctional' for cooperative development" (Riches, 
1977:215).
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